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PREFACE
In this work, I am concerned primarily with what we might meta-
phorically speak of as the temporal shape of persons. Although the
topic of the thesis is personal identity
, there is no attempt here to
define "identity," or to analyze the associated concept. There is no
claim that personal identity is a special type of identity. Rather, my
concern is to give conditions under which persons existing at different
times are identical. Of course, any philosopher can generate dozens of
principles providing necessary and sufficient conditions for identity
between persons in a matter of moments. I am not interested, then,
merely in producing some, any
,
principle which provides such condi-
tions. I am concerned, rather, with principles indicating--again, I
speak metaphorically— the temporal shape entities must have if they
are, properly, to be considered persons. Thus, this thesis is an
examination, not of the concept of identity, but rather of the concept
of a person. I nowhere fully analyze that concept, however; at most I
offer some clarification of it.
My project, more specifically, is that of examining the memory
criterion of personal identity proposed by John Locke in his Essay Con -
cerning Human Understanding
. This principle, or more generally psycho-
logical continuity principles, seems to hold the most promise for
v
satisfying a variety of diverse intuitions concerning conditions under
which persons who look nothing alike, who perhaps do not even think in
the same way, are to be pronounced the same . I examine the traditional
charges of circularity brought against Locke's approach, as well as
Reid s brave soldier" objection. This work is done in Chapter II.
Countless other objections, with the following exception, are left
untouched. The exception involves the "brain-splitting" case intro-
duced by David Wiggins (1967). In what follows, I refer somewhat
misleadingly to this case as the "fission" case. Chapters III, IV, and
V are devoted to a discussion of this case as counterexample to Lockean
criteria as well as to a certain more general difficulty, the "three-
world puzzle introduced in Chapter III. The three-world puzzle is
based on a case sketched by Derek Parfit (1971). I eventually conclude
in favor of Lockean criteria.
I am very grateful to Fred Feldman for his extensive criticisms
of earlier drafts of this work and for his many positive suggestions as
well. I am also indebted to Michael Jubien, Gareth Matthews, and Alan
McMichael for their helpful comments.
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ABSTRACT
Psychological Criteria of
Personal Identity
May, 1983
Melinda Allien Roberts, A.B., Vassar College
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
Two closely related issues are addressed in this thesis. The
first of these issues is whether Lockean criteria can withstand criti-
cisms based on cases such as Wiggins' brain bisection case. The prob-
lem here is that the memory relation, or in general any relation of
psychological continuity, seems to be a many-one relation and hence not
suitable as a criterion of identity for persons. The second issue
involves the question of what we ought to say about such cases. The
problem here is that, intuitively, psychological continuity seems to be
a very good criterion of personal identity. When one person is psycho-
logically continuous with a future person, we want to say that the one
person has survived--as that future person.
Several contemporary philosophers have addressed themselves to
these issues. In Chapter I of the thesis, I consider the theory of
identity suggested by Baruch Brody. He rejects Lockean criteria, and
instead uses his own perfectly general theory as a criterion of identi-
ty. I argue that the theory he suggests is of limited value, and that
the arguments he provides against Lockean criteria are question-begging.
In Chapter II, I develop a specific Lockean criterion; in Chapter III,
I consider and finally reject particular arguments against this criter-
ion which are based on the brain bisection cases. In this chapter, I
consider work by David Wiggins, Bernard Williams, and Roland Puccetti
.
In Chapter IV, I turn to the defense of Lockean criteria suggested by
John Perry and David Lewis. Finally, in Chapter V, I develop my own
views on the brain bisection case, and concluding that Lockean criteria
of a certain sort remain defensible.
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CHAPTER I
PERSONAL SURVIVAL, IDENTITY, AND LEIBNIZ'S LAW
My primary aim in this Chapter is to determine the limitations of
Leibniz s Law as a principle, or criterion, of identity for persons. I
conclude that, given that one's goal is to settle issues of personal
survival by settling issues of personal identity, it is entirely un-
clear whether Leibniz's Law will be of any help whatsoever. This fact
motivates the investigation, initiated in Chapter II, of other means of
settling issues of personal identity.
The Problem
I noted earlier that any number of principles providing necessary
and sufficient conditions for identity between persons are available.
Some of these principles will be adequate for one purpose, some for
another. For this reason, my first task will be to indicate for what
purpose we seek a principle of identity here.
As already noted, a principle of identity which will count as ade-
quate for our purposes will be one which helps to indicate the "tempo-
ral shape" persons have. I should explain this metaphor. An example
will be helpful. Smith, let us suppose, is very ill but nonetheless
very much alive at time tl. At time t2, what is apparently Smith is
1
unconscious. At time t3, the individual physicians and nurses and
family members call "Smith" is in an irreversible coma. At t4, their
"Smith" is a ventilated corpse. At t5, "Smith" is declared dead and
his bod£ is wheeled out of the emergency room. To indicate the tempo-
ral shape of Smith is. in part, to point out the precise time at which
the person Smith ceased to exist. Was it when he became unconscious?
Was it when he slipped into a coma? These are difficult questions.
The issues raised here are, clearly, those of personal survival
.
Other examples of questions involving personal survival are the follow
ing. If something is a person, does it survive the loss of a hand?
Puberty? Turning thirty? A "body transplant"? Complete and irrevoca
ble loss of all memories?
Concern with issues of personal survival may be motivated by a
number of diverse interests. Consider, for instance, the following
hypothetical situation. Smith's surgeon decides that the unconscious
Smith requires a certain purportedly life-saving operation. The
surgeon performs the surgery, and within a few hours the fellow— call
him Smith*—whom the surgeon regards himself as having saved becomes
conscious. Let us assume that a correct account of personal survival
yields that in fact Smith did not survive surgery; Smith* is, thus, a
new person. The surgeon has not saved Smith, but has rather produced
Smith*. It seems to me that in this hypothetical situation Smith's
surgeon was not obligated to operate: while physicians are perhaps
prima facie obligated to save lives, they are not obligated to create
them. Indeed, it may plausibly be argued that, given certain natural
exceptions, they are obligated to refrain from creating new lives.^
3Concern with issues of personal survival stems not just from in-
terest in certain practical issues. It is not unreasonable to think
that the issue of what persons essentially are may be approached by ex-
amining conditions under which persons survived Specifically, in
learning that puberty, or a brain transplant, alters but does not de-
stroy a person, one learns something about what persons are.
For these reasons, then, as well as others, issues of personal
survival arise. A principle of identity which will be considered ade-
quate for our purposes will be one which enables us to answer such
questions of personal survival. It is evident that the notions of per-
sonal survival and personal identity are closely linked. For any
person x and event e, x survives e if and only if there is a person y
such that y exists just after e occurs and x is identical to y. Thus,
we may say that a principle of identity between persons which shall
count as adequate for our purposes will be one which generates answers
to questions of identity in those situations or contexts in which
questions of survival arise. Reconsider the case of Smith and Smith*.
We wonder whether Smith survives surgery. Thus, we ask whether Smith=
Smith*. An adequate principle of identity yields that Smith is
identical neither to Smith* nor to anyone else existing just after the
time of surgery. We then appeal to the fundamental and evidently true
principle, introduced above, which links the notion of survival and
identity. We infer, finally, that Smith does not survive surgery.
Of course, there are contexts and there are contexts; and no
principle of identity can be expected to generate results in every con-
text in which questions of survival arise. In the following discus-
4sion, I put practical limitations aside. Thus, for instance, the hypo-
thetical subjects raising questions about survival and identity in what
follows are assumed to have powers of observation and concentration
limited in no particular way. In general, it will be important to keep
in mind, in what follows, the issues of survival we seek to settle by,
first, settling issues of identity. These include: If something is a
person, does it survive the loss of a hand? Puberty? Turning thirty?
A 'body transplant"? Complete and irrevocable loss of all memories?
Leibniz's Law is the principle that persons x and y are identical
if and only if, for any time t and property F, x has F at t if and only
if y has F at t. It may seem that Leibniz's Law, together with the
straightforward principle linking survival and identity introduced
above, may enable us to answer perplexing questions of personal
survival. At the very least, the proposal is worth considering.
Ultimately, it will be rejected. The difficulty with Leibniz's Law, as
I will argue in the following sections, is that it is not clear that,
in any of the contexts of interest here, one can come to any sort of
rational conclusion to the effect that objects have all their proper-
ties in common— or even that there is a single property that they do
not share—unless one al ready has managed to settle, or one is al ready
in a position to settle, those very identities in question. There are
exceptions to this generalization. But the clearer exceptions involve
contexts which are not of interest here. The exceptions thus do not
refute the principal thesis of this chapter, which is just that if our
goal is to settle issues of personal survival, then we shall need
criteria of identity beyond Leibniz's Law.
5Exceptions arise, for instance, in cases in which the objects
being compared are of different sorts or kinds. Thus, Leibniz's Law
may enable one to infer that the pen with which Ronald Regan signs his
name, for instance, is not identical with Ronald Reagan. The more
interesting questions of identity arise, however, in those cases in
which the objects under inspection are of the same kind. I will be
concerned only with cases of this sort here. Other exceptions arise in
any case in which the subject is told by a reliable source that objects
a and b share all their properties; the subject, then, may infer by
appeal to Leibniz's Law that a=b. This exception, and others as well,
will be examined in subsequent sections of this chapter.
Limitations of Leibniz's Law
David Wiggins writes, In Sameness and Substance
, that
... it is impossible even i n theory to conceive of a way
independent of the prior discovery that a=b by which to
establish that, for all 0, no matter what 0 property 0 is,
0a 0b.
^
Wiggins in this passage refers to a certain limitation of Leibniz's Law
(LL). In particular, he is interested in a principle entailed by
(LL), the Principle of the Identity of Indi scerni bles (Id). This is
the principle that x=y, if for any property F and time t, x has F at t
if and only if y has F at t.
Wiggins elucidates his objection to (Id) as follows.
. . . suppose one should leave the identity [between a and b]
open and renounce all elucidations of identity other than
a and b's complete community of properties. How would one
then think about the temporary properties enjoyed by an indi-
vidual a identified with respect to the past and the temporary
properties [that is, properties a thing may have for a while
6and then lose] enjoyed by individual b identified with respect
to the present?
His objection has nothing to do with the difficulty of ascertaining,
for instance, that b possesses each of the infinite number of proper-
ties possesseo b. a Nor dn^s he, presupposing that being identical to
—
is a property, argue that (Id) is circular. His objection is more
subtle than either of these. Consider an example. Suppose that at tl
there is before someone Jones an apple; later, at t2, it is also the
case that there is before Jones an apple. Jones calls the apple he
first observes "a" and the apple he later observes "b". (He utters,
one may imagine, first, "The apple I am pointing to now is a," and
then, "The apple I point to now is b.") Jones is thus presumed to have
the ability to recognize apples. Suppose as well that Jones has extra-
ordinary powers of observation and, furthermore, that he inspects the
situation continuously from tl to t2. Among other things, he notices
that a is green at tl, and that b is red at t2. Unknown to Jones, a=b.
Will (Id) help him to answer the question of whether a and b are the
same? Before (Id) is of any use to him, clearly he will need to know
that the antecedent of the appropriately instantiated (Id) is satisfied
by a and b; he will need to know, that is, that a and b share all their
properties. Jones, then, will need to know that a and b are both green
at tl and red at t2. But being green and being red are what Wiggins
calls temporary properties. That a is green at tl tells Jones nothing
about a's color at t2. Thus, if Jones ". . . should leave the identity
open . . .," then he will not know whether to say that a is green at
tl, and b is not, or to say that a and b are both green for a time, and
7then both red. In the absence of information as to the identity of a
and b, on Wiggins' view, Jones would have no means of determining which
of these two inconsistent ascriptions of properties is correct.
This is Wiggins' argument; and it is an interesting one as well as
a forceful one. But here again certain objections which can be raised
against it. Let us consider these objections now.
It is given that Jones knows (Id). Suppose as well that Jones
knows, from some^(x,y), the following principle (PI):
PI- (x)(y)(x and y are apples —
»
(<£(x,y)
— (F)(t)(x has F at t y has F at t)))
Jones can ascertain, suppose finally, that $(a/x,b/y) without first
having to know that a=b. In this situation, Jones may use (PI) to
infer that a and b have all their properties in common; he may then use
(Id) to infer that a=b. Thus, it would seem that it is not the case
after all that Jones needs information as to the identity of a and ab
in order to justify one way to ascribing properties over others.
Two replies to this particular objection are available to Wiggins.
First, given (PI), it seems that all need for (Id) has been obviated.
For (PI) together with the plausible assumption that each thing x has
the property of being identical to itself entails (PI
'
)
:
PI'. (x)(y)(x and y are apples
U(x,y)«_* x=y ) )
.
Thus, Jones, given (PI), has no reason to appeal to (Id) whatsoever.
In attempting to supplement (Id) with (PI), one in fact succeeds in
supplanting (Id) by (PI). To counter this objection, one would have to
argue that there is no such property as being identical to a.
A second reply, as well, is available to Wiggins. (PI) was intro-
8duced as a way of supplementing (Id). Given just (Id) and the facts of
the case, Jones was not able to justify one ascription of properties to
a and b over others. (PI) was introduced, then, to help Jones choose
among ascriptions. It is, however, doubtful that any principle having
(PI) s form will in fact help Jones to make this choice. Suppose, for
instance, that, where "t" varies over times and "1" over spatial
locations, $(x,y) = (3t)(3i)(x and y occupy^ at t). Under thi s suppo-
sition, is (PI) then useful to Jones? It is, only if Jones can
determine, in the absence of any information as to the identity between
a and b, that (Ht) (3/) (a and b occupy^ at t). But how he may make
this determination, if indeed he ".
. . leaves the identity open
. .
.," is very mysterious. Consider, for instance, tl. Jones knows
where a is at tl. However, he could not know that b occupies just that
spatial location at tl unless he has additional information concerning
b. (The most obviously useful information would be, of course, that b
i
s
a.) Thus, whereas (PI) was introduced to enable Jones to determine
that a and b share all their properties, some further principle, it
appears, will have to be introduced to enable Jones to make any use of
(PI); specifically, the principle would need to enable Jones to
determine that a and b overlap fully at some point. There is, clearly,
no guarantee that this further principle will not itself have to
supplemented as well.
The deficiencies of principles such as (PI) and (P1‘) are
elaborated on in more detail in Chapter II. For the present, it
suffices to say that the problem with such principles seems to involve
the fact that Jones, unsure about the identity at issue, is unsure of
9the precise references of the names "a" and "b." Jones does not know
how far a and b extend, so to speak; he does not know at what temporal
point a "leaves off" and b "begins." He thus cannot be clear on what
properties they have. And this is knowledge he must have, if he is to
be able to determine whether the antecedent of the relevant properly
instantiated principle holds.
We may summarize, then. Even where the subject is assumed to have
the ability to recognize instances of the kind in question, and assumed
to have powers of observation and concentration limited in no particu-
lar way, (Id) is not useful in settling issues of identity, or
indirectly of survival. The problem with (Id) is not merely that it is
impracticable. It is not merely practically impossible for Jones to
determine, for the infinite number of properties a has, that b has
those very properties, and vice versa
. For Jones cannot even
determine, for the one property of being green at tl, that b has that
property. No matter how closely he scrutinizes b at t2, he will not be
able to ascertain that b is green at tl. Information gained through
observation alone— no matter how close and careful that observation
—
coupled with (Id) will not suffice; more theory is needed; and once
this further theory is introduced, dictating, as it would, that a and b
share all their properties, need for (Id) evaporates.
Two points are appropriate here. First, it may be supposed that
Jones, having great powers of observation, correctly notices that there
are no spatiotemporal gaps separating what he observes at tl and what
he observes at t2. It may even be supposed that Jones has--correctly
,
again—determined that the matter constituting what he observes at tl
10
is the same as— or approximately the same as— the matter constituting
what he observes at t2. (There is, from tl and t2, at the very most
only a slight shift in constituent stuff.) Do these data help Jones to
decide whether a=b? Not unless he has at hand certain further prin-
ciples as well— such as the principle that spati otemporal continuity
between a and b guarantees complete community of properties, or the
principle that continuity of stuff between a and b guarantees complete
community of properties. But such principles, as does (PI), make
appeal to (Id) unnecessary.
The second point is a caveat of sorts. Wiggins, I think success-
fully, points out a certain difficulty in appealing to (Id) to settle
issues of identity. But it is certainly consistent with what I have
said in my elaboration of Wiggins' point that Leibniz's Law is useful
on some occasions
,
even if it is not useful on that occasion described
above. Consider a different case. Jones observes apple a at tl and
apple b at t2. In fact, unknown to Jones, a=b. Someone, Smith,
informs Jones that a and b share all their properties. Jones, then,
appeals to (Id) and deduces that a=b. One might here wonder, however,
how Smith came to learn that a and b have all their properties in com-
mon. He did not, as we have already seen, gain this information simply
through whatever powers of observation he may be assumed to have.
There are other situations in which (Id) appears, at least, to
help settle issues of identity. These are cases in which the subject
is assumed, not only to know enough to recognize apples, but also to
have at hand a definition of ". . . is an apple." These cases are
discussed in Section 3 below.
11
Wiggins might also have argued, I think, that (LL) is as
ineffective in settling questions of diversity among objects as it is
in settling questions of identity. The relevant entailment of (LL)
would be, of course, the Principle of the Indi scerni bi 1 ity of Identi-
cals (In), that is, the principle that, if x=y, then for any time t and
property F, x has F at t if and only if y has F at t. That this
charge can be supported may seem doubtful; after all, given (In), to
infer diversity between, say, distinct objects a and b, one need only
spot a single property object a has and b lacks. Surely one such
property can be discovered. It will be recalled, however, that the
problem with (Id) cited above was independent of the issue of whether,
in principle at least, one could compare a and b with respect to an
infinite number of properties. The problem involved, rather, the
ascription of one mundane property— the property of being green at tl.
Suppose, as before, that Jones observes a at tl and b at t2. He
sees that a at tl is green and that b at t2 is red. He retains his
marvelous powers of perception, etc. Unknown to Jones, a^b. Can he
infer, given (In) and the facts of the case, that a^b? Being green,
as noted before, and being red are temporary properties. Thus, a's
being green at tl does not indicate that a is green, and hence not
red, at t2. Analogously, b's being red at t2 does not indicate that b
is red, and hence not green, at tl. Other temporary properties are no
more helpful to Jones than are color properties. Indeed, were the
facts that (1) a at tl is green, rough in texture, small, and located
at the South Pole and (2) b at t2 has none of these properties, the
facts would not together dictate that a has even one property b lacks.
12
Temporary properties are, of course, not the only sorts of pro-
perties things have. They also have essential
, or necessary
,
proper-
ties as well as properties which are neither essential nor temporary.
Since a and b are both apples, they have in common what may be
considered their essential properties. Both are apples, for instance,
and both are self-identical. Thus, Jones will not find any essential
feature which one of the objects of his examination has and the other
lacks.
It might be objected that there exist essential properties which
belong to some, but not to all, apples. If Jones recognizes such a
property F in a at tl, then Jones knows that at each moment a exists,
and in any possible world a exists, a possesses F. If he discerns,
further, that b lacks F at t2, and recognizes that F if possessed is
essential, then he knows as well that at no moment at which b exists
does b possess F. (Otherwise, it would possess F at t2.) He may con-
clude easily, then, by appeal to (In), that a^b. There are two cases
he would consider. If a fails to exist at t2, then clearly a^b. And
if a does exist at t2, then a has F at t2. b, as noted before, lacks F
at t2. Thus, by (In), a^b. Since either a does, or a does not, exist
at t2, a^b.
Perfectly analogous reasoning leads to the conclusion that the pen
with which Ronald Reagan signs his name, for instance, is not identical
to Ronald Reagan.
Such results, however, under reasonable assumptions, are of lim-
ited value. Let us make the assumption that the essential properties
possessed by some but not all apples are not unique to those apples
13
which possess them. On this assumption, from the fact that a has the
essential property F, it cannot be concluded that anything which has F
is a. F, thus, is not unique to a.
Thus, let us consider a case involving only apples which are F's.
Suppose that Jones examines apple a at tl and finds it to have property
F. Jones examines apple b' at tl and finds it to have F as well. In
this case, Jones cannot appeal to (In) in an attempt to distinguish be-
tween a and b'. Thus, even under the assumption that there are essen-
tial properties common to some but not all apples, difficulties with
(In) remain. We still must set out the conditions under which F-apples
persist— conditions, that is, under which an F-apple, existing at some
time tl, and an F-apple, existing at a later time t2, are identical.
We have considered, up until this point, three classes of proper-
ties: temporary properties, essential properties common to all apples,
and essential properties common to some but not all apples. There is a
fourth class of properties which should be examined here. It might be
thought that each individual apple (or, more generally, each physical
object) has at least one essential property which no distinct apple can
possess. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that such essential pro-
perties exist. Under this assumption, for every pair of distinct ap-
ples, there will be some such essential property one has which the
other lacks. Reconsider, then, the case sketched above, a and b' were
said to share certain essential properties. Since a and b' are in fact
distinct, there will be at least one essential property— say , G—unique
to a. b', since in fact it is not a, must lack property G. Hence,
under the assumption that essential properties of this special sort
14
actually exist, (In), it seems, will enable Jones to discover, in prin-
ciple, for an^ pair of distinct apples, that they are distinct.
There are two fundamental problems with this proposal. The pro-
posal clearly rests on the assumption that such essential properties
actually exist. But this assumption is highly dubitable. It is cer-
tainly difficult to imagine what such properties would be like. (Ob-
viously, the property of being identical to a will not do for our pur-
poses.)
The proposal, furthermore, rests on the assumption that the subject
is able, in principle, to detect that a particular apple has, or lacks,
such a property. Why is this? Reconsider the example of a and b'.
These are in fact distinct apples; presumably, between the time a
ceases to exist and b' begins to exist there is a spatiotemporal gap.
No matter how brief the gap, let us suppose, Jones is able to see that
it is there. We may suppose further that between a and b' is a differ-
ence in constituent stuff. Jones is able to perceive this difference,
as well, no matter how subtle it may be. Jones wants to know whether
given these circumstances a has persi sted—whether
,
that is, a=b'.
Under the current proposal, he will not be able, even in principle, to
answer this question unless he can somehow discern the property G which
a has essentially and b* lacks. Someone might posit that the property
G is just the property of being composed of such-and-such constituent
stuff. If this were the case, then of course Jones would have al ready
detected it. However, it is evident that this property is not one
plausibly said to be essential to a given object.
There is a final class of properties which should be examined in
15
this discussion. These are properties which are neither temporal nor
essential. Consider, for instance, the property of having come into
existence at. tjme and spatial location JL\ . Nothing having this pro-
perty must have it; and if a thing ever has this property, then it al-
ways has this property. Presumably, since a and b (or b') are distinct
apples, they will not have come into existence at precisely the same
time in precisely the same location. Thus, if, say, a begins to exist
at tl inil, it is not the case that b begins to exist at tl in Jtl.
All Jones must do is recognize this fact; he then can appeal to (In) to
determine that a^b.
Difficulties arise. Let us suppose that in fact b comes into
existence in X\ (taking a's place) at t2. Let suppose, as well, that
Jones observes that a comes into existence in JL\ at tl. Then, how is
Jones to know that b has not yet come into existence? (In), of course,
does not provide this information; and it is not information Jones can
glean through observation.
Consider an attempt to supplement (In)— to introduce, that is,
some principle which will help Jones to determine how properties are to
be ascribed (thus, to determine that, while a has the property in ques-
tion, b does not). Once he knows which of the two competing ascrip-
tions is correct, he can then appeal to (In), inferring finally that
a^b. Here is one principle which may seem to be potentially useful.
P2. (i)(t)(x)(y)(x and y are apples
((x comes into existence at t in/&
y comes into existence ini &
x and y are not spatiotemporally continuous)
y does not come into existence at t))
Since Jones may be presumed to have noted a temporal gap between a and
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b, he can use (P2) to infer that there is some property a has which b
lacks. But it seems that, while indeed (P2) does helpfully supplement
(In), one must ask what justifies (P2). How does Jones know that (P2)
is true? It seems to me that the only plausible way of justifying (P2)
is to appeal to the fact that distinct apples do not come into exist-
ence at just the same time and in just the same place, and apples which
are not spatiotemporally continuous are distinct. But if this is
right, then while in this case the supplement (P2) does not itself sup-
plant (In), one must accept a certain principle (the "fact" above)
which does supplant (In) before one can be justified in using (P2).
But, then, appeal to (In) (indeed, appeal to (P2)) is unnecessary.
There is a further difficulty here as well. In order to use (P2),
Jones must know that a and b are not spatiotemporally continuous. It
was supposed above that Jones in fact had this information. This sup-
position is itself problematic, however. It seems to suggest that
Jones already knows at what point a ends, so to speak, and at what
point b begins. But it is unclear whether Jones can have this infor-
mation, if he has indeed left the question of identity open.
I have tried to suggest, concerning several different classes of
properties, the difficulties involved in justifying one ascription of
properties over others. Of course, if the issue of identity is al ready
settled, these problems disappear. Observations, together with the
facts of identity, favor one ascription over others. For instance, if
Jones knows that apple a=apple b, then he will not be so puzzled over
whether a is red at t2 (assuming, of course, that no other apple exists
at t2).
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I want to introduce one last example to help motivate the claim
that it is not as easy as it would perhaps seem to be to spot even one
feature which a has and b lacks. Suppose Jones observes that the apple
he calls "a" exists in Room 1, and the apple he calls "b" exists at the
same jMme in another room. Room 2. In fact a^b. Will Jones, recogniz-
ing that be i
n g j_n_ Room _1 and being in Room 2
_
are distinct properties,
be able to justify an ascription of properties which, together with
(In), will enable him to infer that a^b? All Jones would need to do is
note that a is in Room 1, and b is not. (In) then yields that a/b.
But in fact things are not quite so simple. For what justifies
the claim that a is in Room 1 and b is not for Jones? It cannot merely
be that a is in Room 1 and b is Room 2 (although Jones is aware of this
fact). For it is consistent with the claim that a is in Room 1 and b
is in Room 2 that a is in Room and b is in Room 1. It is consistent
with what Jones is assumed to know that a single apple, co-designated
by "a" and "b," is scattered through space. Jones, as before, thus has
no means of justifying one ascription of properties (that a is in Room
1 and b is not) over the other (that a and b are both in Room 1). He
does not know that it is not the case that a and b have all their pro-
perties in common.
I conclude that, given the limitations on (LL), there is no evi-
dence that (LL) will, indirectly, enable one to answer questions such
as: Can a person survive the loss of his hand? His body? His memory
and perhaps character? I do not, of course, mean to suggest that (LL)
is false, or even that as a criterion of identity it is circular.
Wiggins' own conclusion concerning (Id) is a bit more radical than
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mine. On his view,
. . relations of agreement in every property of
relation must flow from identity itself." If, but only if, Jones knows
that a=b will he be able to choose among property ascriptions— that is,
will Jones be able to choose that ascription which dictates a and b
have all their properties in common. In the next section, the evidence
against Wiggins' stronger claim is considered.
When Leibniz's Law is Useful
There is, it seems to me, a single class of cases in which (LL)
will be useful in settling the relevant issues of identity, if (LL) is
ever useful in settling such issues. Because of this class of cases, I
am hesitant to accept the extreme view that no ascription of properties
can be justified until the question of identity is settled.
(LL) is limited in its usefulness, I argued in Section 2, because
it is typically difficult to justify one ascription of properties over
others if the question of identity is itself not settled. Of course,
one must choose among ascriptions before one can appeal to (LL).
In this section, I want to describe a case in which it at least
seems that one can choose among ascriptions prior to having settled the
question of identity.
Consider the following situation. Suppose that Jones fixes the
references of the names "a" and "b" as follows. He lets "a" name that
thing which exists just during tl and just in Room 1. He lets "b"
name that thing which exists just during t2 and just in Room 2. There
is no claim here to the effect that a and b are apples. In this situ-
ation, Jones should have no trouble deciding on an ascription of pro-
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perties. He notes, we may suppose, that a is green; b is not. a is in
Room 1; b is not. Appealing to (In), then, he infers that a^b. Thus,
if Jones is allowed to "draw- for himself the spatial and temporal
boundaries of a and b (in general, if he knows what these boundaries
are), he will be in a position to determine a's and b's properties.
He, then, can appeal to (In). It may be, as well, that in analogous
circumstances involving identical objects, the ascription according to
which the objects in question have all their properties in common can
be justified. In such circumstances, contrary to what Wiggins
suggests, (Id) will be useful. One might defend Wiggins here by
arguing that two objects can share, in a world, precisely the same
spatial and temporal boundaries. (A bowl and the clay of which the
bowl is made may be imagined to begin to exist and to cease to exist at
precisely the same moments.) Let us see whether there is any defense
of the extreme view on (In)— the view, that is, that one can not
discover even one difference between objects until the question of
identity is settled.
Reconsider the case at hand. Jones has learned that a^b. He
still, it seems, does not know very much. Let us suppose that he
recognizes what he observes in Room 1 at tl as an apple and what he
observes in Room 2 at t2 as an apple. (He thus, Quine might say, is
assumed to have the ability to "herald" apples.) He is interested in
whether the apple he observes at tl in Room 1 persists; that is,
whether that apple is identical to the apple he observes at t2 in Room
2. He knows that a is not b; but it is consistent with everything that
has been said so far that he does not know that a and b are apples.
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Suppose, that, in fact, a and b are apples, distinct apples, and that
Jones falsely believes that a and b are not apples
, but are rather
distinct temporal parts of the same apple. He then will of course
wrongly think that the apple he observed at tl in Room 1 does indeed
persi st.
It seems that the further bit of information Jones needs, if he is
to correct his beliefs, is an adequate definition of ".
. . is an
apple," or at least enough information about apples to determine that a
and b are apples. He will then recognize that the apple he first
observes does not persist— does not, at least, persist as the apple he
observes next. (A definition of ".
. . is apple*'— if such exists-will
not help him a whit, however; for the aggregate of a and b—that object
scattered through space as, say, my pen is on occasion scattered—would
presumably count as apple
. What he needs is some indication that a and
b each count as one apple.)
Suppose, then, that he has this further information. Need he have
used (LL), many steps back? He can appeal to the definition of " . . .
is an apple" to learn that the aggregate of a and b is not an apple,
that is, that it is not one apple. Furthermore, he can appeal to the
definition of "... is an apple" to learn that each of a and b alone
is an apple. At this point, he surely knows enough, even without (LL),
to say that the apple he first observes is not identical to the apple
he next observes and, hence, that the apple observed at tl does not
persist as the apple observed at t2. He could reason, by reductio
,
as
follows: suppose the apple observed at tl is identical to the apple
observed at t2. Then, the aggregate consisting of both what is
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observed just at tl— a-- and what is observed just at t2--b--would
satisfy the definition of "... is an apple"; that entity would be
one apple. This contradicts the earlier claim (already known to Jones)
that the aggregate in question does not count as an apple.
A brief summary might be helpful at this point. Leibniz's Law may
be useful for settling questions of diversity for certain rather arti-
ficial cases. If the subject has a clear idea of the precise refer-
ences of "a" and "b"— if he knows where object a "leaves off" and
object b begins"--then he is an a position to justify one ascription
of properties to a and b over others. He may, then, appeal to (LL).
However, he may still be unable to settle the principal issue; he may,
that is, not know whether the apple he first observes persists. (He
knows that a does not persist; but he does not know, ipso facto
,
that
the apple does not persist.) A definition would enable him to settle
the issue of the apple's persistence; but with the definition in hand,
he will not need to appeal to Leibniz's Law.
What can be concluded? In those cases in which Leibniz's Law
seems to enable the subject to settle issues of identity, the subject
remains unable to answer questions concerning the persistence, or sur-
vival, of kinds of things, whether apples or persons. The thesis of
the preceding section has been borne out: it remains quite unclear
that (LL) is ever useful in settling issues of identity in those
important and interesting contexts in which we are striving to settle
issues of persistence and survival.
One further point must be made here. This point concerns the
claim that (LL) is at least useful in settling issues of identity in
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the narrow class of cases described above. Jones, it was said, "draws"
for himself the spatial and temporal boundaries of a and b. He "draws"
the boundaries of a, for instance, in such a way that it is obvious to
him that a exists in just Room 1 and just tl. b, then, he stipulates
to exist in just Room 2 at just t2. But could Jones actually define a
and b as he does without a deep awareness at the time of definition of
the diversity between a and b? I will not attempt to settle this ques-
tion here; indeed, I am not sure how the question could be settled, one
way or the other. In any case, the arguments above are independent of
this question.
Improper Uses of Leibniz's Law
Some philosophers have seemed to suggest, contrary to what I have
argued above, that Leibniz's Law can be used in perfectly ordinary con-
texts to settle questions of identity. Baruch Brody, for instance, in
his book Identity and Essence
,
seems to suggest in several passages
that Leibniz's Law is useful in deciding certain interesting questions
of identity.^ Having established, by appeal to (LL), a given identity
(or diversity), Brody then rejects whatever criteria of identity
produce results conflicting with his own. I argue that, in many
instances, at least, Brody succeeds only in misusing (LL).
Consider a specific example. Brody imagines a case in which
someone, Roger, pulls the trigger of a gun, and in doing so, kills a
stranger. Brody continues:
It is easy to show why, on our theory, Roger's pulling the
trigger is not identical with his killing the stranger. A
number of familiar arguments show that these two events do
23
IN I • I |||VJ 9
Thus, Brody concludes, the event of pulling the trigger and the event
of killing the stranger are distinct. Furthermore, any criterion of
event-identity which directs otherwise is false.
I do not question Brody's conclusion here, only his argument.
Brody tells his reader that one event lasts a certain period of time,
and that another event endures for a longer period of time. The diffi-
culty is that Brody does not justify his claim that this particular
ascription of properties is correct. Without such justification he has
begged the question against the claim (however improbable it may be)
that pulling the trigger and killing the stranger are the same event.
Given the ascription he indicates, it follows necessarily that the
events are distinct. Indeed, that they are distinct, given this
ascription, is hardly worth saying. What needs arguing is the accuracy
of the ascription he provides.
Perhaps Brody conceives his approach a bit differently. He may,
for instance, intend to suggest the following line of reasoning. We
stipulate that "a," say, names a process which lasts precisely one
second, while "b" names a process which lasts precisely two seconds.
(In this case, we have ourselves "drawn" the boundaries of the entities
in question; we know precisely what the references of "a" and "b" are.)
Then, of course, we may infer by appeal to (LL) that a^b.
However, even on this unlikely reading of Brody, his argument is
thoroughly inadequate. For it does not follow, from the mere fact that
a^b, that the event of pulling the trigger and the event of killing the
stranger are distinct. Additional premises are needed, to the effect
that a j[s the event of pulling the trigger and b the event of
killing the stranger.
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Consider another of Brody's arguments. (As before, I question his
method, not his conclusion.) Let "a" name the event of "the top's
spinning in place at tl."'
7
Let "b" name the event of "the top's heat-
ging up at tl." Where the spinning and the heating occur at the same
place and time, a criterion of event-identity having the result that
a=b would be: e is e' if and only if e and e' occur at the same place
and time. Brody writes that a and b “
. . . cannot be identical, since
one is a spinning and the other is a heating."^ He apparently intends
to suggest the following argument. (1) (LL) is true; (2) if an event
is a heating then it is not a spinning; (3) a is a spinning and b is a
heating; therefore (4) a is a spinning and b is not; therefore, (5)
a^b. The claim that needs support is, obviously, (2). Without an
argument for this claim, Brody's argument is hardly more compelling
than the following: (1) (LL) is true; (2') if a thing is red then it
is not round; (3') a' is red and b' is round: therefore, (4
'
)
b' is
not red; therefore (5
'
)
a'?*b'. (2‘) is obviously false. (2) is not
obviously false; nonetheless, Brody cannot simply assert (2) without
begging the question against the so-called "rough-grained" criteria of
event-identity.
Brody's arguments against what may be called "specific" criterion
of identity for persons are also unsatisfactory. He writes that " . .
. the claim that bodily continuity ... is sufficient for the identity
of persons is, at least, a hypothesis whose justification is very
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unclear. "10 He continues:
. . . consider the hypothetical case of a person who wakes upone morning to find himself in a very different body far re-
moved from the one he previously occupied. This problem case,
often advanced by opponents of the claim of bodily continuityis an example of a case in which there is a pi before the trans-formation and a p2 afterwards who are identical just becausethey have all of their properties in common, but who do not
satisfy the condition of bodily continuity. Similar examples
can be constructed to cast doubt upon the claim that either
bodi ^continuity or memory continuity is sufficient for iden-
l 1 uy •
Brody supposes correct a particular way of ascribing properties; and
clearly, if he is right, pl=p2. But he does not justify the ascrip-
tion he affirms. He thus begs the question, this time against the so-
called bodily continuity criterion of personal identity.
One can imagine arguing analogously against the Principle of
Extensional ity. Let si be the set of all persons actually existing at
noon, January 1, 1900. Let s2 be the set of all persons actually
existing at noon, January 1, 1982. Then, "because" (as Brody says) si
and s2 "have all their properties in common," by (LL) sl=s2. This
example, one might expect Brody to say, "casts doubt" on the Principle
of Extensional ity.
Brody seems to be aware that his pattern of argumentation is
problematic. Thus, when he considers Extensional ity, he says that his
only critical point about it is that it is inadequate as a definition
of "identity" for sets. But when he considers various criteria of
individuation for events and persons, he is not nearly so cautious. He
is, clearly, urging that the theories yield false results, not that
they are simply inadequate definitions of identity. He calls the ex-
amples he presents in discussion of personal identity "counter-exam-
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pies." He calls one view of events "wrong"14
; another he says is
"clearly not correct ." 15
Brody seems to think that he can argue against particular criteria
of identity by noting (a) that their results conflict with (LL) and (b)
that (LL) is correct. But in each case Brody assumes (a), thereby
begging the question against the principles he seeks to undermine.
Cone! usions
In many instances, the conclusions which can be drawn from the
preceding discussions are not, I think, very firm or fast. What seems
clear is just that the situation in which Leibniz's Law will actually
enable one to decide between a claim of diversity and a claim of iden-
tity are relatively rare. The difficulty, in each case, involves
justi fyi ng one ascription of properties to objects over others. Until
one ascription is justified over others, (LL) cannot be used; it is,
while neither circular nor false, simply ineffecti ve . I do not
conclude from this that it cannot happen that an ascription is justi-
fied before the identity at issue is settled. I do not conclude that
(LL) is always ineffective. However, we have yet to produce clear
evidence for the claim that (LL) is effective in any of the contexts of
interest here. Indeed, in the cases we have examined so far, by that
point at which the subject is prepared to justify one ascription of
properties over others, he typically has al ready settled, or has the
information he needs in order to settle, the issue of identity at hand.
At the very least, in such cases, it is not clear that he has not
already settled that issue.
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Perhaps the weakest link in the discussions of this chapter is the
senes of objections raised against the proposal that unique essential
properties are possessed by things such as apples. I am unable to show
that no such properties exist. However, the difficulty with showing
that such properties do exist argues in favor of the claim that there
is no clear evidence in favor of the view that, in certain relevant
contexts, at least, (LL) is ineffective.
Persistence and Survival
Let us return to the original apple case, in which a persists dur-
ing tl, at a given location, and b (ja) persists during t2, at that
same location. What actually happens is that a ceases to exist just
before b begins to exist; b replaces a. So far, Jones has been unable
to ascertain the identity at issue.
Suppose, however, that Jones is given a criterion of identity for
apples based on spatiotemporal continuity. Inspecting the situation
carefully, he notes that after he observes a, and before he observes b,
he finds nothing at all. What actually happens is that a simply
withers away, and b, a moment later, pops into existence. Consequent-
ly, there is no spatiotemporal continuity between a and b. Jones con-
cludes, then, that a is not identical to b.
Jones may similarly infer, concerning the case in which a and b
exist at the same time but in two completely disjoint spatial
locations, that a is not b.
Thus, while (LL) will not be useful in answering the question of
whether the one apple is the other, it is not implausible to suppose
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that there are other principles capable of doing this work.
A principle of spatiotemporal continuity may be viewed as part of
the definition of an apple, or more generally a physical object. A
thing which is a physical object, one might hold, cannot be, so to
speak, separated from itself. There are no spatiotemporal gaps between
its parts. If this view of identity criteria holds in general, then my
project in the coming chapters is to say something about what persons
are.
In general, criteria of identity for persons which may actually be
useful in helping us to settle issues of identity and survival fall
into two distinct categories. They are either based on spatiotempoeral
continuity or on psychological continuity. In the following chapters,
I am most interested in formulating an acceptable criterion based in
the relation of psychological continuity.
In Chapter II, I assume the ability of recogni ze (Quine might say
'herald") persons. I assume, that is, the ability to recognize the
presence of humanity. I do not, for obvious reasons, assume at hand a
definition of "... is a person." I, then, consider several criteria
of identity for persons of the form.
(x)(y)(x and y are persons —
*
( x=y ^ (x,y ) )
)
As it happens, principles having this form are ultimately no more
helpful in settling issues of identity than is Leibniz's Law. Thus, in
Chapters III, IV, and V, I find it necessary to complicate matters
somewhat. In these chapters, I assume the existence of temporal person
parts
,
or person stages
,
and consider a variety of principles designed
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to provide conditions under which temporal parts are unified in a
single person. Such principles are, as it turns out, more appropriate
for the task of settling questions of personal identity and survival.
CHAPTER I NOTES
In some cases, at least, philosophers seem to Dut to pthiral
jjSrrfp
accounts of personal identity. Michael B. Greene and DanielWildeF for instance, suggest that a certain Lockean account of oer-sonal identity (that suggested by John Perry) may be used to justify
euthanasia in a variety of contexts. See their "Brain Death and Per-
sonal Identity, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9. (Winter 1980), 105-133. Some patients' lack of psychological continuity with earlierpersons, on the psychological continuity account to which Greene andlkler appeal, indicates that those patients are not identical to any
earlier persons. Thus, euthanasia is morally permissible, in such
situations. Greene and Wikler's argument is not convincing. The dif-ficulty with it has nothing to do with whether the particular account
of personal identity they appeal to is correct. The problem rather in-
volves their failure to exclude the possibility that the patients in
question are, while perhaps not survi vors
.
persons nonetheless.
2
V. Quine suggests that one does not really understand terms
such as rabbit," "apple," and, it would seem, "person," unless one
understands what counts as, respectively, one rabbit, one apple, and
one person. Thus, in "Speaking of ObjectsTHn his Ontological
Relati vity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press
1969), he writes:
To learn "apple" it is not sufficient to learn how much of
what goes on counts as apple; we must learn how much counts
as an apple, and how much as another (p. 8).
And, again, the term "rabbit" cannot, Quine says, "... be mastered
without mastering
. . . where one rabbit leaves off and another
begins. See "Ontological Relativity," in his Ontological Relativity
and Other Essays
, p. 31. In general, one does not really understand a
particular term for F's (a given count noun) unless one understands
what counts as one F; and, of course, to determine whether the F's at
hand are one or two, one needs to be able to settle the question of
their i denti ties . Conversely, presumably, when one gains the ability
to count, say, persons, one has gained some insight into what a person
is.
%)avid Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1980), p. 50.
4 Ibid
.
^Baruch Brody, in Identity and Essence (Princeton: Princeton
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ip. 83). 1 will not here consider the modified version of the theory
of identity Brody favors; I should just note the nowhere in his lateriscussions do I find any disavowal of the uses he makes of (LL) in the
early chapters of his book. It is these early chapters I will be
examining here.
6
1 bi
d
.
, p . 70
.
7
1 bi
.
, P . 69.
8
1 bi d
.
Ibid
., p. 69. I am simplifying Brody's argument here. He
states his argument as follows.
Using Donald Davidson's example of the top which is both
spinning and rotating, we consider the following events:
E'l the top's spinning in place at tl
E'2 the top's heating up at tl
E'3 the top's undergoing a rotation or heating at tl
(this is the event associated with, but maybe not
identical with, E'l)
E'4 the top's undergoing a rotation or heating at tl
(this is the event associated with, but maybe not
identical with, E'2)
E'3 and E'4 cannot be identical, since one is a spinning and
the other is a heating, and yet they both involve the same object
having the same property at the same time in the same place
(p. 69).
I assume that he would hold
that E'3^E'4, that E'l^E'2.
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for precisely the same reasons he holds
CHAPTER II
LOCKE'S MEMORY CRITERION
Consider the following version of Leibniz's "King of China" ex-
ample
.
1
I am told that tomorrow I will be crowned King of China. I am
astonished and delighted. I am then told that prior to coronation I
will lose all my memories. I will, tomorrow, know nothing of my
present self; I will not know, for instance, that I was at one time
astonished and delighted at the prospect of becoming King of China. My
spirits fall.
John Locke s account of personal identity suggests an explanation
for my sudden change in attitude. On Locke's view, when I learn that
my memory bank is to be erased prior to coronation, I ipso facto learn
that it is not who will be crowned. I learn that I was initially
misled—that in fact someone other than me
,
someone who nonetheless has
my body, is to be made King. At this point, I cease to look forward to
the coming day, for my glee depended upon my belief that l_ was the one
who would be crowned King.
Locke's memory theory suggests one explanation for my shift in
attitude. Of course, there are competing views. If I were told that I
was soon to undergo any dramatic and terrible change, I would be dis-
mayed. Why not say that my shift in attitude is due, not to my dis-
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appointment in being denied the crown, not even to my fear of imminent
death, but rather to the fact that 1 have come to anticipate some dra-
matic and terrible change in myself?
Leibniz's case can be further detailed. I am obsessed with be-
coming King of China. I care about nothing except that I become King
of China. No prospect disturbe me, as long as I remain confident that
tomorrow X will be crowned King. Intuitively, it seems that my learn-
ing of impending memory loss would leave me crestfallen. Locke's
theory helps to explain my new attitude. But the claim that I have
come to anticipate some dramatic and terrible change in myself does
not. lx hypothesi
,
such a prospect is undisturbing to me.
Locke's Theory of Personal Identity
Locke expresses his memory theory in his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding
.
• . . since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it
is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and
thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things;
in this alone consists personal identity, i.e., the sameness
of a rational being: and so far as this consciousness can be
extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far
reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now
it was then, and it is by the same self with this present one
that now reflects on it, that that action was done.
In this passage Locke suggests that a later person is identical to an
earlier person if the later person has consciousness of doing or think-
ing something the earlier person in fact did or thought. Thus, for in-
stance, if I have consciousness of thinking about Appleton last even-
ing, then I, Roberts, extend backwards in time at least to that point
at which Appleton was contemplated.
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Locke indicates that he holds the converse of this principle as
well. He writes, for instance, that:
. . . it being the same consciousness that makes a
man he himself to tjimself, personal identity depends
on that only
. .
L
Furthermore
,
[that] with which the consciousness of this present
thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person,
and is one self with it, and with nothing else
. . .
In both of these passages, Locke seems to be providing necessary, as
well as sufficient, conditions for personal identity.
These passages together suggest what I take to be the basic
Lockean intuition concerning personal identity. It is that persons are
identical if and only if one has consciousness of doing something the
other did.
Before this intuition can be evaluated, it needs to be more care-
fully formulated. It will be seen that producing a plausible, workable
formulation is no easy task.
Consider, for instance, (LI). Let "x" and "y" vary over persons,
and "t" and "t"' over times. Then,
LI. x=y <-*
(3t)(3t')(x exists at t &
y exists at t' &
y has consciousness at t' of having done (doing)
something x did (does) at t)
We may provisionally say that, where y's consciousness at time t' is
consciousness of an action occurring at time t and t is earlier than
t', then "has consciousness of" just means remembers . Furthermore, if
t'=t, "has consciousness of" just means is aware of. The notion of
having consciousness of performing a specific action will be more care-
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fully scrutinized in a later section. We may assume further that
thoughts are actions. Thus, according to (LI), persons are identical
just in case one at some time remembers or is aware of having done some
one thing the other in fact did.
Consider a certain application of (LI). Suppose that one wants to
know whether, say Jill is John. If one knows that (1) holds
1. (3t) (3t‘ ) (John exists at t &
Jill exists at t'&
Jill at t' has consciousness of having done (doing)
something John did (does) at t),
then one may infer, given (LI), that John=Jill. On the other hand, if
one knows that (2)
2. (3t) (3t
' ) (John exists at t &
Jill exists at t' &
Jill at t‘ has consciousness of having done (doing)
something John did (does) at t),
then one may infer, given (LI), that John^Ji 1 1
.
(LI) is, however, problematic. In order to use (LI), one must
either know that (1) holds or know that (2) holds. In certain rather
ordinary cases, cases in which any principle adequate for our purposes
can be expected to yield results, one will be unable to choose between
(1) and (2). One will, that is, be unable to justify (1) and not (2),
or (2) and not (1), as the correct ascription of properties.
It will be helpful to have an example at hand. Suppose that John
exists at time tl, and Jill, at a later time t2. Suppose further that
for any time t at which they exist, John and Jill have consciousness at
t of doing something he or she in fact does at t. Suppose, finally,
that it is not the case that Jill at t2 has consciousness of doing any-
thing which John does at tl. The case may be depicted as follows.
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where arrows represent the four-place consciousness relation, xtyf (y
has consciousness at t' of doing something x did at t).
o o
John Jill
tl t2
1. Problem Case for (LI)
As noted before, to make use of (LI), one must justify (1) over (2), or
(2) over (1). But it is clear that, given the facts of the John-and-
Jill case, neither (1) nor (2) can be justified over the other. One
must of course in the beginning "leave the identity open"; then, in
order to determine whether (1) holds or (2) holds, one must first
settle on (3) and (4)r>
3. John exists at t2 &
Jill exists at t2 &
Jill at t2 has consciousness of doing something
John does at t2
4. John exists at tl &
Jill exists at tl &
Jill at tl has consciousness of doing something
John does at tl
Clearly, (5) and (6) are both true, given the facts of the case.
5. Jill exists at t2 &
Jill at t2 has consciousness of doing something
Jill does at t2
6. John exists at tl &
John at tl has consciousness of doing something
John does at tl.
But, given just (5) and (6), it would seem that one is unable to
justify any judgment about (3) and (4) if one truly "leaves the
identity open." For, if John is Jill, then if (5), then (3) and if
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(6), then (4). Furthermore if JohnWIll, then given the facts of the
case neither (3) nor (4) holds.6
Thus, the difficulty with (LI) in the above context is that the
subject, lacking information to the effect that the appropriately in-
stantiated right-hand side of (LI) holds, cannot apply (LI). I should
stress that the claim against (LI) here is neither that it is false
nor that it is circular. The claim against it is not even that it is
impracticable. For convenience, let us say simply that it is ineffec-
tive in this context.
Here is a second point. Clearly, if the subject has al ready set-
tled the issue of identity, he can easily obtain the information he
must have if he is to apply (LI). Indeed, if he thinks it possible
that Jill is John, then he will, as well, think it possible that (3)
and (4) both hold. He can only justifiably deny (3) and (4), given (5)
and (6), if he has already precluded the possibility of identity be-
tween John and Jill. If this argument is sound, then (LI), in any con-
text absent of further supplementation, is ineffective.
But let us return to the former, weaker, objection. Why does the
ineffectivity of (LI) constitute a problem with (LI)? Why is it reason
enough to reject (LI)?
In this chapter, I am presupposing the ability to “herald"
persons. What is being sought here is a principle which will distin-
guish between those transformations a person who has already been “her-
alded" will survive and those "transformations" such a person will fail
to survive. Thus, suppose that a thing x is recognized as exemplifying
the property of personhood by someone s at a time t. x is named "John"
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by s at t. An adequate criterion of personal identity should enable s
to answer, for instance, the following questions (given that John's
survival depends solely on his being identical with some future
person): Will John survive total and irrevocable loss of memory? Will
he survive dying his hair green? Will he survive the disintegration of
his body? (LI), unless it is supplemented in some way, does not enable
s to answer these questions. Even given the assumption that s has
stupendous powers of observation (that he knows what actions the
persons he heralds perform, at the time and place of their heralding;
what thoughts they are thinking; their shapes, colors and sizes), (LI)
does not settle for s a single question of identity or, consequently,
of survival.
Consider, then, (L2).
L2. x=y +-*
( t ) (
t
'
)((x exists at t &
y exists at t' &
t is earlier than or the same as t')—
y has consciousness at t' of having done (doing)
something x did (does) at t)
(L2) requires for identity that one person have awareness, at each time
he exists, of doing something the other in fact did at each time at
which the other exists. Note first that (L2) directs that John^J ill;
thus, (L2) is not vulnerable to the specific objection which forced the
rejection of (LI). (L2) is nonetheless itself quite obviously false.
Ronald Reagan may not now remember doing anything anyone did on March
6, 1962, yet he nonetheless existed at that time.
Can such a case be used to show, further, that (L2) leads to con-
tradiction? Similar examples have, of course, been used to show that
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certain memory criteria lead to contradiction. The most famous of
these examples is Thomas Reid's "brave officer" case. Reid writes:
Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a
boy at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken
a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and
to have been made a general in advnced life; sup-
pose, also, which must be admitted to be possible,
that, when he took the standard, he was conscious*
of his having been flogged at school, and that, when
made a general, he was conscious of his taking the
standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness
of his flogging.
These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr.
Locke's doctrine, that he who was flogged at school
is the same person who took the standard, and that he
who took the standard is the same person who was made
a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth
in logic, that the general is the same person with him
who was flogged at school. But the general's conscious-
ness does not reach so far back as his flogging; there-
fore, according to Mr. Locke's doctrine, he is not the
person who was flogged. Therefore the general is, and
at the same time is not, the same person with him who
was flogged at school/
Does the "brave officer" case, together with (L2), lead to contradic-
tion? Suppose that the young boy exists at tl, the brave officer, at
t2, and the old general, at t3, where tl, t2, and t3 are distinct
times. Then, since there is a time, tl, such that the young boy exists
at tl and a time, t3, such that the old general exists at t3, and since
furthermore the old general at t3 fails to recall doing anything the
young boy did at tl, (L2) directs that the old general^the young boy.
A contradiction can be derived if it can be inferred as well both that
the young boy is the brave officer and that the brave officer is the
old general; from this information, given the transitivity of identity,
it can be concluded that the young boy is the old general. (No other
means by which a contradiction might be derived suggests itself.)
40
However, (L2) together with the facts of the case does not direct both
that the young boy is the brave officer and that the brave officer is
the old general. For consider: if the brave officer
_i_s the old
general, then by (L2) the brave officer is not the young boy. For if
the brave officer is the old general, then there is a time t3 at which
the brave officer fails to recall doing anything the young boy did at
tl. By (L2), then, the brave officer^the young boy. It can be argued,
similarly, that if the brave officer j_s the young boy, then he is not
the old general. Thus, the "brave officer" case cannot be used to
prove that (L2) leads to contradiction.
It is worth noting that (LI) as well fails to yield a contradic-
tion when applied to the "brave officer" case. (LI) directs that the
old general is the brave officer and that the brave officer is the
young boy. The "trouble" with (LI) is that it does not direct that the
old general/the young boy. Thus, given the facts of the case, it— like
(L2)— does not lead to contradiction.
While (L2) does not, when taken together with the standard exam-
ples, lead to contradiction, the principle is, as noted before, none-
theless problematic. Reagan, it may be supposed, does not recall doing
anything anyone did at noon, March 6, 1962. Yet in fact he is
identical to someone who existed on that day, since in fact he existed
then. (Similarly, the old general existed fifty years earlier even
though he in later life does not recall his youthful escapades.) A new
principle is needed.
It will be convenient to allow "Rx,t,y,t"' to abbreviate "y has
consciousness at t' of having done (doing) something x did (does) at
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t. n R's logical features are as follows. For any person x and time t
at which x exists, Rx,t,x,t. But it may happen, for some x, y, t, and
t
,
that Rx,t,y,t‘ but not Ry,t',x,t; and it may happen, for some
further person z and time f, that Rx,t,y,t\ Ry.t'z.t", but not
Rx,t ,z,t". Loosely, then, R is reflexive, but neither transitive nore
symmetric. "R*x,t,y ,t
'
," which expresses the ancestral of R, in
contrast, has the advantage of being "transitive." It may be defined
recursively as follows. 8
Dl. R*x,t,y,t'
(Rx,t,y,t‘ v
pz)(3t")(R*x
g t,z,t" &
R*z,t",y,t' ))"
R* is the relation which will be used here in formulating the Lockean
thesis. Consider, then (L3).
L3. x=y
(3t)(3t‘ )R*x,t,y,t'
(L3) avoids the particular difficulty which plagued (L2), since its
requirements for identity are not so stringent as (L2)'s. On (L3), x
may be identical to y, where y exists now and exists twenty years ago,
even though y does not now recall doing something x did twenty years
ago. (L3) requires for identity just that y's present be linked by a
series of memories to some action x performed in the past.
Consider, for instance, a schematic version of the "brave of-
ficer" and the "Reagan" cases, c, at t3, remembers doing something b
did at t2; and at t2, b remembers doing something a did at tl. Thus,
Rb,t2,c,t3 and Ra,tl,b,t2. By (Dl), then, R*b,t2,c,t3 and R*a,tl,b,t2.
A second application of (Dl) yields that R*a,tl,c,t3. Finally, (L3)
yields are a=c.
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Given that a certain psychological continuity holds between
Reagan of twenty years ago and today's Reagan, and between the young
boy and the old general, (L3) yields the "right" results in these two
cases: that Reagan did live on March 6, 1962, and that the old general
i
s
the young boy.
(L3) must, however, be rejected on other grounds. The principle
is, in fact, defective in just the way (LI) is. Consider again the
John-and-Ji 1 1 case. Is John identical to Jill? To answer this
question by appeal to (L3), one must determine first whether there are
times t and t' such that R* relates John, t, Jill, and t'. As before,
in the context in question, one shall be unable to determine whether
such times exist. (L3) is, thus, ineffective in this context.
Furthermore, it is unclear how one might obtain this necessary informa-
tion if one in fact "leaves the identity open."
(L4) in contrast yields that John and Jill are distinct.
L4. x=y *-*
(t) (t
'
)((x exists at t &
y exists at t' &
t is earlier than or the same as t')-»
R*x,t ,y,t 1 )
R* does not hold among John, tl, Jill, and t2. So by (L4) JilljAJohn.
So far, so good.
An adequate principle must also direct that Reagan lived twenty
years ago, and that the old general is the brave officer. Consider,
again, the schematic version of these cases, involving a, b, and c who
exist at tl, t2, and t3, respectively. An adequate principle would
yield that a=c.
As before, Ra,tl,b,t2 and Rb,t2,c,t3. Two applications of (Dl)
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yield that R*a,tl,b,t2, R*b,t2,c,t3, and R*a,tl,c,t3. Of course, (L4)
does not direct, given only the fact that R*a,tl,c,t3, that a=c. (L4)
requires more: it requires for identity that for aJJ_ times t and t’
such that a exists at t and c exists at t\ R* relates a, t, c, and t\
Thus, before applying (L4), one must establish that each of the
following pairs (among others) satisfies the condition specified by
(L4):
<tl, t2>, <tl, tl>,
<t2, t3>, <t2, t2>,
<tl, t3>, <t3, t3>
The condition, specifically, is (A):
A. (a exists at t & c exists at t
* ) —
R*a,t,c,t'
It can now be seen that (L4), too, is ineffective. For, as it
happens, whether certain pairs satisfy (a) cannot be determined in the
context described. The easiest way to see that this is so is to
imagine that each member in the original cast has a contemporary. (I
am supposing here that a thing may be a contemporary of itself.) The
situation is depicted below. Arrows, as before, indicate the R-rela-
tion.
o
_
.O O
d
^
e
“
f
O O O
a b
.
c
tl t2 t3
2. Problem Case for (L4)
The R-relation is not exemplified except at these points. (One may
look across the "matter of mind" to see how often R is exemplified.
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Suppose, e.g., that a at t intentionally sips a cup of coffee. It can
be known, without appeal to questions of identity between persons, that
the thoughts associated with the action of intentionally sipping coffee
occur just once.) But it is absolutely crucial to note that from the
fact that R is exemplified no more times than indicated above, it does
not follow, for example, that it is not the case that Rc,t3,f,t3. For
if c=f, then indeed Rc,t3,f,t3. And diversity between c and f has not
yet been established.
Let us turn, then, to the issue at hand. Does (L4) direct, as it
should, that a=c? Consider, for example, the pair <t2,t2>. Does it
satisfy (A)? If either a or c fails to exist at t2, then <t2,t2>
satisfies (A). But suppose that both a and c exist at t2. If each is
b, then as before <t2,t2> satisfies (A). The result is the same, if
each is e. But now consider the case in which a=b and c=e. If b=e, as
before <t2,t2> satisfies (A). But suppose now that b^e. In this
case, it would be false that R*a,t2,c,t2. (Recall that exemplifica-
tions of R, hence, of R*, are limited in accordance with the above
diagram.
)
The issue could be settled easily enough if the possibility that
c=e could be precluded. For, if c=e, then whether or not b=e,
<t2,t2> will satisfy (A).
Thus, is c=e? There are alternative means of showing diversity
between c and e which should be considered. If, for example, it can
be shown that c^f, then it may be inferred that ~R*e,t2,c,t3 and,
hence, by (L4) that c^e. (L4 ) , however, provides no means of deter-
mining whether c=f. As pointed out before, it cannot simply be assumed
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that ~R*c,t3,f,t3. And, clearly, if c=f, then R* holds among c, t3, f,
and t3. But, if c^f, then the relation does not hold. Thus, it is
difficult to justify the claim that R* holds, and so, difficult to use
(L4) to decide identity between c and f. In this context, then, (L4)
is ineffective. And here, as before, it seems that one must al ready
know whether c=b, before one can support the claim that R* holds.
If it can be shown that c^d, then one can reason to the conclu-
sion that ~R*c,tl,e,t2 (given, again, the fact that exemplifications of
R are limited). And, if R*c,tl,e,t2 then by (L4), c^e. But, again,
to use (L4 ) to determine diversity between c and d, one would first
have to determine diversity between c and f. Problems with this task
have already been noted.
Determining diversity between c and e would do as well, for set-
tling the issue of identity between c and d; but this is the very ques-
tion at hand.
It should be noted that, while (L4) fails to direct that a=c, it
does not direct the clearly false a^c. It simply yields no results.
Thus, (L4) is, we may say, ineffective in a variety of ordinary
contexts— in contexts in which a principle adequate for our purposes
can be expected to yield results. Indeed, it cannot be used to answer
certain even extremely straightforward questions of identity.
The several identity criteria considered in this chapter have
been found to be ineffective in contexts in which we expect adequate
principles to yield results. Considerable observational data have been
assumed (such as the location and nature of thoughts and actions); yet
the Lockean principles so far considered have been no more helpful in
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indicating how person-stuff is properly divided into persons than
either the Principle of the Identity of Indi scerni bles (Id) or the
Principle of the Indi scerni bi 1 ity of Identicals (In). I argued, in
Chapter I, that it is unclear whether these principles can be used to
settle issues of identity between persons in certai crucial contexts.
The argument is based on the fact that it is unclear whether one as-
cription of properties can be justified over others, in those contexts
of interest to us here. Of course, unless one can justify a particular
ascription of properties over others, one cannot use (Id) or (In) to
determine identity. In this chapter I have argued that the Lockean
principles are similarly defective. The difficulty is in determining
whether the R relation, or the R* relation, holds. And, of course,
without this information, the corresponding principles are of no use
whatsoever.
Indeed (LI) through (L4) appear to be, if anything, more proble-
matic than (LL) is. In the case of (LL), the possibility that, in the
contexts of interest here, the principle shall be of use remains open.
(There may be, for instance, unique essential properties.) But for
each of (LI) through (L4), there appear to be certain crucial contexts
in which the principle is without a doubt ineffective. For we cannot
tell just who has consciousness of whose activities, until issues of
personal identity are settled. Thus, if we even admit the possibility
of identity, or diversity, between objects, we become very unclear on
whether or not the R, or R*, relation in fact holds.
One might object that some further principle could be introduced,
which would provide conditions under which R* holds by appealing to our
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abundance of observational data. However, it is unclear that there U
any true principle which both links observational data and the R, or
R*, relation
_and is itself effective.
In any case, the hope behind each Lockean principle introduced so
far has been that that principle would enable the subject, who has the
ability to "herald** persons and who has at hand unlimited observational
data, to answer questions of identity. The subject wonders, we may
suppose, whether the person before him on Saturday and the person
before him on Sunday are the same
. He observes carefully and closely
the situation at hand. A principle adequate for our purposes would
enable him to answer this question. Certainly, a principle which is in
effect a full definition of "... is a person" would do the trick;
but, since we have got no such principle we must ask whether there is
anything less than that which would yield the desired information. It
is not clear that (LL) will serve this purpose; and it is clear that
(LI) through (L4) will not.
A1 ternati ves
It would be premature to dismiss Locke's account of personal
identity at this point. Other, more promising alternative formulations
of his position remain to be considered. One alternative involves con-
joining certain principles considered above; the other involves an
appeal to the notion of a temporal person part
,
or a person-stage .
(L3) was rejected because it was shown to be ineffective in
certain contexts, not because it was shown to be false. (L4) was re-
jected for the same reason. Thus, there is no reason to think, at
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this point, that the conjunction of (L3) and (L4) is false. Further-
more, conveniently enough, where one principle does not provide answers
to the questions of identity so far raised, the other principle does.
Thus, the conjunction of (L3) and (L4) may succeed as a criterion even
though each principle alone fails.
Reconsider the “brave officer" case. (L3), but not (L4), directs
that the old general is the young boy. Reconsider as well the case of
Jill, who at t2 fails to remember doing anything John did at tl. (L4)
directs, in contrast to (L3), that Jill is distinct from John. Thus,
the conjunctive principle (L5)
L5. (L3) & (L4)
has a certain advantage over each of (L3) and (L4) alone.
The second formulation involves quantification over person -
stages rather than persons. Two definitions will be helpful. Let "s,"
"s', " and "s“" vary just over person-stages. Then,
D2. Ms,s'~
s' has consciousness of having done (doing) something s
in fact did (does)
M is reflexive but neither symmetric or transitive. One might object
that persons, not stages, are the sorts of things that have conscious-
ness or perform actions. But this objection is not compelling. If a
person at a time t lifts that bale, surely the stage that belongs to
him at t— i f there is such a thi ng— 1 i fts that bale as well. However,
if one wishes, one may substitute for the literal "s' has consciousness
of doing something s in fact did" Grice's metaphorical "s' contains a
memory of an action actually contained in s."^
A criterion appealing to the M-relation rather than to the an-
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cestral of this relation will be problematic. Such a criterion, like
(L2), is vulnerable to the "brave officer" objection. 11 Thus, a second
definition is required.
D3. M*s ,s ' —
(Ms, s' v (3s")(M*s,s" & M*s" ,s 1 )
)
M* holds between s and s' just in case either M holds between s and s'
or s and s' are linked by a series of person-stages, pairs of which are
related by M. Finally, the criterion may be stated.
S. (7x)(s is a stage of x) =
(7 x ) (
s
' is a stage of x)<->.
(M*s,s‘ v M*s
'
,s)
Thus, s and s' are stages of the same person just in case M* holds
between s and s'.
Consider, yet again, the schematic version of the "brave officer"
case. Call a's tl stage, "si"; b's t2 stage, "s2"; and c's t3 stage,
"s3. " Then, given the facts of the case, by (D2) Msl ,s2 and Ms2,s3;
thus by (D3) M*sl,s3. (S) yields then that a=c. Similarly one could
infer that the young boy is the old general. Consider again the "John-
and-Ji 1 1 " case. Call John's tl stage "s4" and Jill's t2 stage "s5." M*
does not link s4 and s5; thus, by (S), the person to whom s4 belongs—
that is, John— is not identical to the person to whom s5 belongs— that
is, Jill.
(L5) and (S) thus both yield results which are intuitively cor-
rect when applied to the cases that have already been introduced.
(S) may be thought to be flawed in a way (L5) is not. For unless
(S) is simply vacuously true, it presupposes the existence of person-
stages, that is, temporal person parts. If these entities exist, what
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are they? Presumably, one is to come to an understanding of the notion
of temporal parts by analogy— by understanding first, the notion of a
a ^ P art * But just what the analogies are supposed to be between
the two cases is unclear. The disanalogies are what stand out. The
spatial parts are at least in principle separable from one another.
Temporal parts are not. An entity may exist at a given location when
only an arbitrary minute temporal part of it exists there. But an
entity cannot exist at a time if only one arbitrary minute spatial part
of it exists at that time. Still, the supposition that person-stages,
which have some very brief duration and are individuated by appeal to a
principle of the "unity of consciousness," is not itself obviously in-
coherent. In the following chapters, I shall in fact be making this
very supposition.
Fundamentally, the claim that person-stages exist will be no more
than a supposition. Just now, however, I wish to point out a certain
advantage (S) has over (L5), and, thus, indirectly the practicality of
the supposition that there are person-stages.
Consider the following example, a and b both exist at time tl.
a reads a book then, and is aware of doing so. b sews on a button
then, and is aware of doing so. In fact a^b. No one exists before or
after tl. The case may be depicted as follows.
o
a
o
b
tl
3. Problem Case for (L5)
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As before, R is exemplified only as indicated; nonetheless, it cannot
be determined at this point that
~Ra,tl,b,tl. Consider the results
(L5) yields concerning such a case. On (L3), a=b if and only if there
is some action one performs of which the other has consciousness. If
a-b, then there is such an action: a has consciousness of b's sewing
on the button, since b does. If a^b, then (given the limited number of
exemplifications of R--just two, in this case) there is no such action.
Thus, (L3 ) cannot be used to determine whether a=b unless one already
has at hand this very information.
Clearly (L4) is no more helpful. (L4) cannot be used to decide
identity between a and b unless it is already known whether a=b.
Is (S) similarly flawed? To use (S) to infer diversity between a
and b one must have already at hand a means of differentiating between
person-stages. As before, call a's tl-stage "si" and b's tl-stage
"s2." These two stages are distinct, a reads at tl and is then aware
of himself reading. Such thoughts, but no others, are contained in si.
b sews on a button at tl, and is at tl aware of himself sewing. No
thoughts but these occur in s2. (S) then directs that a^b. One thus,
in order to use (S) to decide identity between a and b, must have at
hand information concerning the identities of person-stages
. But one
need not have already at hand information concerning the identities of
persons
.
(S) seems, then, to have a certain advantage over (L5). But does
it really? It was assumed that a's tl-stage, si, and b's tl-stage, s2,
were distinct. Gi ven this assumption, it was easy to determine that M
failed to hold between these two stages. Since there exist, ex hypoth-
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— * these tw0 stages, and since M fails to hold between them,
clearly so does M*. Applying (S), one obtains finally that a^b (that
is, that the person to whom si belongs is distinct from the person to
whom s2 belongs).
It was taken as fact that sl^s2 before any attempt to apply (s)
was made. The ability to individuate among person-stages was assumed.
Here a question arises. If one has the ability to distinguish between
distinct, simultaneous person-stages, does one not also have the abil-
ity to judge, after having examined at a given time what are in fact
distinct persons, that they are in fact distinct? If this question is
answered affirmatively then (S) after all has no advantage over (L5);
if one is in a position to apply (S), one would then be, ipso facto
,
in
a position to apply (L5).
In fact, however, the answer to our question is "no." One may
have the ability to distinguish simultaneous person-stages si and s2
without having the ability to distinguish between a and b, who exist at
a single time and are at that time examined. One may, for instance, be
ignorant as to whether a, like milk, can exist in entirely disjoint
locations at a given time.
A second question concerning the supposed advantage of (S) over
(L5) might be raised. It was assumed above that person-stages exist
and that a means of individuating them was at hand. An alternative
supposition would be that there are persons and that synchronic ident-
ity conditions for them are at hand. We must, it seems, make one sup-
position or the other; does it really matter which of the two suppo-
sitions is adopted? If not, then, it does not matter whether (S) or
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(L5) is ultimately adopted. If not, (S) would have no advantage over
(L5). However, despite the fact that the main topic of this thesis is
personal survival
,
which might seem to involve only issues of
d iachronic identity, it is actually important that one and not the
other supposition is made. Indeed, mere suppositions concerning syn-
chronic identities of persons must be avoided at this time. For, as it
happens, how issues of person survival are settled may decide how
certain issues of synchronic identity should be settled.
The primary goal of this chapter is to state a plausible, work-
able Lockean criterion of identity for persons— a basis on which de-
cisions concerning survival may be made. Both (S) and (L5) would seem
to count as Lockean principles. But (L5) is effective only in contexts
in which issues of synchronic identity are already settled. This is
not so of (S). To use (S), one need only have settled issues of ident-
ity between person-stages. Thus, in the following sections, it is (S)
rather than (L5) which is developed and scrutinized. In particular,
(S) must be defended against two “charges of circularity," one rather
obscure and the other, a bit more well-known. I turn, now, to these
objections.
"Charges of Circularity "
Both the M-relation and the R-relation were specified in terms of
the notion of one thing's having consciousness of having done something
another in fact did. The elucidation of this notion is the primary
topic of this section.
In particular, there are two difficulties which must be overcome.
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(1) If "something" in "y has consciousness of having done something x
did," is construed as equivalent to "some action-type," then clearly one
person may have consciousness of performing actions in fact performed
by others, such as bathing the dog or reading a book. Thus, if "some-
thing" is interpreted in this way, principle (S) will generate numerous
false results. Suppose, then, that "something" is construed as meaning
^some action - token
.
(Examples of such entities would be Sam's bathing
the dog this morning and my reading a book yesterday). Then, where V"
varies over individual, irrepeatable action-tokens, "y has conscious-
ness of doing something x did" may be expanded as "(3<y)(x performed &
y has consciousness of hi
s
having himself performed °c)." If (S) is
construed in accordance with this expansion, a certain "charge of cir-
cularity" may be raised against it. For surely y cannot have con-
sciousness of hi
s
having performed <*, unless y also believes himself to
be identical to the unique performer of <*. The difficulty is that the
criterion is beginning to look circular, for implicitly referred to in
the right-hand side of (S) is the concept of identity. Perhaps it is
this objection Joseph Butler had in mind when he wrote:
. . . one should really think it self-evident that
consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and
therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any
more than knowledge, in any other case, can consti-
tute truth, which is presupposes.^
(2) Assume, as before, that "y has consciousness of having done
something x did" is to be expanded as "(3°<)(x performed & y has con-
sciousness of his having himself performed <*)." There is no require-
ment that y's consciousness by accurate or true . This omission opens
the door for counter-examples. Bernard Williams imagines the case of
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Charles, who lives during the twentieth century and has the false
belief that he himself is the seventeenth-century Guy Fawkes. 13
Charles' delusion is detailed and accurate; he can even be imagined to
be clairvoyant with respect to Guy Fawkes' thoughts and actions.
Clearly, Guy Fawkes and Charles are distinct persons; but (S) instructs
that they are the same. 14 This difficulty for (S) cannot be overcome by
requiring that y's consciousness be accurate or true. For such a
construal would make the account vulnerable to yet another "charge of
circularity. Clearly, the accuracy of y's consciousness cannot be
determined unless identity between x and y--the unique performer of °c--
is already known.
In this section I will consider the question of whether either of
these two objections signifies irreparable flaws in the criteria stated
above. I will conclude that neither clearly does.
The former "charge of circularity" will be discussed first. The
locution "y has consciousness of doing something x in fact did" can be
expanded in accordance with (El).
El. y has consciousness at t‘ of having done
something x in fact did at t «-»
there is something x did at t, and
y has consciousness at t' of his having
himself done this thing x did.
(El) is, of course, vague. The first issue which must be settled is
whether the something x does is an action-token or an action-type. Is
(E2), or (E3), what is wanted for the purpose of stating a criterion of
identity for persons?
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E2. y has consciousness at t' of having done something
x in fact did at t
There is an individual, irrepeatable action-token
performed by x at t, and
y has consciousness at t' of his having himself
performed this action-token.
E3. y has consciousness at t' of having done something x in
fact did at t ->
There is a universal, repeatable action-type
performed by x at t, and
y has consciousness at t' of his having himself
performed this action-type
Examples of what I am calling "individual, irrepeatable action-tokens,"
are my working on my thesis now, your eating dinner last evening, and
Nixon's resigning as President of the United States August 2, 1974.
Examples of what I am calling "universal, repeatable action-types" are
writing a thesis, eating dinner, and resigning as President of the
United States. Thus, for instance (7), together with (E3) but not
(E2), entails that Bob has consciousness of doing something Sam did:
7. Sam bathed Rover this morning, and Bob has
consciousness this evening of his having
himself bathed Rover.
In contrast, (E2) as well as (E3) yields, with (8), that Bob has con-
sciousness of doing something Sam did.
8. Sam bathed Rover this morning, and Bob
has consciousness this evening of his
having himself performed the action of
Sam's bathing Rover this morning.
(S), given (E2) but not given (E3), is apparently vulnerable to the
first "charge of circularity." I turn to this objection now. The al-
ledged difficulty may be stated as follows. Suppose one wonders whether
Bob is identical to Sam. For Bob to have consciousness of his perform-
ing the irrepeatable action-token of Sam's bathing Rover is just for
57
Bob both to have consciousness that he is identical to Sam and to have
consciousness of Sam's bathing Rover. Thus, the concept of identity of
which (S) is alleged to provide an account is implicitly appealed to in
the right-hand side of that principle. (S) is, thus, circular.15
It is perhaps obvious that this objection to (S) fails. (S) has
not here been alleged to define "identity" or to analyze the concept of
identity. It is, rather
,
intended to convey information concerning the
nature of persons, specifically, information concerning changes which a
person may undergo without ceasing to exist. It is this information,
having to do with the nature of persons
, not information concerning the
nature of identity
,
which must not be presupposed. Thus, one may in-
deed need to understand the concept of identity to be able to determine
whether Bob has the appropriate "consciousness"; but one need not al-
ready have any accurate opinion as to conditions under which persons—
in contrast to ships or piles of stones
—
persist through time.
Thus, given that the questionable locution is understood in ac-
cordance with (E2 ) this first "charge of circularity" is not compel-
ling. There are, however, other problems with (E2). Consider the fol-
lowing case, adopted from a Castaneda example. Suppose that Quintus
is attempting, on Monday, to find his way out of the Stanford library.
Suppose, too, that he is aware of what he is doing, but that he real-
izes neither that h£ is Quintus, nor that the day is Monday. In this
case, it seems that Qunitus indeed has consciousness of performing one
of Quintus' Monday actions. But, given, Quintus' ignorance, it is not
the case that he has consciousness of himself performing the action of
Quintus's attempting to find his way out of the library on Monday.
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(E3) is invulnerable to this particular objection. Since Quintus
seeks to find his way out of the library, and since quintus has con-
sciousness of himself seeking to find his way out of the library, by
(E3) Quintus does indeed have consciousness of doing something Quintus
did.
Should "has consciousness of" in (S), then, be expanded in ac-
cordance with ( E3 ) ? (S), so interpreted, is problematic. Suppose that
Sam bathed Rover this morning, and that an hour later Bob bathed Rover.
Suppose further that Bob has consciousness of his bathing Rover. Fi-
nally, suppose that Bob^Sam. Then by (E3) Bob has consciousness of
doing something which Sam did. It is easy to see that, if "has con-
sciousness of" in (S) is interpreted in accordance with (E3), (S) will
generate false results.
Before resolving the issue of whether (E2), (E3) or neither is an
adequate expansion of "x has consciousness of having done something y
in fact did," it will be convenient to introduce the second "charge of
circularity."
The Second Charge
Whether (E2) or (E3) is finally adopted, the "Guy Fawkes" problem
arises. Suppose that twentieth-century Charles believes falsely that
he plotted, as Guy Fawkes in fact did, against the British during the
seventeenth century. Does this belief count as a case of Charles' hav-
ing consciousness of doing something Guy Fawkes in fact did? Nothing
said so far precludes that it does. But it "has consciousness of" is
so interpreted, (S) will generate obviously false results— for in-
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stance, that Guy Fawkes and Charles are identical.
One might suggest that "has consciousness of" is properly defined
in such a way that, if the consciousness is inaccurate or "false," then
it is lacking altogether. The following modifications of (E2) and (E3)
take this proposal into account. (For simplicity, I suppress reference
to times here.
)
E2'. y has consciousness of doing something
x in fact did «-*•
1. There is an individual, irrepeatable
action-token performed by x;
2. y has consciousness of himself
performing that action-token; and,
3. y in fact performed that action-token.
E3‘. x has consciousness of doing something
y in fact did
1. There is a universal, repeatable
action-type performed by x;
2. y has consciousness of himself
performing that action-type; and,
3. y in fact performed that action-type.
It is clear that whether (E2‘) or (E3
' ) is adopted, serious objections
against (S) may be raised. Consider again the "Guy Fawkes" example.
On (E2
' ) , Charles has the appropriate consciousness only if in fact he
performed the action of Fawkes' plotting against the British. To
determine whether Charles performed this action-token, one would have
to know already whether Charles is Fawkes. On (E3‘), Charles has the
appropriate consciousness only if he performed the action of plotting
against the British. To determine whether Charles performed this
action-type, one would have to discover first whether Charles is
identical to any of those persons— including Guy Fawkes--who plotted
against the British. Thus, (S) read in accordance either with (E2 ' ) or
with (E3‘) appears to be circular.
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Perry's Defense
Some contemporary philosophers, bearing in mind this second
"charge," have rejected Lockean criteria altogether. 16 Others have
attempted to distinguish between genuine memory and merely apparent
memory (such as Charles') without appeal to the identity relation. The
intuition is that, if the memory is genuine
, the original action forms
part of a causal chain resulting in the subject's later consciousness
of having performed that action. On such a view, Charles' memory is
merely apparent, since it is not Fawkes' plotting that causes Charles'
later delusion, but rather his reading about Fawkes together with a
certain mental instability.
Such a "causal" approach has a second advantage. Recall that the
suggested expansions of "has consciousness of" (E2) and (E3) were prob-
lematic. (E2) was subject to the "Quintus" objection, and (E3), taken
together with (S), simply produced the wrong results—yielding, for
example, that where Bob is not Sam, since Bob has consciousness of
bathing Rover and Sam in fact bathed Rover, Bob j_s Sam. No effective
defense of (E2) suggests itself. But the "causal" approach suggests a
way of defending a modified (E3). Since it was not Sam's bathing Rover
which ultimately resulted in Bob's consciousness that jie bathed Rover,
the hoped-for expansion of "has consciousness of" will not yield that
Bob has consciousness of doing something Sam in fact did. The remain-
der of this section will be devoted to developing this "causal"
approach.
(E4) expresses the above informally-stated and, as it stands.
ill-fated intuition. "0" varies over repeatable, universal action-
types.
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E4. y has consciousness at t' of doing something
x in fact did at t *—
1. There is a 0 such that x performed
0 at t;
2. y has consciousness at t' of his having
himself having performed 0;
3. x's performing 0 causes y to have
this consciousness.
(E4) is clearly inadequate. For it is possible, even likely, that
Fawkes' actual plotting against the British is at least a causal fac-
tor leading to Charles' later delusions. What Fawkes did is partly why
he was written about in the history books Charles later read. The
Rover" case can also be detailed in such a way that it is a problem
for (E4) . One can imagine that, while Sam and Bob separately bathe
Rover, it is Sam's bathing Rover— not Bob's—which causes Bob later to
have consciousness of himself bathing Rover.
Substituting for clause (3) the phrase "x's performing is the
sole cause of y's later consciousness" does not, for obvious reasons,
improve matters a whit. I have consciousness of having eaten breakfast
this morning. But (E4) directs that in fact I lack such consciousness,
since my eating this morning is obviously not the sole cause of my
current remembrance.
John Perry develops the "causal" approach in a less objectionable
way.^ I turn now to his theory.
According to Perry, three conditions must be met in order for
"E" varies oversomeone to have a genuine memory of an earlier event,
individual, non-recurrent event-tokens.
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D4. y remembers E «-
!• There is a x such that x witnessed E;
2. y represents to himself the past occur-
rence of an event of E's type; and,
3. x's witnessing of E is C-related to
y's representation of the past occur-
rence of an event of E's type.
Some explanation of each of these three clauses is in order.
The term "represent," according to Perry, ".
. . covers the many
ways a person can indicate the past occurrence of an event of a certain
type
. . ."—by imagining the event, by verbally describing the event,
or by painting a picture of the event/ 0
Someone may wi tness an event by either perceiving it or by inten-
tionally performing it, on Perry's view. 20
Perry specifies the C-relation by appeal to the notion of recol-
1 ecti on
. ("Recollection" is, for him, a technical term.)
D5. y recollects E
1. There is a x such that x witnessed E;
2. y represents to himself the past oc-
currence of an event of E's type; and,
3. y's stage at the time of the repre-
senting and x's stage at the time of
the witnessing are stages of the
same live human body/~
Linking the C-relation and recollection. Perry writes:
. . . any ordinary human is drawn to the belief that
there is [a causal] explanation for the frequent oc-
currence of unaided cases of recollection, that there
is some process, material or immaterial, gross or
sublime, complex or simple, which frequently occurs
when a human being [or live human body] witnesses an
event and leads to that same human's later represent-
ation of it. When the witnessing of an event leads
by this process to a later representation of it, t±e
witnessing and the representation are [C-related]/
Thus, on Perry's view, the C-relation can be specified as . . the
23
relation that explains the great bulk of cases of recollection."
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Since live human bodies and persons are different sorts of things,
according to Perry, the third condition does not lead to circularity.
Perry s proposal can be adapted to views already expressed as
follows. It is his notion of the C-relation which is most helpful.
(0, as before, varies over repeatable, universal action-types.
)
E5. y has consciousness of doing something
x did *—*
1. There is some action 0 such that x
intentionally performs 0;
2. y has consciousness of his having
himself performed 0; &
3. x's performance is C-related to
y's consciousness.
Consider, then, the cases at hand— the "Guy Fawkes" case and the
Rover" case. Does Charles have consciousness, on (E5), of plotting
against the British, an action which Fawkes in fact performed? Only if
Fawkes' performance is C-related to Charles' consciousness. Clearly,
by (D5 ) , Charles' consciousness is £Ot a case or recollection, for
Charles' later stage and Fawkes' early stage are stages of distinct
human bodies. But it does not follow from this fact that the C-rela-
tion does not hold between Fawkes' action and Charles' consciousness.
The C-relation may hold even when the correlated stages are not stages
of the same live human body. Thus, ".
. .
by distinguishing between
[the C-relation] and the relation of being or belonging to the same
human body, and by virtue of our lack of knowledge of the [C-relation],
it becomes possible to think of the two as separate. Witnessings
and representings, to use Perry's language, ". . . might be [C-rela-
OC
ted], though not experiences of the same human body . . . ." Events
of, not just human bodies, but of ". .
.
ghosts or even gorse-bushes
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..." may be related by C. 26
Thus, the question of whether Charles' consciousness and Fawkes'
action are related by C has yet to be answered. But it is surely clear
that the causal link between Fawkes' action and Charles' consciousness
is not that "... process, material or immaterial, gross or sublime,
complex or simple, which frequently occurs when a [live human body]
witnesses an event and leads to that same human's later representation
0-7
of it." Similarly, it may be concluded that, although Sam's bathing
Rover is part of what caused Bob's later consciousness of he himself
having bathed Rover, Sam's action and Bob's consciousness are not C-re-
1 ated.
(E5) thus has advantages over (E4). In (E5) the causal relation
betwen actions and consciousness has been restricted in such a way that
dubious cases of consciousness have been eliminted. (S) does not
generate, if "has consciousness of" is read in accordance with (E5)
rather than (E4), obvious falsehoods such as Charles' being identical
to Fawkes or Bob's being identical to Sam.
(E5) needs defending on many fronts, however. I will just
mention a few problems here. (E5) is an account of how the phrase "y
has consciousness of doing something x in fact did" is to be expanded;
it is not a definition. (E5) as such perhaps helps one to understand
the questionable locution; but it does not by itself suffice to convey
the concept.
In this respect (D4), suggested by Perry, may seem preferable to
(E5). For one difference between (D4) and (E5) is that "y has con-
sciousness - - or "x remembers - - is explained in terms of "y
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represents to himself Primarily for this reason (D4) has the
status of a definition. Perry says a bit about the notion of repre -
senting something to oneself
,
but not enough to indemnify himself
against charges of vagueness on this account.
A second difficulty is one which (E5) inherits from Perry's
theory. Consider the following case. Dr. Smith wonders whether the
memory Jones seems to have just after having his left cerebral hemis-
phere removed is an instance of memory as specified by (D4). Dr. Smith
understands thoroughly both the mechanism which explains Jones' post-
operative mental activities, and the manner in which the human brain
ordinarily functions. On Perry's view, Jones' memory is genuine only
if his postoperative and preoperative experiences are C-related. And
they are C-related just in case that relation which explains the "great
bulk" of cases of recollection holds between them. Does it? Perry
provides no accurate way of determining whether or not a case of repre-
sentation belongs to the "great bulk." And anyway the C-relation may
hold between a representing and some action even though that represent-
ings does not belong to the "great bulk." Presumably Dr. Smith shall
have to ask himself whether Jones' recollection is sufficiently, or
relevantly, similar to more normal cases of recollection. And here all
manners of vaguenesses emerge. Each is inherited by (E5).
Despite its flaws. Perry's work nonetheless has value: it
demonstrates that a non-circular memory criterion may well be within
the range of the feasible. At the very least, he indicates what such a
criterion might "look like," if it exists.
I will not attempt to detail Perry's theory further here, since
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it is not my primary aim to evaluate the circularity charges. However,
I should note that, looking ahead a bit, one can find good reason to
believe that an acceptable account of memory can be given which does
j]ot^ appeal to a claim of identity between the relevant persons. I will
conclude eventually that it may happen that in certain so-called
fission cases, two persons— say, b and c— have consciousness of doing
something one person—a— in fact did. Thus, the claim that y has con-
sciousness of performing an action in fact performed by x entails that
x=y (as it would if identity between x and y is appealed to in the
definition of "y has consciousness of doing something x did") leads to
contradiction, given that fission cases are at least possible. Thus,
an adequate elucidation of "has consciousness of" will not render
principle (S) circular.
CHAPTER II NOTES
r i nomu
Gott
^
rie
^
Wi1helm Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics" in Lerov137^:-^ ,10S°Ph,Ca1 PdPerS and LetterS (Boston: D. Reidel,
Edition
o
John Locke
(New York:
» Essay Concerning Human Understandin g Fifth
Dutton, 19/4), Book II, Chapter 27.
3Ibid
.
,
emphasis added.
4 Ibid
. » emphasis added.
discovering either the truth or falsity of (3) and (4) willin this particular case, enable one to choose between (1) and (2)CleaMy one will be justified in choosing (1), if one can establish
either (3) or (4). Furthermore, given the facts of this particular
case if °ne can establish that both (3) and (4) are false, one will bejustified in selecting (2) over (1). (I assume that the world in
question contains at most John and Jill and that no one in this world
lives before tl or after t2. Further, I assume that the consciousness
relation is exemplified only as indicated— that is, exactly three times
in the world in question.)
GThis last conditional perhaps needs some explanation. I
assume that the consciousness relation is exemplified only where indi-
cated, and furthermore that actions are performed only where indicated.
(Thus, John performs some one action at tl, and Jill performs just one
action at t2.) Thus, unless John
_i_s^ Jill, he will not have done any-
thing at t2 of which Jill may have consciousness. And, unless Jill is
John, she will not, at tl, have consciousness of doing somethinq John~
does at tl.
7 From Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man
,
"Of Memory," Chapter 6. Reprinted in Personal Identity, ed. John
Perry (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1975), pp. 107-111.
®H. P. Grice suggests this response to the "brave officer"
case. See his "Personal Identity," Mind 50 (Oct. 1941), 330-350.
^Suppose, for instance, that R relates a, tl, b, and t2 and
that R relates as well b, t2, c, and t3. Then, on (Dl), R* relates a,
tl, b, and t2, and also b, t2, c, and t3. So far, just the first
disjunct of (Dl)'s right-hand side has been applied. But now the
second disjunct comes in handy. Since R*a,tl,b,t2 and R*b,t2,c,t3,
67
68
there is a z and a t" such that R*a,tl,z,t"
yields, then that R*a,bl,c,t3.
and R*2,t
"
,c,t3. (Dl)
10
Grice, "Personal Identity," pp. 344 . 346
.
^Interestingly, a principle such as (S) (see following nara
annl i pH t
XCePt Where "M " replaces "M*" does lead to contradiction whenpp ed to a version of the "brave officer" case.
12
From Joseph Butler, The Analoqy of reliqion. First Annpnrii*
Reprinted in Personal Identifi ed. Perrv PP qq.i nc;
* PP *
13
B. A. 0. Williams, "Personal Identity and Individuations,
Proceedings of the Tristotelian Society 57 (1956/57), 233-239.
14
To support this claim of diversity, Williams adds to his
story the character of Robert, a second twentieth-century inhabitant
who suffers under delusions similar to Charles'. Any principle which
directs that Charles is Fawkes will also direct that Robert is Fawkes.
According to Williams, this result is "absurd" ( Ibid ., p. 238). If by
absurd Williams means contradictory, then he is wrong on this last
point. Nonetheless, the result that Fawkes is both Robert and Charles
and thus exists in two disjoint places at a single time is counter-in-
tuitive and, thus, provides reason to reject any principle generating
that result.
15Wiggins suggests this objection; see his Sameness and
Substance
, pp. 152-153. In this work, he discusses this first
change of circularity, and others, at length (pp. 148-189).
16See, for instance, Williams, "Personal Identity," p. 233.
17
Perry, "Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem of Circu-
larity," in Personal Identity
,
ed. Perry, pp. 146-147. In this work.
Perry discusses other "charges of circularity" as well.
18 Ibid
.
,
p. 147. Perry calls the relation appealed to in con-
dition (3) the "M-relation"; I call it in clause (3) the "C-relation."
19
Ibid
.
,
p. 145. Perry notes that he follows Martin and
Deutscher's article, "Remembering," The Philosophical Review 75
(1966), 161-196.
2Q
Ibid
,
,
p. 144.
21
Ibid
., pp. 147-149.
22
Ibid
.
,
p. 148.
69
2 4 Ibid
., p. 149.
2 5
I bid
.
2
^Ibid
.
27
1 bi
d
.
.
p. 148.
CHAPTER III
FISSION PUZZLES
In the preceding chapter, several objections to Lockean criteria
of personal identity were considered. Criteria were reformulated in
the face of these objections. Given this work, it seems reasonable to
conclude that criteria which both capture the Lockean spirit and are
nonetheless invulnerable to ineffecti vi ty charges, Reid's "brave
soldier" objection, and circularity charges may well be available.
Other objections to the Lockean approach, however, have not yet
been countered. In this chapter and the following two, I will focus on
a cluster of difficulties involving a single apparent counterexample to
the Lockean principle (S). I will refer to this apparent counterexam-
ple as the "fission case." Different versions of it have been
presented and discussed by several philosophers, including B. A. 0.
Williams, David Wiggins, Derek Parfit, John Perry, Roland Puccetti
,
and
David Lewis. The version I introduce in Section I following is one
which, I will argue, can only implausibly be held to be logically im-
possible and is at the same time apparently effective against a wide
variety of Lockean criteria.
Williams finds in such "splitting" cases reason enough to reject
psychological continuity criteria in general in favor of (certain)
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bodily continuity criteria. Williams' conclusion does not follow, I
will point out, from his premises; and, in any case, it seems that any
otherwise satisfactory bodily criterion can be counterexampled, to-
gether with psychological continuity criteria, by the fission case.
This latter claim has a paradoxical air to it; but it can be sup
ported. The claim is based on a certain perfectly general problem—
a
problem designed to undermine bodily continuity criteria as well as
psychological continuity cri teria—which will be introduced towards
the end of this chapter. In the final section of this chapter, I
consider and reject a single solution, proposed by Derek Parfit, to
this more general problem.
The Fission Case
The following example seems to show that the memory criterion (S)
developed in the preceding chapter leads to contradiction. The brain
of person a is (carefully) split into two equal parts. 1 The halves are
housed in distinct, healthy, brainless human bodies. The resulting
creatures— b and c—upon awakening behave as though they have just a's
memories. But b and c, after surgery, are each utterly unaware of what
the other is doing, a, b, and c are all persons, si is a's stage
prior to surgery, s2, b's stage just after b awakens, and s3, c's stage
just after c awakens, si occurs at tl, and s2 and s3, at t2. Thus, s2
and s3 at t2 have consciousness of doing something si does at tl, but
neither s2 nor s3 has consciousness at t2 of what the other is doing at
t2. Thus, by (D2), since b and c both have consciousness at t2 of
doing something a did at tl, Msl,s2 and Msl,s3. By (D3), both M*sl,s2
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and M*sl,s3. (S) yields, then, that a=b and that a=c. Since the iden-
tity relation is both symmetric and transitive, b=c. Furthermore, it
is not the case that Ms2,s3. And, there is no series of stages linking
s2 and s3, i.e., there are no s4, s5,
. . . sn such that Ms2,s4 and
Ms4,s5 and
. . . and Msn,s3. Thus, it is not the case that M*s2,s3.
Similar reasoning yields that it is not the case that M*s3,s2. This
information together with (S) entails that b^c. Thus, (S) together
with the facts of the fission case yields a contradiction.
The fission case may be diagrammed as follows. (Arrows represent
the M*-rel ati on.
)
4. The Fission Case
There are two ways of avoiding this contradiction. One may
either reject the example itself as impossible, or (S) as false. In
the following sections, I consider both these alternatives.
The Possibility of Fission
If persons logically cannot undergo fission, then of course any
objection to (S) or to any other criterion of personal identity based
on the fission case is insignificant. Contemplation of any one of a
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variety of alternative positions may lead one to worry that the fission
case is impossible.
There are three such positions. A. Necessarily, if something
which is ordinarily thought to be a person, a single conscious being,
is subjected to the "fission procedure" described above, at most one
person is produced. It is not the case that two or more conscious
beings could be produced. B. Suppose that something which is ordin-
arily thought to be one person is "divided into" two persons. Under no
circumstances, then, would the resulting persons have consciousness of
doing anything the original person in fact did. C. Suppose that brain
surgery of some exotic sort does produce two persons from what is
thought to be just one, and that each of the resulting creatures has
consciousness of doing something the original in fact did. Then, under
no ci rcumstances would what appears to be one person in fact be one
person. What appears to be one would really be a conglomerate of more
than one. (Each would fail to have consciousness of what the other is
doing; by (S), then, there would be two.)
Positions (A) and (C) both follow from the principle that it is
impossible to generate, from a single person, two persons. (B) is
consistent with the negation of this principle. It concerns, rather,
the nature of the relationship between the resulting conscious beings
and the original. I will discuss these three positions in this section
and the following, and conclude that the fission case is indeed
possible.
One might wonder why this discussion is necessary when all that
is needed to refute (S) is the logical possibility of fission. Con-
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trary, perhaps, to appearance, the discussion is necessary. For posi-
tions (A) through (C) involve claims which would be expressed by
sentences of the form "Necessarily, anything which is a person has
such-and-such features." Thus, a philosopher who sincerely accepts any
one of (A) through (C) may sincerely doubt whether an entity undergoing
the procedure described in Section I is a person
. And indeed if any
one of (A) through (C), none of which is entirely implausible, is true,
the fission case is impossible.
One method of undermining (A) through (C) involves an examination
of a ctual creatures, entities such as you and me, which cannot plaus-
ibly be denied that status of personhood
.
2
I will rely largely on this
method in the following sections.
Thus, consider (A). "From the inside" it does seem that a single
conscious being cannot serve as material for the production of a plur-
ality of such beings, especially where there exists a continuity of
mental experience between the original being and each member of the
plurality. But in fact there is evidence which suggests that people
may not really be what they seem, from an insider's point of view, to
be.
It will be helpful to have at hand certain physiological data.
Over seventy percent of the human brain is composed of the left and
right cerebral hemispheres. These two anatomically nearly symmetric
parts form the seat of the so-called higher mental functions, including
the ability to speak, reason, learn, calculate, recognize objects, as
well as to see, hear, feel, taste, smell, and finally to move about in
the world
.
4
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The two cerebral hemispheres are more alike anatomically than they
are functionally. They do different things. For instance, severe
right hemisphere damage may leave a right-handed person linguistically,
but not physically, nearly unimpaired, whereas severe left hemisphere
damage may leave someone apparently unable to communicate by means of a
spoken or written language. (An interesting exception to this rule
involves the important ability to understand so-called "abstract"
language, such as metaphor. Damage to the right hemisphere signifi-
cantly diminishes this ability.5 )
Although the hemispheres become, so to speak, accustomed to per-
forming their own jobs, they seem to have similar capacities
. Thus,
Stuart Diamond and J. Graham Beaumont write that each hemisphere ".
has a capacity, but
. . . one exceeds the other in proficiency" at
particular tasks
.
5 Many who write about the phenomenon of "later-
ality" find it convenient to speak of one hemisphere as being "dominant
for" a specific function. What is ordinarily meant, when a given hemi-
sphere is said to be "dominant for" a particular function, is (loosely)
that that hemisphere is more "important" than the other for the com-
pletion of the task, and (more precisely) that that function is more
likely to be diminished or absent if the hemisphere in question is
severely damaged. The left hemisphere of most right-handers would, for
instance, be said to be dominant for the majority of language-related
functions, including the abilities to speak, write, and understand both
oral and written communications.
The right hemisphere is dominant for crucial functions as well.
Norman Geschwind writes that it . . is dominant for certain spatial
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functions
. .
., for certain musical tasks, and
. .
.
possibly for
certain aspects of emotional response ." 7 it is thought further that
the right hemisphere is dominant for calculating and creati ve-associa-
8
tive thinking. Thus, the speech of those right-handers who sustain
severe right hemisphere damage tends to be "monotonous and flat"; and
right-hemisphere patients will perform less well on a variety of tests
designed to measure spatial ability
.
9
Right hemisphere damage results in the subject's receiving lower
scores on the Block Design test (a test which requires subjects to
arrange blocks in such a way that a given pattern is repeated); but
left hemisphere damage leads to lower vocabulary scores.
The hemispheres are, then, functionally unlike; however, as noted
before, each appears to have some capacity for the labor that ulti-
mately is divided between them.
The cerebral hemispheres are joined together by the cerebral
coirmissures, the largest of which is the corpus callosum. Until recent
years, the corpus callosum was thought to be without significant cogni-
tive function. At one point, the role of the corpus callosum was con-
sidered to be merely that of holding the hemispheres in place. It is
now known, however, that information is passed from one hemisphere to
the other via the corpus callosum. What led researchers to this con-
clusion was the fact that bisection of these commissures (the procedure
is called a "commissurotomy") seems to produce ".
. .
two separate
centers of consciousness in a single body." And it is this striking
phenomenon which is considered philosophically significant by some
philosophers. ^
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R. W. Sperry described the effects of commissurotomy on non-human
animals as follows:
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Before the effects of the commissurotomy were thoroughly understood,
the procedure was performed on several patients suffering from severe
epilepsy. Their epilepsy was greatly improved by the surgery; subse-
quent testing then revealed the more dramatic effects of cormiissur-
otomy, and the procedure was dropped.
These effects initially were not noticed. For ordinarily the
conmi ssurotomy patient's left and right hemispheres received the same
information. (For instance, ordinarily when the left ear is exposed to
a given sound, the right ear is exposed to just the same sound.) But,
when testing is carefully restricted, the independence of the two hemis-
pheres became evident.
Howard Gardner provides a vivid description of results gleaned by
R. W. Sperry, j^t. aj_. In the following passage, he is speaking of a
right-handed conmi ssurotomy patient.
With his right hand, the patient could write appropriately,
and with his left hand, he could draw figures accurately.
However, he was unable to write with his left hand (because
the verbal information in the "linguistic" left hemisphere
was inaccessible), and incapable of drawing accurately with
his right hand (because the visual-spatial information in
the right hemisphere was disconnected from his right hand).
Required to copy a three-dimensional model of blocks, the
patient was unable to accomplish this with his right hand.
While the right hand was fitfully struggling to solve the
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problem the left hand, which evidently understood the taskne l,k e a Good Samaritan to rescue its hapless cSne ue
’
It was, however, restrained by the experimenter.
When words were flashed to the patient's right visual fieldhe reported accurately what he had seen. When the same
materials were presented to his left visual field, however
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» Patient could correctly designate the veryitem that he claimed not to have seen. When verbal information
was presented simultaneously to both visual fields, the subiect
reported orally what he saw in his right visual field, but atthe same time, he was able to draw what he saw in his left*
visual field. His right hemisphere seemed unable to perceive
this inconsistency; the left hemi sphere—which could talk-
appeared aware of the paradox but remained impotent in the
face of it
.
10
Although the left and the right hemispheres, subsequent to commissur-
otomy, can no longer "communicate," they continue to function. 14 Each
hemisphere behaves more or less normally, albeit independently of the
other. 15
Recall the division of labor" between the hemispheres described
above. As Gardner's discussion suggests, these remarks apply to the
split-brain patient as well as to the normal subject. For instance,
the split-brain patient is able to describe verbally the information
presented just to his left hemisphere, which is dominant for certain
linguistic tasks; his right hemisphere, if placed in similar circum-
stances, remains "mute." Thomas Nagel writes, somewhat misleadingly,
that the "... right hemisphere is not very intelligent and it cannot
talk." 15 Nonetheless, the right hemisphere as well as the left is
capable of responding appropriately (by controlling the left and right
sides of the body, respectively) to instructions of varying levels of
complexity. 17
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A Cartesian might be inclined toward the view that the right hem-
isphere, with its small quantity of linguistic ability, is not con-
scious
.
18 But it seems that in fact patients in which the left hemis-
phere has been fully excised are only implausibly excluded from the
category of conscious beings. Oliver L. Zangwill writes, of such a
patient, that he
• • • though grossly handicapped in speech and motor
performance, was fully alert, in touch with his environ-
ment ji^d responsive to those around him. He was found by
Smith to be capable of a low-average performance on a
diagrammatic intelligence test.
Interestingly, left-hemisphere patients have been taught to communi-
cate by means of a language-like apparatus
.
21 Using paper cut-outs as
symbols for nouns, proper names, and verbs, patients expressed in
appropriate contexts simple propositions and behaved appropriately
when, in the same "language," propositions were expressed to them.
These observations make the claim that the right hemisphere (after
commissurotomy) lacks conscious awareness seem implausible.
The data introduced above do not, of course, prove in any sense
that commissurotomy produces a plurality of conscious beings. However,
it does seem that during certain periods the split-brain patient is
most plausibly described as possessing distinct centers of conscious-
ness. This, in turn, suggests that it is at least possible that
something which would ordinarily be counted a single conscious being
can undergo a procedure which produces a plurality of conscious beings.
One now need blend together only a bit of science fiction with
actual fact. One need imagine only that, after the commissurotomy is
performed, the two hemispheres are removed from the original human
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body, transplanted into each of two separate bodies, and reconnected to
distinct middle and lower brains, thereby producing distinct conscious
beings, each the proud possessor of his own human body. These distinct
creatures surely must be counted persons
. Obviously, no one has been
subjected to such a procedure. But is it logically possible? It
seems that it is. It is hard to see why surgical procedures delicate
enough to bring about the desired result could not exist. The dubious
aspect of the described procedure is that which involves severing the
lines of communication" between the hemispheres without destroying
consciousness altogether. That this aspect is more than possible has
already been substantiated.
I turn, then, to position (B). Recall that stage si is a pre-
fission stage, and that s2 and s3 are post-fission stages. Suppose
that it can happen that what is apparently just one person splits into
two distinct persons. Position (B) is that, under this assumption, if
cannot happen that the M-relation holds between si and s2 and between
si and s3.
Against this position it should be noted that the right hemis-
phere of the conmi ssurotomy patient is capable of learning and, thus,
apparently of remembering. (Zangwill writes, "The right hemisphere may
be mute but is certainly not amnesiac"^). Thus, the right hemisphere,
despite its minimal linguistic capability, apparently retains in its
memory certain bits of linguistic information acquired by the patient
prior to commissurotomy. It seems, then, that there is a certain con-
tinuity of consciousness linking the precommissurotomy patient and the
03
right hemisphere.
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Of course the M*-rel ation
,
and hence the M*-relation, remains
obscure to a considerable degree since it is specified by appeal to the
still somewhat vague notion of x's having consciousness of doing some-
thing y did. But it is implausible to suppose that whatever causal
processes gross or sublime" are involved in generating the M-relation
could not link si with s2 and si with s3. Furthermore, any specifica-
tion of the "consciousness of" relation acceptable to the defender of
(S) will yield together with (S) that the left-hemisphere patient, for
instance, is identical to the person who used to occupy his body. For
this reason as well, (B) must be rejected.
Puccetti 1 s Theory
Puccetti adopts a view very like position (C). According to him,
commissurotomy does not actually produce two persons. It is rather a
means of separating two intimately related persons. The problem of
deciding identities among a, b, and c, on Puccetti's view,
. . . could be overcome by supposing that each cerebral
hemisphere in the normal human brain constitutes the
basis for a unitary person, separation and successful
transplantation of each destroying only the original
compound of these two persons. ^
Thus, Puccetti avoids contradiction by maintaining that persons b and c
exist all along, at first within a single body and later within inde-
pendently functioning bodies. The question of with whom the original
persona, a, is identical never arises, since there is no original
person.
Does this way of looking at things save ( S ) ? The answer to the
question depends on whether what was originally said to be one stage.
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Sl, is really two; and furthermore, if two, on whether the two are re
lated by M*. Since Puccetti thinks that both prior and subsequent to
fission there are just two conscious beings, in fact the same two
conscious beings, it seems that he would reply affirmatively to the
former question and negatively to the latter. This line would indeed
save (S) from contradiction. The fission case, as Puccetti describes
it, can be diagrammed as follows:
o o
sl s2
o o
sl 1 s3
tl t2
5. Puccetti
' s Example
The basis for his claim that entities which are normally thought
to be single persons are really conglomerates of persons cannot, of
course, simply be that if it is correct, then (S) is saved. For, even
though (S) intuitively seems very plausible, a claim which is even more
intuitively plausible is the claim that under normal conditons what is
thought to be just one person really is just one person. This latter
claim is not, of course, something that one is wedded to as one is
wedded to the Law of the Excluded Middle. Nonetheless, a considerable
amount of evidence is required before one is actually justified in re-
jecting it. Puccetti offers what he considers sufficient evidence.
This evidence is presented in the form of arguments based on neuro-
physiological data and the Principle of the Indiscernibil ity of Iden-
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tical s.
I Will consider here only the two arguments he introduces for his
view that the ordinary human body is associated with two conscious
beinas. These arguments are both, I think, flawed. (A distinct argu-
ment, which 1 will not consider here, is required to show that each of
conscious beings is a person.)
Puccetti argues as follows.
[In] the normal, commissural ly intact brain there is neurological
representation for the full subjective visual field in each
cerebral hemisphere
. But in that case,TrT“.^7 wnlH^us-
ness spans both hemispheres through the commissural connections
between them, j ought to see not one but two- full visual fields
w2th thej_r contents
,
side b^ side
. But I do not. I see only
“
one full subjective visual field. But if that is correct, my con-
scious unity is not based in both cerebral hemispheres but onlv
in one.^ J
Thus, on Puccetti's view, in my visual field now, for example, is a
single, small, red rug.^ Neural activity—what Puccetti prejudicially
calls a neurological representation"--corresponding to what I see is
to be found in each of my cerebral hemispheres. Suppose, as Puccetti
apparently does, that it is in virtue of there being a red-rug-repre-
sentation in one of my cerebral hemispheres that I see, or seem to see,
a red rug. Suppose, then, for reductio
, that associated with my brain
there is only one conscious being. (That is, suppose that the
conscious being associated with my left hemisphere just is the one
associated with my right hemisphere.) Then, since in each of my cere-
bral hemispheres is a red-rug-representation, I should see (seem to
see) two red rugs, side by side. But I don't. Thus, Puccetti con-
cludes, it is not the case that I, the conscious being associated with
the left, verbal hemisphere, am identical to that associated with the
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right, non-verbal hemisphere. Thus, under one skull are two distinct
conscious beings.
Puccetti appeals in this argument to the principle that for each
distinct red-rug-representation existing in the hemispheres, one at
least seems to see a distinct red rug. Without this principle, the in-
ference from the fact that there exist in my hemispheres distinct red-
rug-representations to the claim that I see, or seem to see, distinct
red rugs would be unlicensed. But this principle is dubious. It needs
support. Clearly, associated with each of my retinas is a distinct
retinal red-rug-image. But no one would suggest that, therefore,
either I seem to see two red rugs (which I don't) or "I" am really two.
Puccetti himself thinks that this first argument is suggestive,
but not obviously sound.^ Thus he offers a second argument.
The neurological data that form the basis for this second
argument are the following. (The subject, as before, is someone with
an intact corpus callosum.) It was found that
... if the subject fixated on a point equi-distant between
two flashing lights the light flashing in the left visual
half-field of a right-hander had to precede by, say, 9.75
milliseconds the light flashing in the right visual half-
field in order for the subject to report them verbally as
simultaneous. [In contrast] the flashing lights were per-
ceived in the mute hemisphere at twice the actual time
elapsed between them, that is as occurring 19.5 milli-
seconds apart
. . ,
2°
Puccetti concludes as before that there are two distinct conscious
beings in one body. One conscious being perceives the lights to flash
simultaneously, whereas the other perceives the lights to flash a
fraction of a second apart. By the Principle of the Indi scernibi 1 i ty
of Identicals, the conscious beings are thus diverse.
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Here as before certain principles Puccetti appeals to should be
examined. One principle is that every perception is such that some
conscious being has it. Without this principle, Puccetti would not be
able to conclude from the fact that a perception occurs in the right
hemisphere that a conscious being has that perception. This principle
accords both with philosophical and with everyday usage of the term
perception." I will not question it here.
However, a second principle, if indeed the word "perception" is
understood in this way, is less acceptable. Puccetti assumes that the
electrochemical responses to the flashing lights which occur in the
right mute" hemisphere 19.5 milliseconds apart are perceptions.
(Recall that the case is a "normal" one. The subject's right, "mute"
hemisphere cannot be isolated and asked what it perceives.) Thus, he
writes, "... the flashing lights were perceived in the mute hemis-
phere at twice the actual time
. . .
." But Puccetti provides no justi-
fication for this claim.
Puccetti would perhaps argue as follows. The responses of the
right hemisphere (what Puccetti says are "perceptions") are qualita-
tively similar to those of the left hemisphere. Since the responses of
the left hemisphere are perceptions, so are those of the right hemis-
phere.
This reply is clearly inadequate. Assuming that the responses
have exactly the same qualities (except, for instance, spatial loca-
tion) would be to beg the question, since it would require the assump-
tion that the right hemisphere's responses are such that some conscious
being is aware of them. However, unless Puccetti assumes that al 1
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qualities which the two could share they in fact do share, the possi-
bility remains open that one difference between them is that one is
perceived and the other is not.
Thus, Puccetti's arguments in favor of his startling view con-
cerning the nature of the ordinary human being are unconvincing.
Furthermore, Puccetti fails to account for data which seem to support
the seemingly well-supported commonsensical claim that within the
ordinary human skull there is a single conscious being (where a con-
scious being is something which thinks and remembers, wills and wants.)
But these data need to be accounted for by Puccetti, given that he
wants to hold that the thesis they support is false. Thus, for in-
stance, he needs to explain why it is that only after commissurotomy
patients begin occasionally to manifest behavior indicative of two
conscious beings. One commissurotomy patient attempted to strike his
wife with his left hand, which is controlled by the right hemisphere.
At the same time, with his right hand, which is controlled by the left
hemisphere, he strove to restrain his left hand. Why are such cases so
unusual, if associated with the ordinary human being are two minds?
Thus, there seems at this point to be no adequate justification
for our third possibility, (C). I conclude, then, that the fission
case is at least logically possible, if not phy si cal ly possible as
well. To avoid contradiction, the Lockean principle (S) shall have to
be rejected.
What criterion of personal identity, if any, should be accepted
in its place? Appealing to an argument very much like that stated at
the beginning of this chapter against (S), Bernard Williams reasons
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that bodily continuity is at least a necessary condition for personal
identity. He thus rejects al_l_ criteria according to which psychologi-
cal continuity between one person and another suffices for personal
identity. In the following section, the line of reasoning he suggests
against these “psychological criteria" will be examined.
Williams' Argument
Williams' example of the twentieth-century Charles, who imagines
himself to be the seventeenth-century Guy Fawkes and who seems to
remember doing many of the things Fawkes in fact did, has already been
mentioned (Chapter II, Section 3). It was used as a counterexample to
an early version of the memory criterion. In the following passage,
Williams further details the case. The similarity between the fission
case and the modified "Guy Fawkes" case is obvious.
[Both] Charles and his brother [are clairvoyant
with respect to Guy Fawkes.] What should we say in
this case? They cannot both be Guy Fawkes; if they
were, Guy Fawkes would be in two places at once,
which is absurd. Moreover, if they were both iden-
tified with Guy Fawkes, they would be identical
with each other, which is also absurd. Hence, we
could not say that they were both identical with
Guy Fawkes. 29
And any principle which does say that both Charles and Robert are
identical with Guy Fawkes is, in consequence, false. Williams intro-
duces this example in order to argue for the claim that bodily contin-
uity is a necessary condition of personal identity. ^0 It is this argu-
ment I will be concerned with in the present section.
It is fair to point out here that, given (E5), it is not the case
that either Charles or Robert can be said, strictly, to have conscious -
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ness of doing anything Guy Fawkes in fact did. Consciousness between
stages impiies that the M‘-relation holds between these stages. But
Stages of Charles and Guy Fawkes are not stages of the same human body;
neither are stages of Robert and Guy Fawkes. The stages are not
causally linked in any way similar to the way stages of the same human
body are linked, when one such stage recollects doing something the
other did; and thus (E5) yields that neither Charles nor Robert has
consciousness of doing something Fawkes did. On (S), then, as it is
finally construed in Chapter II, Charles and Robert are neither one
Identical to Fawkes. Thus, while the “Guy Fawkes" case may perhaps be
used as a counterexample against certain psychological criteria, it by
no means refutes every such criterion. The case, by itself, does not
compel one to accept Williams' claim that bodily continuity is a
necessary condition of personal identity.
Williams, however, has at hand a more general argument against
psychological criteria. He writes:
• • • identity is a one-one-relation, and ... no princi-
ple can be a criterion of identity for things of type T if
it relies only on what is logically a one-many or many-
many relation between things of type T. 31
The point may be put as follows. The following principle is a truth
of logic ( x, "y
, "
"u," "v," and "w" vary over persons):
(R)((x)(y)(x=y Rxy ) ->
(u)(v) (w) ( (Ruv & Ruw) v=w))
Thus, on Williams' view, no criterion of identity for persons, of the
form (x)(y) (x=y Rxy), will be true if the relation R does not satis-
fy the following condition (Wl):
Wl. (u)(v)(w)((Ruv & Ruw) —> v=w)
89
Williams presumably thinks that no "psychological" relation can satisfy
(Wl). Thus, he concludes that bodily continuity is a necessary condi-
tion of personal identity. However, as it happens, the relation
appealed to in (S)-ss' (M*s,s‘vM*s 1 ,s)-can hold only between
person-stages and thus trivially satisfies (Wl). So even Williams'
more general argument fails against (S).
Nonetheless, the more general argument can easily be revised. A
close relation of the logical truth formulated above is the following.
Let si," "s2," "s3, " "s4," and "s5" vary over person-stages. Then,
(R)((sl)(s2)( (The x such that si is a stage of x) =
(The x such that s2 is a stage of x) *->
Rsls2)~*
(s3)(s4)(s5)((rs3s4 & Rs3s5)-^
Rs4s5)
Here, too, is an undeniable truth of logic. On this principle, rela-
tions are only suitable for use in a criterion of personal identity if
they satisfy the following condition (W2):
W2. (sl)(s2)(s3)((Rsls2 & Rsls3) — Rs2s3)
This second conditional is not, of course, equivalent to Williams' ori-
ginal; but it clearly a condition Williams would expect any adequate
criterion of identity to satisfy.
One may use (W2) to construct an argument against (S). The
fission case reveals that the relation appealed to in (S) is m)t such
that it si bears it to s2 and to s3, for any si, s2, and s3, s2 bears
it to s3. Therefore, (S) is unsatisfactory as a criterion of identity
for persons.
Williams does not explicity consider a "brain splitting" case.
But given the use he makes of the "Guy Fawkes" case, he could be expec-
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ted to accept the preceding line of reasoning as an argument against
(S). There is nothing wrong with this line of reasoning, (s) shall
have to be rejected.
A similar point has, of course, already been made without appeal
to Williams' condition. If one accepts both (S) and the possibility of
fission, one becomes enmeshed in contradiction. That fission is at
least logically possible cannot plausibly be denied. Thus, (S) must be
rejected.
Williams 1 own conclusion is a bit more radical. He apparently
thinks that some such line of reasoning as that used above can be
adduced against any_ psychological criterion of identity. He thus con-
cludes that 11
. . . bodily identity is always a necessary condition of
personal identity." 32 However, whether this stronger conclusion can be
justified is doubtful. Among other things, one would first have to
argue that no psychological criterion can be formulated which satisfies
both (Wl) and (W2). A view will be suggested in Chapter IV which must
be considered psychological but nonetheless meets the conditions
Williams suggests. For the present, we will examine a certain assump-
tion Williams makes in his argument for his position that bodily con-
tinuity is a necessary condition of personal identity we will then look
at a series of questionable results to which this apparently unjusti-
fied position leads.
Gale's Objection; A Reply
Williams argues that bodily identity is always a necessary condi-
tion of personal identity. He seems to think that this conclusion
91
follows from, or at least indicated by, consideration of examples such
the "Guy Fawkes" case. He, apparently, reasons as follows.
,f bod .
1,y COntinuit
* is admitted as a necessary condition of persona, iden-
tity, then Since not both Robert and Charles can be bodily continuous
with (have the same body as) Fawkes, one will not be led to the result
that both Robert and Charles, clearly distinct persons, are identical
to Fawkes.
Richard Gale notes that this line of reasoning contains a certain
questionable assumption.« The problem, as Gale sees it, is that the
relation which Williams implicitly suggests cannot be such that Fawkes
bears it both to Charles and to Robert does not in fact have this very
feature. That relation. Gale thinks, is not one-one. It does not,
that is, satisfy the very condition, (Wl), which Williams suggested
that any useful relation must satisfy. The case which leads Gale to
this conclusion is the following, which not unexpectedly parallels the
fission case. At t, person
A rises from his chair and goes off in two different di-
rections-t0 h’s left and right. Let us call the body
which goes off to the left B and the one to the right C.
o say that A splits in two at t may be misleading,
since it might be taken to mean that the right and left
s^es of his body sever, each going its own merry way.
But this is not what happens, since-the bodies of B and
C are in all respects similar to A. 4
B and C are both bodily continuous with A. But B and C are themselves
distinct. Gale thus concludes that Williams’ reliance on bodily con-
tinuity is misguided: that relation is no more helpful, "logically,"
for stating a criterion of personal identity than is a relation of psy-
chological continuity.
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williams states the claim he wants to make in different ways. As
already noted, he writes that “bodily identity is always a necessary
condition of personal identity." He does not provide any complete elu-
cidation of the notion of bodily identity, although he does say that he
upposes that
... it includes the notion of spatiotemporal contin-
uity, however that notion is to be explained ." 35 In a later paper pn
the same topic he says, about the argument presented in the earlier
paper that it was intended to show that bodily continuity is a necessary
condition of personal identity
.
36
Let us, then, just consider the question of whether spatiotem-
poral continuity, that is, bodily continuity, is one-one.
Williams would, of course, want to maintain that the relation is
one-one. He considers, explicitly, the case of an amoeba's splitting.
On his view, neither of the amoebas produced in fission is spatiotem-
porally continuous with the original. Presumably, Williams would say,
too, that neither is bodily continuous with the original.
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It seems, then, that Williams would say about Gale's case that
neither B nor C is spatiotemporal ly continuous with A, thus, that
neither B nor C is bodily continuous with A.
The pertinent question is, however, on what grounds might Wil-
liams make this claim. He must explain wh^ it is that B and C are
not each spatiotemporal ly continuous with A. As noted earlier, he does
not provide a complete elucidation of the notion of spatiotemporal
continuity. He does write that "... the normal application of the
concept of continuity is interfered with by the fact of fission
. .
."
Williams does not, however, go on to say what it is about the "fact of
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fission" which "interferes" with spatiotemporal continuity. Here are
two positions one might take. First, one might hold that A and B are
not spatiotemporally continuous because of the presence of an offshoot
c. Second, one might hold that B is not spatiotemporally continuous
with A because B and A do not share enough of the same stuff. That
they do not is indicated by the presence of C, which is an exact du-
plicate of B and is related to A just as B is.
The first position is clearly unacceptable. Williams would not
want to say that the mere presence of a spati otemporal offshoot inter-
rupts the spatiotemporal continuity of a given aggregate of temporal
parts. When an acorn falls from an oak tree, spatiotemporal continuity
between the oak tree at the earlier time and the oak tree at the later
time is not disrupted. So the first position will not do.
Thus, consider the second position. It can be formulated as fol-
lows: x at t and y at t' are spatiotemporally continuous if and only
if there is some stuff s such that more than half of the stuff which
composes x at t is s and more than half of the stuff which composes y
at t* is s. (How such stuff is itself to be identified is a deep ques
tion I leave aside here.) I shall refer to this principle as the
"fifty percent plus" rule. The criterion of identity, then, which
makes use of this notion would involve the following claim: persons x
and y are identical, only if for any times t and t', such that t'
occurs just after t, x exists at t, and y exists at t', x at t and y
at t are spatiotemporally continuous. (There are fairly obvious dif-
ficulties with this principle. To alleviate these difficulties, one
must have at hand some distinct means of settling questions of syn-
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chronic identity. Let us put these difficulties aside here.)
The bodily continuity criterion sketched here does seem to avoid
contradiction. Since not both B and C can have more than half of the
stuff composing A, not both B and C, after fission, will be spatiotem-
porally continuous with A, before fission. Thus, not both B and C are
identical to A.
Gale seems to ignore this particular not implausible way of ex-
plaining the relation of spatiotemporal
,
or bodily, continuity. Ex-
actly why Williams thinks that the "fact of fission" indicates the lack
of spatiotemporal continuity remains unclear. But if indeed Williams
does adopt the fifty percent plus rule, then it becomes a bit easier to
see why he finds it reasonable to hold that bodily continuity is a
necessary condition of personal identity. The view, quite simply, en-
ables one to avoid contradiction. The relation specified in the fifty
percent plus rule satisfies (Wl).
Adopting bodily continuity as a necessary condition of personal
identity may, thus, enable one to avoid contradiction. Nonetheless,
there are difficulties with this position. We now turn to these dif-
ficulties.
Bodily Continuity Criteria
Clearly, a person may from one moment to the next lose more than
half that stuff of which his body is made and nonetheless continue to
exist. Under the fifty percent plus rule, a bodily continuity criter-
ion would yield that this situation could not arise. Hence, that cri-
terion is false. Because of this remarkable fact about people, it ap-
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pears that no bodily continuity criterion will be correct.
Someone inclined for Williams' reasons toward a bodily continuity
criterion might suggest the more plausible view that the correct cri-
terion of personal identity is the one based on brain continuity. Of
course, the prihciple will be helpful in the face of fission only if
the fifty percent plus rule is assumed. Thus, one might hold that,
where x and y are persons, x is y only if for any times t and t\ such
that f occurs just after t, x exists at t and y exists at t\ x's
t and y s brain at t are spatiotemporally continuous. Con-
sider, then, the original fission case. The principle under consider-
ation yields that either afb or a*:. Analogous results would be ob-
tained concerning Gale's case. Thus, it looks as though a brain con-
tinuity criterion may well enable one to avoid contradiction.
Brain continuity principles are, however, problematic for other
reasons. In right-handed persons it generally happens that the left
cerebral hemisphere, which controls the right-hand, is the seat of
linguistic and analytic abilities. In such cases even extensive damage
to the right cerebral hemisphere seems to have relatively little ef-
fect on the person. A right-hemisphere patient can still talk, still
oo
reason, still remember
.
00
Many of the abilities he had prior to the
trauma are retained.
Given these facts, the following case is surely logical ly--even
physically possible. Jones' right cerebral hemisphere is damaged and
must be removed from hs cranium to prevent the spread of infection.
His left "verbal" hemisphere remains as healthy as ever. The infection
has, however, already spread to certain parts of the middle and lower
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brain. Some of these have to be replaced by donated organs. All in
all, slightly more than fifty percent of Jones' brain is removed. He
awakens from surgery with his memories intact. He is able to co«uni-
cate. Even though he has difficulty understanding abstract language,
and a hard time sketching accurately what he sees, the operation is de
dared a success. His life has been saved. But the brain continuity
criterion directs that the resulting creature is not Jones-that in
fact no one who now exists is Jones. Thus, the brain continuity cri-
terion is false.
Alternative Brain Continuity Criterion
A brain continuity criterion according to which identity with
some future person requires that the verbal hemisphere persist more or
less intact seems to have the advantage of both enabling one to avoid
contradiction and directing that Jones, in the case described above,
survives surgery. But such a criterion must ultimately, I think, be
judged to be unsatisfactory. For consider the more pitiable cases in
which left, verbal hemisphere damage is present. It was noted earlier
that in such patients, a variety of higher cognitive abilities may
linger if not flourish despite the fact that verbal communication is
typically thought to be impracticable. Furthermore, in left-handed
persons brain lateralization (division of labor between the hemi-
spheres) has been found to be less dramatic: linguistic ability may
thus not be so affected by damage to either of the hemispheres. And
finally it is difficult to see why a case in which perfect hemispher-
ical symmetry exists could not occur. In such a case, both hemispheres
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wou,d be verbal. Then, there would be no unl que verbal hemisphere.
The above criterion would direct falsely that such a surviving subject
does not in fact survive.
Consider, then, yet another criterion. It is that persons are
identical just in case (1) a certain brain continuity relation B holds
between x and y at all times during their lives and (2) it is not the
case that either (a) there is some person z such that z and x bear B to
one another at all times during their lives but z and y do not or (B)
there is some person z such that z and y bear B to one another at all
times during their lives but z and x do not.
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B here is a weakened
brain continuity relation: the fifty percent plus rule is not assumed
here. The intuition behind the principle is that survival of just half
or less may guarantee survival of the person, providing there exists
no competitor which is related in analogous significant ways to the
original. Consider, then, the case of Jones, introduced above. On
this new criterion, in contrast to the original, Jones survives the
operation, for he bears B, the weakened continuity relation, to some
future person. Furthermore, the principle applied to Gale's case
yields that A^B and that Aj*C; the relation appealed to (not B that con-
structed from B) satisfies Williams' (W2). In other words, adopting
this principle would, it seems, enable one to avoid contradiction.
I will call this final brain continuity criterion (BCC). It is
clearly inadequate. One problem with it is that the relation B has not
been carefully specified. It is not all clear that a brain continuity
relation meeting the above description (i.e., one which relates Jones-
before-surgery and Jones-after-surgery) can be specified. The change
98
in Jones' brain is far too dramatic.
Perhaps some appropriate repair could be made. However, it seems
that there are more fundamental objections to this last stab. I will
consider two such objections here. The first involves a certain two-
world argument. Let wl be a world in which the original fission case
occurs. That is, a's brain is divided and transplanted; the resulting
creature, b, inherits a's left hemisphere and c, his right. Let w2 be
a world in which a's left hemisphere is transplanted; b is thereby pro-
duced; and a's right hemisphere is destroyed. (BCC) yields that, in
wl. afb and, in w2, a=b. Since if things x and y are strictly iden-
tical, it is necessary that they are identical, the principle leads to
contradiction.
One might attempt to defend (BCC) on the grounds that the preced-
ing argument is based on a certain faulty assumption. Let it be given
that a is involved in both the wl and the w2 cases. Then, the faulty
assumption is that b is involved in both the wl case and the w2 case;
these two characters may indeed be remarkably similar but they are
nonetheless two.
The defender of (BCC) may thus point out that contradiction may
be avoided by rejecting a certain cross-world identity claim, as well
as by rejecting (BCC).
The difficulty with this reply is that, given that there are some
cases of cross-world identity, the basis on which diversity between b
and b's w2 look-alike can be claimed is elusive. Call the b-like
creature of w2 "b 1 ." b and b‘ may be assumed to have the same genetic
coding, the same futures; they may be assumed to be composed, subse-
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quent to surgery, of just the same stuff. Furthermore, the worlds in
which the two exist are as similar as they can be, given the fact that
c exists in one but not the other. Claims as to the diversity of b and
b appear to be wholly ad hoc maneuvers designed to save (BCC).
The defender of (BCC) may well deny that such claims are purely
——
At least, it seems that it can be shown that the "consider-
ations of similarity" between b and b' appealed to above in support of
the claim that b=b', do not in fact provide one with enough reason
to hold that b and b' are identical. The argument is as follows. Con-
sider a second series of worlds and entities. In w3 block of wood d
loses one-quarter of the stuff which composes it. A moment later it
loses a third of its remaining stuff. What was originally d's upper
half remains intact, then, as d. (If one desires, one may imagine the
loss of material to be less abrupt.) In w4 d undergoes similar
changes, except that d persists not as its upper half but as its lower
half. Finally, in w5 d is from moment to the next chopped in two,
horizontally left to right. Call what was originally d's upper half
"e," and what was originally d's lower half, "f." Clearly, e^f. But
w3's d and w5's e are composed of exactly the same stuff arranged in
exactly the same way. Their futures if not their pasts are the same.
They simply come to be in their final forms at different rates. Con-
siderations of similarity lead one thus to conclude that d is e;
analogously, one concludes that d _i_s f. Given the symmetry and trans-
itivity of identity, it follows that e=f as well. But it cannot be
that both e=f and e^f.
Some premise or group of premises in this argument must, there-
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fore, be rejected. The weak links In this ardent, the defender of
(BCC) W0Uld h0,d
* claim of cross-world identity between d and
e and between d and f. Considerations of similarity formed the bases
for these claims. Therefore curhT s c considerate are misleading.
Thus, it may appear that the claim that b and b' are distinct is
not a merely ad hoc maneuver designed to save the criterion in ques-
tion. As it turns out, there is nothing really objectionable about
this ploy, for, as it happens, considerations which originally led to
the identification of b and b' lead, when applied to other cases, to
contradiction.
It is perhaps obvious that the above defense of (BCC) is inade-
quate, however. The fictional speaker for the defense assumes that,
to avoid contradiction, identity between d and e or between d and f
needs to be denied. But clearly there are other means of avoiding con-
tradiction. One may hold instead as the "false identity" that between
the original d, in w3, and d's upper half, also in w3. This would seem
to be the more intuitive route.
A brief summary of the preceding discussion of (BCC) may be help-
ful here. I, first, argued that (BCC) together with the two-world case
leads to contradiction. I, then, considered an objection to the argu-
ment against (BCC). The objection involved the claim that a certain
cross-world identity— not between b and b'—which I assumed to hold in
my argument against (BCC) does not in fact hold. An argument support-
ing the claim of diversity between b and b' was then adduced. Finally,
I suggested that this latter argument was not persuasive, since it is
based on questionable assumptions concerning certain diachronic iden-
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titles. A stalemate has been reached. It is one which cannot be bro-
ken until certain profound Issues of cross-world Identity are settled.
These issues need not, I think, be settled here. For the second
of the more fundamental objections to (BCC) does not involve the claim
that b=b'. I turn, now, to this second objection. Suppose (I think
contrary to fact) that b and b' are distinct. Then, (BCC) yields that
a and b (of wl) are diverse, and a and b' (of w2) are identical. The
mere existence of the offshoot c in world wl is what makes the differ-
ence in these two cases. But this seems wrong. Whether c exists or
not should make no difference to how the question of identity between a
and b, or b', is answered. But on (BCC) whether c exists is crucial.
Thus, (BCC) is unacceptable.
Some Conclusions
At this point a variety of conclusions can be drawn. It seems
that criteria of personal identity for which the original fission case
does not present problems-criteria, that is, involving relations which
satisfy Williams' condition— can be counterexampled by the case of
Jones. And those that yield correct results when applied to the Jones
case lead to contradiction when applied to the case of fission. They
do not, that is, involve criteria which satisfy Williams' condition.
The difficulty introduced at the beginning of this chapter— the
fact, that is, that an intuitively plausible criterion of identity
apparently leads to contradiction, given the fission case— has thus
evolved. One can, of course, avoid contradiction by rejecting (S).
But it seems that, paradoxically, there are certain contexts, such as
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the Jones case, in which
the facts of the fission
onin criteria such as (S) which, together with
case, entail a contradiction yield precisely
the right results.
Thus, it appears that a perfectly general problem, a problem for
the bodily continuity criteria which Williams advocates as well as for
psychological criteria, has emerged. It can be stated in the form of
an argument. Consider a world in which a's left hemisphere is trans-
planted and his right hemisphere, destroyed. The resulting creature,
b, awakens; b is tested; and the operation is declared a success. It
seems that any adequate criterion of personal identity would yield that
a=b. (Such a criterion would thus yield that Jones survives the opera-
tion.) Consider, further, a world in which a's right hemisphere is
transplanted and his left hemisphere, destroyed. The resulting crea-
ture, c, awakens; c is tested; and the operation is declared a success.
As before, it seems that an adequate criterion would yield that a=c.
(Recall the more "pitiable cases.") Since if x and y are identical,
necessarily they are identical, and since identity is both transitive
and symmetric, it is necessary that b=c. But finally consider a world
in which the original fission case occurs. Any adequate criterion will
direct that b^c. Thus, it appears that any adequate criterion will
lead to contradiction
.
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I will refer to this argument as the "three-world problem." Its
paradoxical flavor should be noted: each premise is compelling, and
the conclusion appears to follow validly from the premises. The con-
clusion itself is not a contradiction (for perhaps there are no
adequate criteria of identity for persons), but it is startling. It
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throws into question each and every criterion of personal identity
whether based on psychological or bodily continuity. Thus, against
this objection, the defender of bodily continuity criteria has no
better reply than the defender of psychological criteria.
One position which would allow for a fast solution to this puzzle
has already been discussed. On this position (in fact a defense of
BCC), certain crucial cross-world identity claims fail. However, the
issue of whether or not this position could ultimately be justified was
hever Settled
' « «« ^ally concluded that even if this questionable
position could be justified, (BCC) nonetheless was not salvageable.
Analogous points may be made about the three-world puzzle. Of
course, if it could be shown that the person as whom a survived in the
non-fission world, labeled "b,” is not identical to the fission world
creature, also labeled "b," who inherited a's left hemisphere, then the
three-world problem could easily be defused. However, an equally com-
pelling difficulty takes its place. For, if a survives— as b— in the
non-fission world, then a survives-as b's analogue-in the fission
world. Why is this? The worlds differ only in the ways they must,
given that c exists in one but not in the other. It is grossly implaus-
ible to suppose that, because of these differences, a should survive
in one world and fail to survive in the other. But, if whatever hap-
pens to a in one world befalls a in the other, it does no harm to
assume that the cross-world identities, which have yet to be estab-
lished, in fact hold. The original three-world problem thus remains
intact.
In the following section, one solution to the problem will be
104
considered, others will be Introduced in Chapters IV and V.
Parfit's Solution
m his article “Personal Identity." Derek Parfit proposes an in-
novative solution to what is. basically, the three-world puzzle.41 In
this section, I examine his proposal.
He does not suggest a criterion of personal identity. Indeed, he
remains unsure that there is any such criterion available. He is none-
theless willing to make certain judgments concerning identity. 42
Following his lead on the fission case, one would hold that not
both a=b and a=c and would hold (S) to be in consequence false. In
this manner Parfit would avoid the apparently absurd claim that b is c.
Of course Williams, also, disavowed psychological criteria; he with
Parfit, wants not to be committed to the position that b and c are the
same person. But such proclamations do not by themselves amount to a
^1ution t0 the Puzzle. Parfit accordingly goes further. According to
him, a, while not identical to both b and c, nonetheless bears some in-
timate relation to both b and c; in particular, a survives as both b
and c. Thus, in non-fission worlds, involving, say, a and b, one is
free to claim that a survives as b. Thus, following Parfit's recipe,
one might say that while (S) is an inadequate criterion of identity
,
the principle just like (S) except that "survives as" replaces "is
identical to" is adequate as a criterion of survival.
I have not detailed Parfit's view here. But one can, I think al-
ready see some of its advantages and disadvantages. One remains free
to hold, about the fission world (w3), that b^c, yet to hold, about the
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non-fission world (wl and w2), that a survives as b and that a survives
as c. respectively. Thus. Parfit's view allows Lockean intuitions to
be satisfied to some considerable degree. But it is never the case
that a is identified with b and c. who are assumed distinct. So con-
tradiction is avoided.
Parfn's approach thus has certain desirable features. One may
say approximately what one is inclined to say about the fission case
without becoming enmeshed in contradiction. Nonetheless, especially at
first glance, the appeal his theory has is eclipsed by a certain gross
inadequacy. For his view seems to require that one deny the surely
true principle that, where x and y are persons, necessarily if x sur-
vives as y, then x-y. According to Parfit, the important question of
survival should be "prized apart" from questions of identity.43 How-
ever, that this conceptual splitting, upon which he must insist, can be
accomplished is unclear.
Parfit, of course, has anticipated this objection. He is most
reasonably construed as espousing a view which is, contrary to appear-
ance, consistent with the surely true principle stated above linking
survival and identity. For one of Parfit's aims is ".
. . to suggest a
sense of 'survive' which does not imply identity." 44 Survival, on Par-
fit s view, indicates not identity with some future person
,
but rather
psychological continuity with some future person . 4 "1 To avoid ambiguity
I will write "surviveso" when I want to suggest the ordinary sense of
the word, according to which one survives only if one is identical with
some future person, and I will write "survivep" when I want to suggest
Parfit's special sense of the word. Here, then, are two statements
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Parfit could be expected to endorse. Necessarily. If x surv1ves as y>
then x=y; and, possibly, x survives as y and xfy. Thus, Parfit's
position is, contrary to initial appearances, consistent with the
surely true principle linking survival and identity. He can consis-
tently hold that "survives" in its ordinary sense-“survives
"-implies
identity wi th some future person
.
But in maneuvering to avoid one objection to his view, Parfit di-
minishes substantially the overall value of his approach. It was al-
leged earlier that one of the virtues of Parfit's account was that it
satisfied Lockean intuitions. It appeared that on Parfit's view psycho
logical continuity between x and a future person y, since it suffices
for su rvival
,
would decide such important issues as whether x lived or
died. But having examined Parfit's reply to the earlier objection, we
are in a position to see that in fact Parfit's view is that psychologi-
cal continuity decides no such important issues. The Lockean intuition
that "double success" represented in the fission case is no "failure"
remains unsatisfied.^
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CHAPTER IV
PERSONS AS AGGREGATES
John Perry has suggested a means of solving what I called in
Chapter III the three-world puzzle. 1 The first step, on his view, is
to come to a thorough understanding of the events which occur in the
fission world. Perry thinks that examining cases more mundane than that
of fission (such as the "forking road" case described below) is helpful
in obtaining this understanding. For, according to him, what one says
about the more mundane cases can then be applied to the fission case.
Perry's insight concerns the utility, in solving the fission case, of
abandoning the principle that the number of (non-overlapping) temporal
person-stages which exist at a given time t is just the number of per-
sons which exist at t.
Perry develops a theory based on this insight; he later indicates
dissatisfaction with this particular theory but continues to urge that
solving the fission puzzle will ultimately involve rejecting the com-
monsensical principle according to which the number of person-stages
at t is the number of persons at t.
2
In this section, I first examine
one of these more mundane cases. I then turn to a theory of personal
identity suggested by David Lewis. Lewis' theory is similar to the one
Perry finally rejects in that it requires that this commonsensical
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principle be denied. (I consider Lewis' theory rather than Perry's in
this chapter because it is the more plausible of these two closely-re-
lated views.) After presenting Lewis' view. I defend it against ob-
jections proferred by Derek Parfit and Penelope Maddy. Finally. I
raise two further objections which indicate, I think, serious diffi-
culties with Lewis's view.
Perry's Insight
Suppose that through the center of town runs a certain road, Main
Street. 3 Just out of town the road splits. As one travels out of
town, one sees that the fork to the left is called "Seventh Street" and
that to the right, "Highway 67." There is considerable reason to iden-
tify Main and Seventh; they are very like, and someone may travel onto
Seventh without ever suspecting that he has changed roads. Finally,
reasons which favor the identification of the road running through the
center of town are matched equally be reasons which favor identifying
the road with Highway 67.
Consider, then, the following argument (Argument A). If there
were no Highway 67, Seventh and Main would be identified. Thus, since
possibly there is no Highway 67 and since if possibly Seventh is Main,
then in fact Seventh is Main, Premise (1) holds:
1. Seventh Street is identical to Main Street.
One may reason analogously to (2):
2. Highway 67 is identical to Main Street.
Since identity is symmetric and transitive,
3. Highway 67 is identical to Seventh Street.
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But clearly,
4
'
Street!!
01 '** C#Se that Highwa* 67 1s identical to Seventh
A contradiction, from (3) and (4), can thus be derived from premises
Which are, at first glance, innocuous enough. The analogy between this
argument and the three-world puzzle is obvious.
The justification given above for premises (1) and (2) is based
on, of course, the assumption that various crucial cross-world identi-
ties hold. The question of whether or not such an assumption is legi-
timate has already been considered (Chapter III, Section 7). However,
it seems (as before) that even if the assumption is discarded, other
justification for these premises exists. Examining a world containing
roads very_ j_ike Seventh and Main (and perhaps not Seventh and Main) but
such that offshoots of Main do not exist, one is strongly inclined to
say that these "look-alikes" of Seventh and Main are identical. But
whatever it is which obtains between the look-alikes and compels one to
judge that they are the same surely also obtains between Seventh and
Main. (The existence of Highway 67, that is, seems irrelevant.) What
one says about one world should be said about the other. Premise (1)
thus can be justified without appeal to the assumption that the
original roads and their respective look-alikes are identical. So,
also, can premise (2) be justified.
Argument A concerns a very ordinary sort of case. Surely, the
problem with it can be spotted. Then, this information can be used to
work out a solution to the three-world puzzle.
The following analysis seems plausible. If premises (1), (2),
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and (4) seem intuitively compelling, it is only because they are easily
confused with a second set of similar-sounding premises which are intu-
itively compelling. Members of the second set express, not identities
between roads, but rather unities among road £a^. The difference is
that one can accept members of this second set of premises without be-
coming enmeshed in contradiction. One need only refrain from assuming
that one road part cannot be a part of distinct roads.
Consider, then, the following argument (A'). Call the stretch of
road which runs just through the center of town, c; the stretch run-
ning to the left out of town, "1”; and the stretch running to the right
out of town, "r." Then, consider Argument A'.
1 . c and 1 are stretches of some same road.
In other words, there is some road such that c and 1 are better
stretches of that road.
2 . c and r are stretches of some same road.
From (1
' ) and (2
'
)
:
3 • 1 and r are stretches of some same road.
But clearly.
4
• It is not the case that 1 and r are stretches of some
same road.
The conjunction of (3
' ) and (4') is a contradiction.
The claim is, then, that premises (1) and (2) are false . Intui-
tions are satisfied, nonetheless, since ( 1
' ) and (2‘) are true. But
the second argument (A'), in contrast to (A), is inval id
. For, while
premise (3) of (A) is simply a logical consequence of premises (1) and
(2), (3') does not follow from the conjunction of (!') and (2'). The
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only plausible principle licensing the inference from (1') and (2') to
O') is the principle that a stretch of road can belong to (be a
stretch of) at most one road. Known facts about roads indicate that
this principle is false. Thus, (A') is invalid. The paradox is
resol ved.
The fission puzzle may be similarly resolved. Recall that si is
a's stage prior to fission; s2 and s3 are, respectively, b's and c's
stages after fission. One may hold that si and s2 are stages of single
person, as are si and s3. But s2 and s3 are not stages of a single
person. One may say about the non-fission worlds just what one says
about the fission world, without fear of contradiction. Thus, herein
is (perhaps) a solution to the three-world puzzle.
The above, roughly, is the way Lewis describes fission. Thus,
Lewis' view is in some respects similar to Puccetti's: on his view, as
well as Puccetti's, where one expects to find a single person, one
sometimes finds more. But Lewis' view has a certain advantage: he
need not argue that the subject of fission is really a conglomerate of
two conscious beings. In the following sections, I develop Lewis'
theory in detail.
Lewis' Theory
In his paper “Survival and Identity," Lewis writes:
Pretend that the open questions have been settled, so that
we have some definite relation of mental continuity and
connectedness among person-stages in mind as the relation
that matters for survival. Call it the R-relation, for
short.
Lewis's R-relation—the rel ata of which are person-stages— is both re-
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flexive and symmetric, but it is not transitive. How, then, can Lewis'
criterion of identity satisfy Williams' condition? For if the relation
is not transitive, then for some s, s', and s“, Rss', Rs's", and not
Rss". Since the relation is symmetric, Rs's. Thus, it may seem at
first glance that Lewis' criterion will fail Williams' condition.
In fact, this is not so. Lewis appeals to the R-relation, not in
order to state identity conditions, but rather to define “person." The
definition he suggests is the following:
D6. x is a person «-»
1. x is an aggregate of person-stages &
2. (s)(s belongs to x ^
(s* ) (s' belongs to x w Rss')) 5
(D6) yields that the aggregate of si and s2 is a person (call him "b")
and that the aggregate of si and s3 is a person ("c"). 6
Having defined "person," then, Lewis provides identity conditions
for such creatures.
I. x = y «
( s ) (
s
is a stage of x « s is a stage of y)
Thus, persons x and y are identical just in case they have all their
stages in common, b, the aggregate of si and s2, and c, the aggregate
of si and s3, are then distinct persons.
Lewis requires, for identity between persons x and y, that every
stage contained in x be related by R to every stage contained in y. R,
as indicated above, is a relation of "mental continuity and connected-
ness." Lewis' view, then, applied to the "King of China" example
yields that he who wanted so badly to be King is not himself crowned;
Lewis' theory yields, when applied to the case of Jones, whose right
hemisphere is extracted and the operation declared a success, that
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indeed Jones survives surgery.
It should be noted as well that Lewis' criterion satisfies
Williams' condition. If persons x and y have all their stages in
common, and persons x and z have all their stages in common, then,
clearly, persons y and z have all their stages in common. Thus it can
now be noted that Williams too hastily reached his conclusion that
bodily continuity is a necessary condition for personal identity. Psy-
chological criteria which satisfy Williams' condition can be formula-
ted.
How Lewis manages to avoid contradiction should be carefully ex-
amined. As noted above, (D6) instructs that b and c are both persons;
(I) yields that b^c. If identity between b and c can be inferred as
well, then indeed Lewis' theory leads to contradiction. But this
identity cannot be inferred. On Lewis' view, there is no one person,
a, who exists prior to surgery and is a candidate for identification
with b or c. b and c, rather, exist all along: prior to surgery, they
share a single person-stage; afterwards, they do not. Thus, Lewis' is
a psychological criterion which does not result in contradiction when
applied to the fission case. For, while it is certainly surpri sing to
learn that two persons may exist in precisely the same place at preci-
sely the same time, this claim does not by itself lead to contradic-
tion.
Objections to Lewis' Theory
Derek Parfit suggested in an article which appeared several years
before Lewis' "Survival and Identity" that the fission puzzle can be
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solved by “prizing apart" the relations of identity and survival.
(This view was detailed in Chapter III.) Thus> on parf1t . s view> s1nce
"mental continuity and connectedness" decide such important issues as
survival, a survives as both b and c. Yet since Parfit also holds that
it is not the case that survival implies identity, contradiction is
avoided.
Lewis finds this "prizing apart" of identity and survival una-
ceptable. Thus, the theory he suggests is consistent with the prin-
ciple (SI):
SI. x survives as y —> x = y
Yet, he also at least seems to suggest that his theory validates prin-
ciple (CS), which Parfit presumably would accept. 7
CS. If an appropriate relation of mental continuity
and connectedness, such as R, holds between some
stage of x and some stage of y, then x survives
as y.
It is against Lewis' claim that his theory (the conjunction of (D6) and
(I)) is consistent with both (SC) and (SI) that objections have most
often been raised. Parfit, in defense of his own way of handling the
fission cases, and Penelope Maddy, citing Parfit, have suggested such
criticisms. I turn now to these objections, and then to a defense of
Lewis.
Parfit argues that the fission case itself poses grave problems
for Lewis. Suppose that surgery is about to take place. Parfit
writes:
[Since s3 bears R to b's present stage si, by] the first
half of Lewis' thesis [i.e., by the principle that the
"R-relation is what matters in survival"; by, that is,
(CS)], [s3] stands to [b's] present stage in the relation
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Parfit seems to reason as follows. The principle (CS). which Lewis ac-
cepts, together with the claim that s3 bears R to b‘s present stage,
entails that b survives as the person to whom s3 happens to belong.
That person is c. A second principle which Lewis accepts, (SI),
directs, since b survives as c, that b is c. But Lewis also accepts
the conjunction of (D6) and (I). These principles together, as has al-
ready been noted, yield that b*. Thus, both b=c and b/c. Something
is amiss. The problem may be stated in the following way: Lewis'
theory, that is, the conjunction of (D6) and (I), does not in fact have
all the virtues he claims for it. In particular, one cannot consis-
tently hold both his theory and both of those intuitively right prin-
dples Lewis was apparently eager to endorse.
The problem may also be put more bluntly: Lewis' various
claims— (D6), (I), (si), and (CS)— given the possibility of fission
lead to contradiction.
Parfit 's argument is, however, not persuasive. For in fact there
is no good reason to believe that Lewis accepts or even intends to en-
dorse (CS). What evidence there is that he does accept this principle
is to be found in the following passage.
If you wonder whether you will survive the coming battle or
what-not, you are wondering whether any of the stages that
will exist afterward is R-related to you-now, the stage
that is doing the wondering. Similarly for other "questions
of personal identity." If you wonder whether this is your
long-lost son, you mostly wonder whether the stage before
you now is R-related to certain past stages. If you also
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the past. If you wonder whether it is in vnnr coif •
tha^ti
f° r y0u [',0,d age > y°u wonder whether the stages'^
1
at tiresome old gaffer you will become are R-related to
nther°
W t0 8 s,9rnflcantl y greater degree than are all theo person-stages at this time or other times
.
9
This passage indeed suggests (CS). But note that all of these cases
are quite ordinary. These are cases in which no one stage is shared by
more than one person. (CS), restricted to such cases, does not lead to
contradiction.
However, Lewis goes on to say:
If you wonder as you step into the duplicator whether you
will leave by the left door, the right, door, both, or neitheryou are again wondering which future stages, if any, are R-re-lated to you-now.
In this passage Lewis seems to suggest that the principle (CS) holds
for fission cases as well. Isn't Parfit thus justified in his reading
of Lewis?
Lewis comment is, however, better understood as simply a part of
a very rough outline of the position he eventually details. It is not
a precise statement of his 'official" position. The point of the com-
ment is merely to stress, yet again, the importance of the R-relation.
There are two reasons for so construing his comment and thus for
disregarding it. For one thing, on Lewis' view, prior to fission,
there is no one person wondering whether he^ shall survive. There are
rather two; thus Lewis' comment which suggests that prior to fission
there is only one person ("you") is clearly not intended to relfect in
an accurate way his final view.
For another, Lewis holds that possibly two persons may share a
121
single person stage. And since he so emphatically affirms (SI), it is
obvious that he does not hold (CS) as well.
Lewis could be expected to adopt a principle linking survival and
psychological continuity which is very like (CS) and thus perhaps easi-
ly confused with (CS). The principle is as follows: x survives as y
just in case there is a time t and a time t’ such that t occurs before
t
,
x exists at t, y exists at t', every stage in x bears R to every
stage in y, and finally every stage in y bears R to every stage in x.
I. e., just in case x exists at an earlier time, and y at a later time,
and x=y. Survival is, thus, as is identity, decided by appeal to an
appropriate relation is not R itself but rather a relation constructed
from R. Thus, the R-relation is important in determining survival, on
Lewis view, but Lewis remains free to affirm the commonsensical prin-
ciple (SI).
I turn now to the objection Maddy reises against Lewis' views on
fission. Maddy summarizes the intuitions Lewis expects his theory to
confirm as follows: "... identity and the special [psychological]
relations [which Lewis collectively calls "R"] are what matters in sur-
vival." She calls this statement "Lewis' Thesis"; and indeed Lewis
makes comments which suggest it. Then, she argues that in fact
Lewis' theory does not support these crucial intuitions, since on his
theory the following principle (RI) is false:
RI. For any stages s and s' and any person x, if s
is a stage of x, then Rs' s if and only if s' is
I-related to each of x's stages.
The I-relation may be specified as follows: stages s and s' are I-re-
lated if and only if s and s' are stages of a same person. Thus, on
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Lewis’ view s and s' are I -related if and only if they are R-related.
Maddy is correct to point out that Lewis' view (RI) is false.
Consider, yet again, the fission case, si is a stage of b, recall, and
s3 a stage of c. Furthermore, Rsls3. But s3 is not 1-related to each
of b's stages since it by definition is not related to, for example,
s2. Thus, Lewis must deny (RI).
The mistake Maddy makes is in claiming that, if Lewis' theory is
incompatible with (RI), then his theory in fact fails to support the
intuition that R is "what matters" in survival, and thus fails to sup-
port "Lewis' thesis." Her argument for this conditional is as follows.
Suppose that it happens that your current stage bears R to some future
stage which occurs after a certain battle, even though that future
stage does not bear I to each of your stages, all of which occur be-
fore the battle. (If this situation can arise, then (RI) is false.)
On Lewis' view, "you survive the battle [if and only if] there is a
post-battle state I-related to all your stages. "14 Thus, on Lewis'
view you do not survive the upcoming battle, even though your current
stage bears R to some future stage. Thus, Maddy concludes, "... the
fission case is a counterexample to Lewis' thesis, and a wedge between
identity and the special relations has become established."^
This argument, to the conclusion that Lewis' theory is unsatis-
factory. Indeed on Lewis' view one may fail to survive the upcoming
battle even though one's current stage bears R to some future stage.
But does it follow from this fact that "Lewis' thesis" is false, in
particular, that the "special relations" (collectively, R) are not
"what matters in survival"? The claim that "special relations" are
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what matters in survival" ic v/amm ais vague. One might in part mean by these
words (RS):
RS
'
elisis atT^henT bedrs R t0 some st*9e whichx t t t, th n x survives until t.
If (RS) is what is meant, then obviously it does follow, from the claim
that one may fail to survive the upcoming battle even though one's cur-
rent stage bears R to some future stage, that (RS) is false. But the
evidence that Lewis would adopt (RS) is no better than the evidence
that he would accept (CS). (In fact, the passage supporting the latter
just is the passage supporting the former.)
If the questionable words are meant to express the principle that
some future stage bearing R to each of a given individual x's stages
insures that x survives, then Maddy rightly attributes "Lewis' thesis"
to Lewis. But her argument remains inadequate, since the negation of
the thesis, so understood, does not follow from the claim that one may
fail to survive the upcoming battle even though one's current stage
bears R to some future stage.
These two are, I think, the only likely readings of what Maddy
calls Lewis thesis. I conclude, then, that her argument is inade-
quate. In fact, it is very like Parfit's (whom she cites) and fails
for similar reasons.
Another Objection
Lewis theory of persons has, of course, certain counterintuitive
features. One surprising consequence of Lewis' view is that two people
can share a single person-stage, for example. This consequence will be
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examined carefully in Section 5. But 1 should note that it is unclear
Whether this counterintuitive feature of Lewis' view counts very heavi-
ly against it. For it is hardly shocking that an entirely accurate
description of something as untoward as a person's fissioning should
suggest surprising things about persons. Furthermore, the supposition
that on any satisfactory view of personal identity each person-stage
belongs just to one person might even be regarded as question-begging
againt Lewis.
In this section I suggest a line of criticism involving a princi-
ple which governs how one justifies the theories one accepts. It is a
principle which is intuitively true; it is one used at times in ordin-
ary discourse; it stands up well to philosophical scrutiny; and it does
not depend on any specific view on personal identity. Anyone who
refrains from accepting Lewis' view in order to avoid violating such a
principle as this can scarcely be accused of founding an objection on
dubious intuitions or of begging the question. This Principle of Jus-
tification (J) is as follows: anyone who arbitrarily accepts a theory
is not justified in accepting that theory. I think that (J) is obvi-
ously true. But it might not appear to be so at first. After all,
can't someone be justified in arbitrarily accepting one view over
another? Suppose for example I have two maps of the same area, and
equally good evidence for the accuracy of each. 16 I see that the two
conflict. I also know that if I don't follow one or the other— it does
not matter which— I stand no chance of ever reaching my destination.
Thus, am I not justified in accepting, entirely arbitrarily, the "view"
or "theory" provided by one of the maps and rejecting the "view" or
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"theory" provided by the other?
I think not. I am justified only in usin* one of the maps rather
than the other. (Thus the principle that "If someone arbitrarily
chooses to use a particular theory, then he is not justified in doing
so" is false; but this principle is not (j).) i WOn't argue further
for (J) here.
I will call the conjunction of Lewis' (D6) and (I) "LPS" (for
"Lewis person-stage"). Much of the remainder of this section I will
devote to arguing that there is a theory APS ("Alternative person-
stage" )-another theory of persons-which has these important features:
it is incompatible with LPS; and any evidence which supports LPS is
such that there is evidence of exactly equal weight for APS.
Anyone who recognizes that there is a second theory of persons
APS which has these properties will have no more reason to accept LPS
than to accept APS. This sufficiently knowledgeable person, if he has
accepted LPS without accepting APS, quite clearly has done so arbitrar-
ily. According to principle (J), then, he has accepted LPS without
justi fi cation. I take it that this problem is a serious one for LPS
(and for APS as well).
Of course, if one accepts both LPS and APS, his selecting LPS
will not be thought arbitrary. But as noted before LPS and APS are in-
compatible; together, if applied to the fission case, they lead to con-
tradiction. Thus, surely no one who recognizes this fact will be
justified in accepting both views. For I take it that one is never
justified in accepting a view or set of views if he is also justified
in believing that the view or set of views leads to contradiction.
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The theory APS is easily enough constructed. APS and LPS agree
on how people are to be individuated: persons are identical if and
only if any person-stage which is a part of one is a part of the other.
The two views are only different with respect to the definitions of
"person" they provide. APS includes (D7) rather than (06):
D7. x is a person
1. x is an aggregate of person stages:
2. (s)(s belongs to x w
ps'Hs' belongs to x & Rss')); &
~Py)(y is a proper part of x &
y is an aggregate of person-stages &
(s)(s belongs to y <-»
(3s')(s' belongs to y & Rs s')))
(D7) yields that the aggregate of si, s2, and s3 is a person.
The differences between LPS and APS are perhaps obvious. LPS
directs that two people are involved in the fission case both before
and after surgery. APS, given (I), directs that both before and after
surgery there is a single person. Thus, on LPS two people share one
person-stage prior to surgery; on APS one person, after surgery, has
two distinct person-stages.
The theories are clearly incompatible. Consider a world in
which exactly one person fissions. Suppose that on APS in that world
there are exactly n people. According to LPS, in contrast, in that
world there are exactly n + 1 people.
Is there really as much reason for accepting APS as there is for
accepting LPS?
Consider first the disadvantages of the two theories. Both con-
flict somewhat with intuitions about what people are. It has already
been noted that LPS has certain counterintuitive consequences. For
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according to it two people can share a single person-stage. Thus, on
LPS two people can exist In the same place at the same time (assuming
people are spatially extended). But APS is equally counterintuitive;
according to it, one person can be the possessor of distinct simultan-
eous person-stages. That is, one person can exist in two wholly sep-
arate places at once. Thus, both LPS and APS violate the intuitively
true rule that each person occupies his own continuous chunk of space.
Of course one might hold that person-stages are not spatially
extended. In this case there is another intuitively true rule both
LPS and APS violate. It is the rule that there is a one-to-one cor-
respondence between people and "centers of consciousness." The rule,
less obscurely put, is as follows; each person is aware of all his
thoughts and feelings, and no person is directly aware of the thoughts
and feelings of any other person. LPS and APS both require that this
rule be denied.
Counting difficulties infect both views. LPS leads to what
Lewis calls "over-population." 17 It should be the case that, in some
sense, it is true that after fission there are more people that there
were before fission. But LPS directs that there are two people all
along. The analogous problem for APS might be called "under-popula-
tion." According to APS just one person is involved throughout.
Lewis suggests a solution to this particular problem. He pro-
poses that counting be based on a notion of tensed identity
,
or iden-
ti ty-at-a-time .^ This notion can be specified as follows: x and y are
identical -at -t if and only if they both exist at t and share a person-
stage at t. The problem of under-population may be solved by appeal
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to the same notion. When counting is relativized in this way. it
turns out on both LPS and APS that the number of persons which exist
at a time just is. after all, the number of person-stages which exist
at that time.
Finally, on both LPS and APS language-related difficulties a-
rise. Consider the noun phrase “the person sitting in this chair
now." I intend this phrase to refer to just what is sitting in this
chair. Ordinarily. I would say that I intend it to refer to me. But
on LPS if there is a fission looming in “my“ future, this phrase does
not denote: there is no unique thing which is both a person and sit-
ting in this chair.
Suppose that the same description is used after fission has oc-
curred rather than before. This case reveals a problem with APS. The
phrase, one might claim, denotes. But if it denotes, its denotation
is the person— both of his parts—which is such that some of him (one
part) is sitting in this chair now. So, the phrase, if it denotes,
denotes too much.
^
Those difficulties may not be without solution. One possible
solution involves the claim that the referents of such denoting ex-
pressions are just aggregates of person-stages, not necessarily ag-
gregates which are people. Alternatively, one might claim that the
description "the person sitting in this chair" denotes £t _t if and
only of there is exactly one, counting by identity at t, person sit-
ting in this chair.
I turn now to the advantages of the two views. One important
and obvious virtue shared by LPS and APS is that of not leading to
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contradiction when applied to the fission case. That LPS has this
feature has already been shown. Consider, then, APS. APS yields that
all relevant stages belong to just one person. No contradiction a-
nses. It makes no difference, in blocking the contradictions, whether
one holds that there is one person or two people throughout. In other
words, APS, like LPS, satisfies Williams' condition.
A further advantage of LPS is, as noted earlier, that it provides
a psychological criterion of person identity. So, clearly, does APS.
The two theories decide identity differently only for cases of "fis-
sioning" and "fusing." Thus, the considerable amount of support there
is for psychological criteria is support for APS as well as for LPS.
Yet another advantage of APS is that it, like LPS, "reconciles"
survival and identity: the principle (SI) is consistent with both
views. (The defender of APS could be expected to hold that x survives
if and only if x is such that there is some future stage bearing R to
x s present stage, that is, if and only if x is identical to some
future person. The reconciliations are thus different in detail but
the strategy is the same.)
It is likely that there are features LPS has which count either
in its favor or against it but which have not been considered here.
All I have done is to consider some of its outstanding advantages and
disadvantages, and show that APS has analogous advantages and disad-
vantages. But it seems to me that these are features of LPS that pro-
vide whatever reason there is to affirm LPS. Other advantages have not
been emphasized in the literature; others do not come to mind. I take
it thus that the burden is on whoever wishes to defend LPS to say why
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one should accept LPS rather than APS. However, it should be noted
that the two views are entirely parallel. Thus I doubt that a reason
for accepting LPS over APS can be adduced.
Of course, as noted above, one difference between the two theo-
ries is that they disagree on the number of people existing in a world
where fission occurs. But this fact does not help to adjudicate be-
tween the two views. What is needed is some reason to think that one
and not the other is the one that is right. But there are no tests
which might be used to determine the truth of the matter. Are intu-
itions helpful here? No.-intuitive^ it seems that there is one person
prior to fission and two persons afterwards. But this claim is false
on both views.
Thus, anyone who accepts LPS and not APS, or APS and not LPS,
does so arbitrarily. According to (J), then, neither view is justi-
fied; at least neither is justified for a sufficiently knowledgeable
person. To claim that such a person is justified in accepting LPS is
to reject (J); and I take it that this is more than should be done in
exchange for LPS.
One reply to the objection sketched above must be considered. It
might be claimed that LPS can be modified in such a way as to (1) pre-
serve Lewis' general approach but (2) avoid the objection raised above.
The modified view is the view LPS-or-APS.
Is this a satisfactory view? I think not. For it does not do
what a theory of personal identity is expected to do. Such a theory
should say, for example, whether or not the people emerging from the
operating room are identical. But LPS and APS differ on this question.
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Hence, the answer obtainable from the view LPS-or-APS is
Thus, the disjunctive version of Lewis' view will not do
"yes or no.
A Final Objection tn i pc
in this section I shall argue that both LPS and APS satisfy one
set of intuitions concerning personal identity at the expense of vio-
lating a second set of intuitions which are in some sense, more im-
portant.
Imagine several persons in a single room. Some are, at a given
time t, drinking wine; some are dancing. Some are playing marbles, and
others, tiddly winks. Someone-George, say-is asked to examine these
people at t, and to say how many of them there are. The people in
question are entirely ordinary; their corpus callosums, and their per
sonal 1 ties, are intact. I cannot imagine that George would find the
task demanding. To provide an answer, he would of course have to be
able to determine whether, for instance, the person playing marbles
and the person playing tiddly-winks are one and the same. And to do
this he could not appeal to, say, Leibniz's Law. For it is perfectly
consistent with that principle that all the person-stages in the room-
or all the stages in the left-hand side of the room, or all the happy
stages, or whatever--are stages of the same person. I assume further
that George does not have at hand a copy of some well-argued philo-
sophical article which details how to go about counting persons at a
time. Still he can accede to the request; his intuitions about what
persons are will see him through.
Now imagine another sort of case. George is asked to examine
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over a £eriod of time a series of situations occurring in one partic-
ular room. Certain questions of identity have, suppose, already been
settled; George already knows that at any one time during this period
there is in the room at most one person (excluding George himself).
George is asked, then, to say how many persons there have been alto-
gether in the room when the time period in question is over. The se-
quence he will observe is, roughly, to be described as follows. First,
an ovum is fertilized. Then, an embryo, then a fetus, develops. A
child matures, and so on and so forth until an old man begins to deter-
iorate physically and mentally. Finally someone dies. George, to
answer the question of how many persons there have been in the room,
will have first to answer certain questions of diachronic identity.
Suppose that the man's deterioration is brought on by a massive stroke
he suffered. George shall have to answer, then, the rather difficult
question of whether the person who exists in the room just prior to the
occurrence of the stroke is identical to the person who exists in the
room just after the stroke occurs. This case is ordinary; yet how the
issues of identity are to be settled is not obvious. George may well
come to the conclusion that the same person persists in the room
throughout the period in question. But, it seems to me, he will not
find questions of diachronic identity quite so easy to answer as ques-
tions of synchronic identity. Roughly, then, that intuitions concern-
ing what "constitutes" a single person at a time are "stronger" than
intuitions concerning what "constitutes" a single person across time.
The cases just described are relatively common. The same points
can, however, be made concerning the fission case. I am inclined to
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say, having inspected world wl in which a and b but not c exist, that
a is identical to b, that a has survived, that b is not a new person.
I am inclined to say something analogous about a and c, when I inspect
w2. The fission case undermines these intuitions, to a degree. But
I remain relatively confident that prior to fission there is just a
single person and that afterwards, there are two.
Consider, then, Lewis’ view. When one contemplates only issues
of identity across time, LPS seems quite satisfactory, it provides the
"right" results when applied to Leibniz’s King of China example.
Shoemaker's
"body-transplant" case, and a host of others. Even when
applied to the fission case, where one is inclined to say that no one
has died, that whoever existed originally continued to exist, results
are satisfactory.
However, LPS s answers to questions of synchronic identity are
less satisfactory. Recall that, in the case of fission, LPS instructs
that prior to fission, there are two persons who share a single person-
stage. APS instructs that after fission there is only one person, who
has then two distinct person-stages. Thus, both of these views vio-
late intuitions about synchronic identity in order to preserve intu-
itions about diachronic identity.
The type of bodily theory William would urge does just the re-
verse. When theories are evaluated, then, just in terms of the results
they generate when applied to the fission case, theories conforming to
Williams' sketch seem the more plausible of the available bunch, since
they at least validate the stronger of the two sets of intuitions.
Lewis, of course, has a reply to this criticism. His notion of
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tensed identity has already been introduced. If one counts by appeal
to this notion, one finds that on both LPS and APS prior to fission
there is just one person, and afterwards there are exactly two.
This seemingly helpful notion of tensed identity deserves further
careful scrutiny. Lewis writes:
Let us say that continuants Cl and C2 are identical-at-time-t if and only if they .both exist at t and their
stages at t are identical .
^
This passage, together with those earlier passages in which Lewis de-
fines and individuates persons, suggests that in some sense b and c
(for instance) are not identical at time t, (prior to fission), and in
another sense, a new sense, b and c are identical-at-time-t. Thus, in
some sense b and c are not one at tl, and in some other sense b and c
are one at tl.^ 1
Clearly, Lewis thinks it is important for there to be some sense
in which, prior to fission, there is just one person in the room in
question— say. Room 100. He thinks, that is, that it is important that
he offers some way of solving the problem of "over-population" which
his view creates. His intention, apparently, is to provide such a
sense by stipulating the existence of a certain ambiguity. Thus,
sentence (1)
1. "At tl, there is one person in Room 100"
ambiguously expresses both
2. At tl, there are persons x and y in Room 100
such that x=y
and 2'. At tl, there are persons x and y in Room 100 such
that x's tl-stage and y's tl-stage are identical.
I said before that the ambiguity Lewis appeals to in order to solve the
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problem of
"over-population"
clear that the semantic link
is one which is stipulates
. For it is
between (1) and (2') fs not part of the
natural language (in contrast to that between (1) and (2)). Thus,
(l)'s ambiguity is not, convenient though it would be for Lewis, in-
herent in the language, available for exploitation. It has to be in
troduced.
But if this point is correct, then Lewis' theory is vulnerable
to a serious objection. For, while Lewis indeed provided a sense in
which the sentence (1) is true, he does not thereby satisfy the very
strong intuition that, prior to fission. Room 100 contains just one
person. (2) is false, on Lewis' view; and (2'), although true, is far
removed from the intuition the notion of tensed identity was introduced
to satisfy.
It seems that fission does not destroy anyone (a "double suc-
cess, it seems, is no "failure"); however, it is surely far clearer
that prior to fission there is one person and subsequent to fission
there are two. One problem with Lewis' LPS-and APS as well-is that
it validates a collection of rather murky intuitions at the expense of
violating what are, in comparison, easy truths about plain matters of
fact.
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Reason i n 9 analogously, one may conclude that the aggregate of
sl and s3, c, is a person.
Is the aggregate of sl alone--if such exists--a person? Such
an object (call it "o") fails the second clause of (D 6 ): s2 does notbelong to o, but there is a stage, sl, which does belong to o and is
such that Rs2sl
. The qualified claim, with "o" in for "x is thus
false.
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Is the aggregate of sl, s2, and s3 a person? Call this object
0
,
It, too, fails the second clause. For s2 belongs to o’ as does
s3, and it is not the case that Rs2s3.
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CHAPTER V
towards a new theory of fission
in the preceding chapters, severe, criteria of persona, identity
were formulated, evaluated, and ultimately rejected. From these dis-
cusses emerged certain necessary conditions criteria of personal
identity must satisfy, if they are to he judged adequate. One of the
tasFs I undertake in the present chapter is that of cataloging these
various necessary conditions.
It may seem as though any theory which satisfies each of these
conditions will itself lead to contradiction, given the possibility of
fission. For this reason, it may seem further that, however distaste-
ful, one should either abandon the least compelling of these various
necessary conditions (if such exists) or give up altogether the effort
of describing a coherent concept that can plausibly be associated with
the word “person." I win argue, in this chapter, that appearances to
the contrary one is not forced by logic to adopt either of these
alternatives. Support for this claim will be given in the form of a
sketch of a view which both satisfies the adduced necessary conditions
yet fails to lead to contradiction given the possibility of fission.
The view, as one might expect, has certain counterintuitive features.
However, it will become clear that problems with the view here less to
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do with how well it fits
ties can be clarified.
intuitions than with whether its many obscuri-
Some Intuitions
It may seem that any theory which satisfies each of the desider-
ata emerging in earlier chapters must lead to contradiction. These
intuitions concerning personal identity include (Al) through (A3):
A1
'
two'persons.
0" 8 PerS0" PeC“eS (in *•«*•>
That is. fission procedures multiply persons. 1 Prior to fission, the
surgeon is ministering to one person; after fission, he finds himself
ministering to two. Thus, while contradiction must be avoided, it
should not be avoided by denying that fission has any effect on popula-
tion.
Consider, then, (A2).
A2. In ordinary cases, if a later person has
consciousness of doing something an earlier
person in fact did, then the earlier person
survives.
(An ordinary case is just a non-fission case.) The notion of conscious
ness appealed to here is that specified in Chapter II. Person x may at
time t be quite unlike person y at a later time f, and nonetheless be
identical to y. x may be y, for instance, even though x and y do not
share the same body, providing x and y are related in other important
2
ways.
Finally, consider (A3).
A3. Conclusions reached concerning ordinary
cases apply to fission cases as well.
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On (A3), if someone, a, is identified with someone, b, in one world,
then in a fission world, a' must be identified with b', given that a',
although perhaps not a, is very like a, that b', although perhaps not
b. is very like b, and finally that certain significant relations
(e.g., psychological continuity) holding between a and b also hold
between a' and b'. The motivation for this claim is just the fact that
whether a 1 is b' seems to have nothi
survival of some offshoot of a', a'
a is b. 3
ng to do with the question of the
is b 1
, regardless of offshoots, if
It may seem, on the one hand, that no consistent theory could be
produced which-given the possibility of fisslon-satisfies each of
these three intuitively correct claims. Why this is so is perhaps
obvious. First, consider two ordinary cases, the case of a and b in wl
and the case of a and c in w2. b and c both have consciousness of
doing something a in fact did. By (A2), then, b=a and c=a. But now
consider w3. In w3, a' fissions; the resulting creatures are b' and
c'. a', b', and c' are practically indiscernible from a, b, and c,
respectively; furthermore, b' and c' are related to a 1 in the same
significant ways in which b and c are related to a. By (A3), then,
since a-b, a =b'; and since a=c, a'=c'. By the symmetry and transi-
tivity of identity, b 1 =c
' . But this result apparently violates (Al),
according to which fission produces two persons.
There is a way of avoiding the result that b'=c'. It is to say
with Lewis that "a 1 " ambiguously refers to distinct persons, b' and c'.
This maneuver will block the inference to the claim that b'=c'.
also violates (Al).
But it
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But, on the other hand, it nay seen clear that not an available
theories of persons which conforn to (Al). («), and (A3) 1ead t0 con .
tradiction. Or so I shall urge in what follows.
A Way Out
Certain philosophers have suggested that, if one were willing to
abandon a single comnonsensical thesis about persons, one would find
oneself in a position to solve the fission puzzle. This comnonsensical
thesis is that, given that person-stages do not overlap at any point,
the nunber of persons which exist at a given time is just the number of
fierson-staaes which exist at that time. 4 (Or: with each person-stage is
associated at least one person.) Some philosophers, rejecting this
thesis, have suggested that possibly more persons than person-stages
exist at a given time; other philosophers have suggested that possibly
fewer persons than person-stages exist at a given time.
It has already been noted that if this commonsensical thesis cor-
relating persons and stages is abandoned, then a consistent view of
persons can be given which maintains Lockean intuitions yet allows for
fission. (Consider for instance Lewis' view.) The problem is,
however, that in accepting this view, one must abandon other important
intuitions
— in particular, (Al).
It seems that, if one is bent on maintaining (Al) as well as
(A2), then in order to avoid contradiction one will have to abandon the
commonsensical thesis stated above and to abandon a second somewhat
less compelling thesis as well. This second thesis is that associated
with the word "person" is a single, utterly coherent concept. An al-
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ternative position is that the word "person" ambiguous!, expresses two
distinct concepts. On this position, entities which are ordinarily
classified as persons simpliciter in fart cHefc t c satisfy one or two exclusive
concepts.
5
Adopting this alternative position enables one to construct a
View of persons which satisfies (Al), (A2), and (A3). For convenience,
entities satisfying one of these two concepts may be called "physical
persons" and entities satisfying the other may be called "psychological
persons.
"
A sketch of how appeal to these notions may be useful can now be
given. Assuming that the various questionable cross-world identities
hold here and henceforth will ensure that (A3) is satisfied. Then, one
may hold, about the^chological persons a, b, and c, that a persists
and is b in world wl, a persists and is c in world w2, and, thus, that
in the fission world w3, a persists and is both b and c (thus b=c).
One may hold as well, concerning the physical persons a, b, and c, that
in w3 a fails to survive as b or as c. Since the names ,, a," "b," and
"c" would al so be understood, on this position, to be ambiguous, there
is no contradiction. (Al), (A2), and (A3) are nonetheless satisfied.
As noted before, the assumption of identity between a, b, and c and
their respective primes" ensures that (A3) holds. Furthermore, in some
sense of the word "person," prior to fission there is just one person,
and, afterwards, two. For the physical person a ceases to exist at the
time of fission; the physical persons b and c are new creatures. Thus,
(Al) is satisfied. What about (A2)? In some sense of the word
"person," a single person survives fission. For the psychological
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person a persists in wl and is b anri a i tn
’
d also Persists in w2 and is c. So
(A2) is satisfied as wel 1
.
Clearly, then, views abandoning both the commonsensical thesis
correlating persons and person-stages, as wel, as the less obvious
thesis that "person" is unambiguous, may satisfy (Al) through (A3).
The task at hand now is to determine whether any plausible view
Of this sort can be described. Of course, ambiguities are easily
enough stipulated; and any view of persons having the results indicated
above will be unsatisfactory if, on that view, the crucial ambiguity is
H£eli stipulated. Thus, for this reason, my next step will be to
support the claim that the word "person" is in fact ambiguous in a
helpful way.
Consider the following case. Smith is an entirely healthy and
normal human being. He is at some point kidnapped by a deranged scien-
tist; the scientist removes a rather important part of his brain. As a
result he suffers total and irrevocable memory loss. He is otherwise
unhurt. Call this possibly new creature "Smith*." Smith* is found, by
Smith's family, wandering about; he does not know who he is, where he
lives, what city he is in, or what has happened to him. But members of
Smith's family seem to recognize Smith*; he is, after all, in many
outward ways very like Smith. After talking with Smith*, family
members agree that, although Smith has lost his memory, he has retained
his marvelous wit and great sensitivity. Is Smith identical to Smith*?
I think that there is an overwhelming inclination to count them one
person.
But now consider another sequence of events. Smith is kidnapped
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by a deranged scientist who transplants a bit of Smith's brain into
another human body not unlike Smith's. The remainder of Smith's body
is destroyed. Call the hew creature "Smith**." Smith**, when he
awakens, thinks he is Smith, remembers what he did the day before, and
remembers having been kidnapped. He escapes from the scientist's lab-
oratory, and hurries to what he thinks of as home. Members of Smith's
famtly. Of course, do not recognize Smith**; they exclaim that they
have never seen him before. But, in talking with him, they quickly
discover that he remembers all that Smith would have remembered had
Smith come home that evening; and that furthermore he has the same
quick with and great sensitivity for which Smith himself was known.
They accept him, eventually, as Smith. The scientist is indicted; the
charge is something less than murder.
Is Smith identical to Smith**? Again, it seems that there is an
overwhelming inclination to identify the two.
But there seems to be an important difference between Smith* and
Smith**. It is not implausible to say that Smith* and Smith** are of
distinct sorts, or kinds. Members of the one kind survive if they are
psychologically continuous with future members. Members of the other
kind survive if they are bodily identical with future members.
One might of course insist that Smith* and Smith** survive under
the same conditions, that is, that there is no difference in kind be-
tween Smith* and Smith**. This position, however, has certain unac-
ceptable consequences. For suppose the position to be correct.
Suppose, that is, that the original Smith is of the sort members of
which survive if either bodily identical with some future person or
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psychologically continuous with some future person. We turn, then, to
nevitable fission case. Since Smith is Smith* and Smith is
Smith**, Smith* is Smith** Th» n in i1
. e old puzzle arises in a new guise.
Does it help to say that the "subject" of fission is really two
persons, of the same kind, existing in the same place at the same time?
This position has all the drawbacks of Lewis' view. An appealing
alternative is to say that involved in the fission case are distinct
kinds of creatures. Creatures of one kind survive if they are psycho-
logically continuous with future members of the kind; creatures of the
other, if they are bodily identical with future members.
But if the involved entities come in distinct sorts, complete
with distinct identity conditions, then the word "person" should be
Viewed as ambiguous between distinct concepts. Both these concepts are
plausibly associated with the word "person." For consider the aggre-
gate of person-stages involved in the first Smith case. Isn't that,
intuitively, a £erson ? Consider too the aggregate involved in the
second Smith case. Isn't that, as well, as person? I think so.
Persons as Bodies
I will assume that some adequate criterion of identity for things
such as amoebas and snakes is available; I will only say a few words
about such a criterion here. I suppose, with Williams, that such a
criterion is based on spatiotemporal
,
or bodily, continuity; and
further that spatiotemporal continuity is interrupted when an entity
suffers an abrupt, significant reduction in constituent stuff. This
latter assumption is entailed by what was earlier called the "fifty
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percent plus" rule.
When an amoeba, for instance, undergoes fission during reproduc-
tion, on the principie suggested above, it ceases to exist and two new
amoebas, offspring of the original, come into existence.
Principles providing necessary and sufficient conditions for
identity which appeal to spatiotemporal continuity are vulnerable to
some of the same ineffecti vity charges as principles appealing to psy-
chological continuity. I will not attempt to state such a principle
here. It is, however. Important to have at hand necessary conditions.
We may say that, where the fifty percent plus rule is assumed, if x and
y are £h£sical Persons, then x=y only if for any times t and f, such
that x exists at t and y exists at f and t' occurs just after t, x at
t is spatiotemporal ly continuous with y at t . 6
It is most plausible, perhaps, to view physical persons as simply
live human bodies or human beings. They have their survival conditions
in common with snakes and amoebas; and presumably these survival con-
ditions involve the notion of spati otemporal continuity.
The view that there are physical persons—that is, human bodies
or human beings distinct from persons of another sort is pervasive.
Locke distinguished between men^ which were simply animals of a certain
sort, and persons
,
which, unlike mere men, are morally culpable. More
recently, John Perry suggested the distinction. According to him, the
class of human beings and the class of persons are distinct; he seems
to think that, among other differences, identity conditions for the
former are more easily settled on than identity conditions for the
latter.
147
Very young human fetuses may be included in the Cass of physical
persons, as well as individuals whose upper brains have ceased to func-
and even so-called ventilated corpses. Anything properly counted
a live human body is a physical person. 8
We can initiate a description of the fission case by appeal to
the notion of a physical person. The physical person a who is the sub-
ject of fission is identical to neither the physical person b nor the
Physical person c. Since it is impossible that b and c after fission
are both spatiotemporally continuous with a just before fission, the
identity conditions suggested above will yield that afb or a*c, or
ai<b and afc. Thus, so far, so good. In fission, one person, one
fihisical person becomes two; before fission, the physician ministers
to one person afterwards, to two. (Al) is satisfied. Now the ques-
tion of in what sense he who fissions may be said to survive must be
addressed.
Psychological Persons
I assume, for purposes of this section, that the notion of a
physical person is already adequately understood. I assume further
that physical person-stages are just non-overlapping temporal parts of
physical persons. The notion of a psychological person-stage may then
be specified in terms of the notion of a physical person-stage and the
M* relation (defined in Chapter II).
D8. s is a phychol ogical person-stage
1. s is a physical person-stage; &
2. (3s')(s' is a physical person-stage &
M*s,s 1 v M*s
'
,s)
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see psychological person-stages are distinguished in that they are the
first in a series of "‘-related psychological person-stages. These may
be referred to simply as "first psychological person-stages." and
specified as follows:
D9. s is a first psychological person-stage ~
,
s ' s * Psychological person-stage &
.
'[ s ls earlier than s &
M*s
,
s
)
The notion of a psychological person can now be specified.
DIO. x is a psychological person -*
1. x is an aggregate of psychological person-
stages; &
2. (3s)(s is a first psychological person-
stage &
s belongs to x &
( S ‘ ) (
s
' belongs to x w M*s,s'))
Thus, for each first psychological person-stage there exists a unique
psychological person. That psychological person is the aggregate of
stages which includes the first stage and all those stages to which the
first stage bears M*. Identity conditions, not unexpectedly, are the
fol lowing:
( x )(y)(x and y are psychological persons—
»
(x=y ~
(s)(s is a person-stage -*
(s belongs to x <-> s belongs to y))))
Consider, then, the original fission case. The aggregate of si, s2,
and s3 is a psychological person. There is no other psychological
person associated with the fission case.
The names "a," "b," and "c," used in describing the three-world
case, are ambiguous, each between a physical person and a psychological
person. (Thus, a refers ambiguously, for instance, to the physical
person to wnom si belongs and the psychological person to whom si
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belongs.
)
Ordinarily, the ambiguity of the word "person" is not trouble-
some and need not be noted. But for the present purposes it is im-
portant that the ambiguity be avoided. Thus, I will use "a 1 ," "b' "
and "C" to refer to the physical persons involved in fission, and
“a*,"
MbV and "c*" to refer to the relevant psychological persons.
At this point, the description of the fission case begun above can be
completed, a* is identical to b* in world wl
; thus, there is a sense
in which a survives and is b. Furthermore, there is a sense in which
survives in world w2, since a*=c*. Thus, the view conforms to (A2):
in the non-fission worlds, pyschological continuity ensures persistence
of the person, a survives, in some sense, in both wl and w2.
It can now be noted that the view conforms to (A3) as well as to
(Al) and (A2)
. According to (A3), what befalls a in worlds wl and w2
must befall a in world w3. That is, (A3) precludes the possibility
that a survives in wl and w2, but fails to survive in w3. Since on
this view a* survives in all three worlds, and a' fails to survive, in
each of the three worlds, (A3) is satisfied as well.
The view obviously allows for the possibility of fission. And,
finally, it apparently does not lead to contradiction.
Objections and Revisions
Six objections will be raised in this section against the view
suggested above. In response to the fifth objection, revisions of the
view will be proposed.
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First Objection
The view in question accommodates intuitions (Al),
(A3). That it does so, without leading to contradiction
a large part of whatever evidence there is in favor of i
(A2), and
, constitutes
t. The problem
is that surely the list of intuitions given originally is incomplete
ih certain important ways. Furthermore, a complete list would indi-
cate, if the original indicates the view sketched above, some view
other than the one sketched above-some view, perhaps, which posits
m°re tha " juSt tw0 sorts °f person. Thus, because of the incomplete
ness of the original list of intuitions, the view in question is un-
satisfactory.
The objection can be put another way. Surely ordinary, non-fis-
sion cases can be imagined in which examination of connections, other
than the M*-relation and the bodily cohtihuity relation, between, say.
Brown and Brown*, incline one to say that Brown is Brown*. Thus, this
intuition too should be added to the list; following the strategy used
above, a slightly more complex view, positing three sorts of persons,
would then be proposed. But if there are really three distinct sorts
of persons, then the original view is incorrect.
A related problem should be noted in this context. This problem
concerns, not the original list, but rather the view-generating strat-
egy used above. New intuitions perhaps can be accommodated, by apply-
ing the strategy used above. But should they be accommodated? Is one
thereby led to more satisfactory views on persons?
Theories so generated may accommodate numerous intuitions; the
problem is that views that validate any and all intuitions concerning
151
Persona, survival are sure,* suspect. For> 1n general
. successful
solut^ns to paradoxes or puzzles indicate where one has gone wrong,
so to speak; useful solutions indicate which among conflicting intui-
tions are faulty. But views generated in accordance with the strategy
used above do not function in this way; they simply validate the
various inclinations which, taken together, seem to lead to contradic-
tion.
Mix. Two comments are appropriate here. First, it should
be noted that accepting the view sketched above in fact requires that
one give up a certain possibly dear intuition. This is the intuition
that “person" unambiguously expresses some one concept. If one accepts
the view in question, one must also accept that some persons' persist-
ence is determined by appeal to one set of conditions, and other per-
sons' persistence is determined by appeal to a second set of condi-
tions. The intuition which must be given up is not one which was
listed initially, but it is clearly crucial in generating the puzzle.
There is none without it. Furthermore, it seems that the claim that
there is just one sort of person—one set of identity conditions
for things we call "persons"~is less obviously the case than any of
(Al) through (A3). Other intuitions involved in generating the puzzle
are still more compelling: fission is possible; identity is syranetric
and transitive; and no contradiction can be true. Thus, the view at
hand, contrary to what was suggested above, does tell one where one
"went wrong."
A second point concerns how philosophical theories are to be
evaluated. It seems that such theories are plausible, roughly, to the
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extent that they accomodate stronger intuitions about persons. Thus.
lf ^ aCCOmm°dateS TOre
- important, intuitions than a
second, then the one is more plausible than the other.
It may indeed ultimately come to seem that the list of intuitions
(Al) through (A3) stated originally is incomplete. For reconsider the
Smith cases. In one case. Smith was said to survive despite the fact
that there was little bodily continuity between Smith and the person
as whom Smith survives. In the other case. Smith was said to survive
even though the person as whom Smith survived remembered having done
none of the things Smith in fact did prior to his mishap. On the view
sketched above, one may say that "Smith" in the description of the two
cases is being used ambiguously. In one case "Smith" refers to a
psychological person, in the other case "Smith" refers to a physical
person. In one case the psychological, but not the physical, person
survives. In the other case the physical, but not the psychological,
person survives. In both cases, the imagined entities seem to fall
under what one would ordinarily describe as "the concept of a person."
It seems to me quite likely that some third case could be described,
which would incite one to say that the subject of the case, say. Brown,
survives, even when little bodily continuity, and no appropriate mem-
ory, is present. If this new relation, the relata of which are earlier
and later person-stages
,
is called "X," then intuitively, X's relating
the earlier and later stages suffices for Brown's surviving. Thus, let
us say that the most plausible view will be that which satisfies the
most complete ranked list of intuitions. Of course, the method de-
scribed above will be useful in generating more plausible views of
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persons only if the list on which the theory is based mentions only
firm intuitions. A slight Inclination obviously may fail to lead
to a more plausible view.
Second Objecti on
It was assumed above that an adequate identity criterion for
things such as amoebas. trees, and physical persons would, among other
things, preclude a thing's surviving if that thing abruptly lost half
or more of the stuff that composed it. The claim that identity condi-
tions— as sumed to involve spatiotemporal continuity-for such things
must obey the fifty percent plus rule plays a crucial role in the
quest to avoid contradiction, given that fission multiplies persons.
For this claim yields that not both a'-b' and a'=c'; the fact, given
the details of the case, it yields that both not a'=b' and a'=c'. The
objection at hand concerns the legitimacy of applying the fifty-percent
rule to such objects. Surely a tree, for instance, when pruned may
lose half of the stuff which compose it yet continue to exist. But if
in fact the fifty percent plus rule is weakened or dropped, then the
view to question helps not a whit in solving what is only a slightly
revised three-world puzzle. The puzzle which remains unsolved in-
volves Gale's example, in which one person rises from his chair and
thereupon spontaneously divides— as an amoeba would— into two distinct
but very similar fully-formed persons
.
9
If one denies the fifty per-
cent plus rule, then it seems that one shall have not basis on which to
deny that the original j[s^ each of the two resulting creatures. One is
thus faced with a new version of the old problem.
Reply * Two comments are appropriate at this point. I will urge,
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first, that the fifty percent plus rule is not plausible. Second.
,
Will note a way of modifying the view in question which will render
the results of these sufficient conditions more palatable.
I claimed above the identity conditions for amoebas, snakes, and
trees should hold for physical persons as well. I said further that
such identity conditions would appeal to the notion of spatiotemporal
continuity, and finally that things could not be spatiotemporal ly con-
tinuous from moment to moment unless more than half of what composes
each of them, at those moments, is shared. This last claim is entailed
y the fifty percent plus rule. Let us call this principle (FPP).
Then, as noted before, sufficient conditions for diversity between
Physical persons may be stated as follows: for any physical persons
X and y, if x exists at t and y exists at t\ and t' occurs just after
t, then if X at t and y at t' are not spatiotemporal ly continuous, then
xj<y (STC). The objection at hand is not, however, directed against
this particular principle. It concerns rather the broader claim that
identity conditions for things such as amoebas and snakes as well as
physical persons— identity conditions which I here presume to involve
spatiotemporal continuity—must obey the (FPP).
It will be helpful to consider two distinct case here. Consider
a case in which something of sort F is divided or spontaneously divides
to produce diverse F's. Each of the two F's contains half of the stuff
which constitutes the original. Instances of this type of case would
be an amoeba s splitting and perhaps a philodendron's being pruned.
The original F, if the analogue in this context of (A1 ) is to apply,
cannot be each of the resulting F's. But on what basis can it be
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denied that the oriqinal F i<; osrh9 S eaCh of the resulting F's? without vio-
lating (A3) 1 s analogue in this particular context itd
» it appears that the
only applicable consideration is that spatiotemporal continuity, de-
fined by (FPP), does not link the original F's with the two later F's.
It is not the case that the original F js each of the resulting F's,
just because neither of the latter have in common mure than half of the
stuff which constituted the former. Thus, (FPP) has a certain plaus-
ibil ity.
Consider a second, more difficult, case. An F is divided or
spontaneously divides to produce apparently distinct entities, each of
which contains just half of that stuff which constituted the original
F. Only one of these resulting creatures is an F; the other is a mere
blob of matter. An example of a case of this sort would involve a
tree's being trimmed. One is, of course, inclined to say that the
original F survives. But given (FPP), the original F did not survive.
Isn't something, therefore, wrong with the claim that identity con-
ditions for things such as trees must obey (FPP)?
Two points, in defense of (FPP), may be noted. First, while one
is inclined to say that the original F-tree, amoeba, or physical per-
son-survived, the inclination does not compare, I think, to that which
leads one to affirm that the original person, in some sense of the
world "person," survives. One is more willing, with respect to such
objects, to give to otherwise acceptable views a certain legislative
authority.
Second, if (FPP) continues to seem wildly implausible, when,
say, applied to such things as amoebas and physical persons, then a
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certain revision could be made in theories providing conditions for
such Objects' survival. Thus, for instance, one might suggest that
three concepts can be identified with the word "person." The notions
Of a physical person and a psychological person have already been in-
troduced; given this third concept, a person survives providing he has
the same character (say) as some future person and is (weakly) spatio-
tem£oral_l^ contijiuous «FPP is dropped) with that future person. Posit-
ing this third concept helps I think tnf ti , i ru , to defuse objections to the
claim that (FPP) applies to physical persons.
Generalizing, then, one may hold that various so-called "sortals"
are ambiguous. There may be, for instance, physical trees and func-
tional trees, physical ships and functional ships.
Third Objection
Where, intuitively, there is just one entity, on the view in
question there are two~a psychological person and a physical person.
Consider an ordinary case, the case of, say, Ronald Reagan. On the
view sketched above, the name "Ronald Reagan" actually ambiguously
refers to two persons of distinct sorts. It refers to one physical
person and one psychological person. Two related questions arise.
First, it seems that one will care more about the persistence of psy-
chological persons than about the persistence of physical persons (or
v^ versa). Won't this sentiment indicate that one person, but not
the other, is the "real" Reagan? Second, to whom does Reagan refer
when he, in ordinary contexts, uses the word "I" (when he says, for
instance, "I want to ride my horse now")?
_
• A first, perhaps obvious, point to be made here is that
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on the view in question it is not the case that distinct £ersons exist
in the same place at the same time. For however the word “person" is
disambiguated, the result is that no more than one person exists in any
one place at any one time.
Consider, second, the question of whether the psychological per-
son, but not the physical person, or the physical person, but not the
psychological person, is the real Ronald Reagan. It seems clear
that, possibly, each who is named "Ronald Reagan" may care more about,
say, the persistence of the physical person than about the persistence
of the psychological person even though the physical person is not the
"real" Reagan.
Williams would, apparently, disagree. He attempted to argue in
favor of spatiotemporal continuity criteria of person identity by pos-
ing a fission case-one something like the case of Smith. 10 One result
ing creature is to be tortured, and the other, rewarded. Williams asks
his reader to imagine that he is the original person. The reader is
asked, then, to say which of the two creatures. Smith* or Smith**, he
is more concerned about. Is the prospect of Smith* being tortured
more terrifying, or the prospect of Smith** being tortured? The idea
behind Williams' Gedankenexperiment is just that whomever one cares
more about is (one might say) an acid-test for who one is.
The case is indeed a puzzling one. One complicating factor is
that not infrequently happens that one person is more distressed at
the prospect of someone else's being harmed than at the prospect of
he himself being harmed. Thus, the "care" criterion, which Williams
seems to be urging, is problematic.
158
But this complicating factor could be avoided. Wi,l iams cou1d
have asked the reader insteead to say whether he will be tortured if
Smith* is tortured, or he will be tortured, if Smith** is tortured. Of
course this revised test does not represent any revolutionary way of
stimulating intuitions concerning personal identity. But I will ignore
this point here. Williams would apparently suggest that the dilemma he
poses is helpful in determining who the “real” Smith is. And Williams,
presumably, would be inclined toward the view that if one is the orig-
inal Smith, one will be tortured if Smith* is tortured, but not, if
Smith** is tortured. 11 I, however, do not share Williams' intuition.
It remains quite unclear to me that 1 may somehow manage to escape tor-
ture altogether, if Smith* is tortured but Smith** is not, or if
Smith** is tortured, and Smith* is not.
Consider, finally, the question of the reference of "I." when
Reagan uses the word "I," to what does he in fact refer? Won't the
pronoun, on the view in question, be ambiguous; and isn't is surely not
ambiguous?
I will, on the above view, have to be regarded, with certain
other pronouns, as ambiguous. But it does not seem that this fact in-
dicates a difficulty with the view. In fact, if there really are
physical persons and psychological persons occupying, for long periods
of time, precisely the same spatial location, then it seems that this
ambiguity is not a difficulty but rather a convenience. Most personal
properties one has interest in are properties possessed for limited
periods of time; these properties may be said to belong to the aggre-
gates in virtue of their belonging to a given person-stage or subaggre-
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gate of person-stages. Since phy s,cai persons anO psycho, ogica, per-
sons share many, perhaps most, of their stages, physica, persons and
psychological persons have many of the commonly-noted properties in
common (being warm, being hungry, hoping for rain). But there may be
cases in which the physical person is singled out. If one were to say
"The fact that I was in a coma for years hurt my career," one would be
referring just to a certain physical person, if, prior t0 fission>
smith says "In a moment I will have a new body." he may be referring
just to a certain psychological person. In contrast to Lewis’ view,
there is on the view in question a means by which proper names and in-
dexical s can be disambiguated even before one knows that there is to be
a fission in one's future. This advantage is due to the fact that on
the view in question, the claim is made that associated with the word
"person" are distinct concepts.
Fourth Objection
On the view in question, it happens that distinct objects occupy
exactly the same spatial location at a given time. Surely, this is im-
plausible. An even greater difficulty with the view at hand is that,
on this view, possibly, distinct objects occupy exactly the same spat-
ial location at every time either one exists
. That is, it is possible
for there to be a physical person x and a psychological person y such
that every person-stage belonging to x belongs to y and every person-
stage belonging to y belongs to x. But surely such a situation logi-
cal ly cannot ari se.
Re£lx* It is worth noting, first, that cases in which physical
objects overlap in space are ubiquitous. For instance, any intact
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Chair overlaps spatially with the part of that chai
back.
r which forms its
The following is a more controversial description of a second,
perfectly ordinary case. The clay which makes up the clay bow, is a
physical object; and the clay bowl made up by the same Cay is a second
physical object. Fully overlapping are a particular mass of matter and
a particular artifact. The mass of clay may, then, persist longer than
the bowl does (if, say, the bow, is shattered), or the bowl, longer
than the mass of Cay (if, for instance, a bit of Cay is cut away and
replaced by some other bit of clay).
Clearly, a possible situation may be described in which the bowl
and the clay overlap perfectly in space and time. The situation is not
obviously logically impossible; indeed, given the claim that the clay
is not the bowl, it must be accepted as at least possible. It would,
of course, be capricious to accept the possibility of perfect coinci-
dence between the bowl and the clay, while rejecting without further
argument that between a physical person and a psychological person.
One might claim that involved in the cl ay-and-bowl case is really
just one physical object--the clay--and that that physical object was
shaped one way for a period of time, then another way. Given, however,
the restriction that only one physical object is involved in the case,
it becomes rather difficult to provide a coherent description of the
case. The following, for instance, will not do.
1. There is a bowl x such that the clay is
identical to x for a period of time and
then ceases to be identical to x.
If ever the bowl and the clay are identical, they then have all the
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properties they have at any later time in common; thus, if at the
earner time the clay has the property of being identical to the clay
at the later time, the bowl, as well, has the property of being identi-
cal to the clay at the later time. Thus, (1) will not do
Here is a second attempt.
2. The clay has the property of being "bowlish"
tor awhile, and then ceases to have that
property.
Thus, just as a table can be red for awhile, then cease to be red, a
bit of clay can be bowlish for awhile (shaped in a certain way), then
cease to be bowlish.
The analogy is weak, I think. The case of a table's being red
for awhile, and then ceasing to be red, is quite unlike the situation
at hand. In contrast to the case of the bowl, one has no inclination
to say concerning the table that a^ nsd exists for awhile, and then
ceases to exist.
Consider, finally, (3).
3. The clay is identical to the bowl; that object
has for a period of time the property of being
bowlish, and then ceases to have that property.
The problem with this description is perhaps obvious. Even after the
bowl (=the clay) has been smashed into a thousand pieces, since the
clay persists, so does the bowl. But this is wrong.
Thus, it seems most plausible to say that the bowl and bit of
clay really are distinct objects which, for a period of time, fully
overlap. The case could be assimilated even further to the description
offered above concerning the relation between physical and psychologi-
cal persons: the clay and the bowl, one may say, have some, but
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(perhaps) not all, of their stages in common.
Thus, I do not think that the view that physical and psychologi-
cal persons overlap-even imperfectly-is implausible. Indeed, it is
no more implausible than a perfectly coherent view concerning the
relation between artifacts and the stuff of which they are made.
Fifth Objection
It was suggested earlier that a primary motivation for the view
in question was that it seemed to conform to the strong intuition that,
in fission, one person becomes in some sense two. Lewis' view LPS was
rejected in part because it did not have this result. But the view in
question is similarly problematic. For consider the original fission
case. On the view in question, both before and after fission there is
just one psychological person. Thus, the counting results are, on this
view, after all unsatisfactory.
Re£l£- One advantage of the view in question over certain others
is that on it there is a certain intuitively reasonable use of the word
person such that it is true to say, "Before fission there is just one
person, and afterwards there are two." I think that the counting dif-
ficulties, given the possibility of fission, cannot be minimized any
further by any other view which both conforms to intuitions (Al), (A2),
and (A3) and avoids contradiction.
However, a related difficulty should be noted at this point. On
the view in question, the psychological person a, a*, survives
fission and is both b* and c*. Thus, a* could be depicted as a Y-
shaped array of person-stages. Consider then the following sequence of
events. Suppose that the original fission case occurs. Suppose then
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then that several years later b and r (the names are used ambiguously
here) find themselves in battle, c survivpc k * kves, but b is wounded; physi-
cians, to "save" him, operate. The result is that th k' the physical person
b' survives; but after surgery b does not recall having done any of the
things any earlier person in fact did. On the view in question an of
the psychological and physical persons involved in the case prior to
the battle survive: the Ecological
,
person a* survives, and so do
the £hJ! sical_ persons b' and c'. But to someone who has very strong
Locken intuitions, it may seem that some person has ceased to exist.
It may seem that a given person x, who exists at t, ceases to exist if
no person who exists at a later time f has memories of x's own
experiences, or bears the ancestral of the memory relation to x at t.
A slight modification of the view in question accommodates this intui-
tion. Consider the following revised definition of “first psychologi-
cal person-stage." (Other definitions need not be modified.)
Dll. s is a first psychological person-stage •*->
s is a psychological person-stage &
(1. ~(3s')(s' is earlier than s &
M*s
'
,s) v
2. (3s')((s' is earlier than s &
M*s',s) &
(3s")(s" is contemporaneous with s &
s^s" &
M*s 1 ,s" ) ) &
~{3s*)(s* is earlier than s &
ps')((s' is earlier than s* &
Ms', s*) &
(3s")(s M is contemporaneous with s* &
s*^s" &
M*s
'
,s" ) ) )
)
On this definition, a psychological person-stage is first if either it
is an earliest in sequence of M*-related stages, or it is an earliest,
in a sequence, which bears M* to just those stages to which some
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contemporaneous person-stage bears M*.
The intuition behind this modifierlotion is that the introduction
Of an additional ^k^sica, person in effect brings into existence a new
£§1Ch0l091Cal PerSOn
- Each dlsti "0t human body after al, has the
capacity to record its own experiences but no one else's. Thus, the
presence of a new human body indicates a rniior-t-- *y 1 i:e collection of human experi-
..... ...
.....
.. m
.....
...... c. whic. thes, ecperienc.s belwlg wil] ^ ,y yo
future stages.)
Thus, consider again the sequence of events described above.
After fission occurs but before the battle takes place, there exist, as
before, two physical persons but three psychological persons, a*
survives as a*, the Y-shaped aggregate. But fission brings into exis-
tence two new psychological persons, each of whom overlaps a* and each
of whom, one may hope, will survive the upcoming battle. In the
situation described above, however, only one of the two newly-
introduced psychological persons survives the battle. So Lockean
intuitions are satisfied.
Let us, then, turn our attention to this revised theory of per-
sons. I will refer to it henceforth as "TF," for "Theory of Fission."
It is the view that "person" is ambiguous between two concepts, that of
a physical pe rson
,
individuated in accorcance with (STC) and (FPP), and
that of d psychological person. This latter notion is explicated by
(D8)
,
(DIO), (I), and (Dll).
Sixth Objection
David Wiggins finds all views according to which persons are
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aggregates implausible. The problem icDi is that aggregates are "...
mUCh t0° u " like People."12 An aggregate or fus
.
on> ^ wrUeSj
'„'_'_
_
has its relevant properties derivately [sic] from the propert1es of
its constituent moments. But at least half the things we want to say
about persons cannot be even tortuously explained in terms of the
states at an instance of person-moments." 13 Consider for instance,
the following properties* " ia H u .
. . . st rong
,
clever
. . . . brave
. . . .
erratic
, honest ." 14
Mix- Wiggins seems to argue as follows. One cannot say what
it is for an aggregate of Stases to have, for instance, the property of
being erratic. But one can say what it is for a £erson to have the
property of being erratic. Thus, persons cannot be merely aggregates
of stages.
This objection seems mistaken. For if indeed one can say what it
is for a person to be erratic, one can say what it is for an aggregate
of stages to be erratic. Suppose that a person x is erratic, if, with-
in a five-minute period, x believes that P (for some proposition P),
then believes that it is not the case that P, and finally believes that
P. Given this account of what it is for a person to be erratic, one
can now say what it is for an aggregate of person-stages to be erratic.
An aggregate of stages is erratic if, within a five-minute period,
three stages belonging to that aggregate contain, respectively, the
beliefs that P, that it is not the case that P, and that P. 15 Wiggins
would reject the above reply on the grounds that,
_i_f persons really are
just aggregates of person-stages, then one cannot know what it is for
person to be erratic (say), unless one already knows what the term
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"erratic" means "in terms of" person-stages. Thus, he writes:
We might, I suppose, explain what one or two of these[terms such as "erratic" and "resolute"] meant in terms
ficaHon
n
f
m0mentS lf "e a,redd* Possessed their signi-
reverse^rocedure?^
" ^ S8“*“e1 - b ' e iAhe
But surely he is wrong on this point. One knows what it is for a
Eerson to be erratic if one knows that it is for a thing to be erratic.
The project at hand may fairly, and vaguely, be described as an attempt
to "explain," in part, the concept of person in terms of aggregates of
person-stages; but this does not involve an attempt to “explain"
properties of persistent individuals in terms of properties of temporal
parts of those individuals, or to "reduce" the former to the latter.
Further Difficulties
In the preceding section, I considered and rejected several
objections to the view TF. In this section, I will mention two
remaining difficulties.
One crucial issue difficult to settle one way or the other con-
cerns the notion of a psychological person. The Y-shaped aggregate of
stages involved in the fission case was said to be a psychological
person. The problem concerns the plausibility of the claim that such
an object falls under any concept the word "person" expresses. One is
tempted to say flatly "no." On the other hand, it seems that, contrary
to what Berkeley suggests, having a particular concept is a matter of
accepting a particular set of principles. While typically one
recognizes and evaluates some of the implications of a given set of
principles (one wants to verify, for instance, that the implications
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conform to (Al) through (A3)), one typically does not
the implications of anj, set of principles one holds-
recognize
and, thus,
111
it
would not be surprising were it to
thing fell under a given concept,
fact that on TF the Y-shaped array
turn out that some peculiar sort
For this reason, I think that the
counts as a psychological person
of
of
does not indicate a fatal flaw with the view.
A second potential difficulty is one which was mentioned earlier
and in another context. It concerns the M* relation. The difficulty is
that this relation has not yet been satisfactorily specified. The
of a psychological person was specified by appeal to the M*
relation; thus, the crucial notion of a psychological person remains
obscure. And the ultimately worth of the view in question depends, in
part, on the coherency of this notion.
Finally, I have said little here about the notion of a person -
itage, that is, a temporal person part
. For this reason, the
definitions given in this chapter are incomplete.
Concl usions
The difficulties raised above against the view TF do not present
reason enough to reject the view. They, rather, indicate the need for
further work in specific areas.
TF is vulnerable to its own unique set of objections. It may
well ultimately come to seem unacceptable. Nonetheless, the fact that
such a view can be constructed, one which is not obviously incoherent
or entirely implausible, suffices to show that one is not, after all,
forced by logic to reject any of the basic intuitions, (Al) through
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(A3), listed above, or the coherency of the concept or concepts
associated with the word ••person." stronger support than this may be
given here in favor of TF TaHnr. ..
g person as unambiguous, given (Al)
through (A3) and the possibility of fission, leads one irredeemably
into contradict, on.14 And rejecting as incoherent the notion the word
"person" unambiguously expresses-if such exists-leads one to
absurdity of a different sort; for obviously it is sensible to say, of
certain objects, that they are persons. The view sketched above-or
one very much like It— Is clearly preferable to either of these alter-
natives.
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